COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SYG REQUESTS USG HELP TO HIRE

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000519 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2016 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SYG REQUESTS USG HELP TO HIRE TECHNOCRATS REF: BAGHDAD 444 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On February 13, the day after the United Iraqi Coalition (UIC) nominated Ibrahim Jafari for Prime Minister, Council of Ministers Secretary-General (SYG) Emad Dhia al-Khirsan told PolOffs that Jafari knows there were weaknesses in his administration. Dhia said that he is trying to find ways to strengthen the office of the PM by strengthening the capacity of the Council of Ministers Secretariat (CoMSec). He asked the USG to fund a program by SIPDIS which Iraqi-American technocrats would work in the CoMSec's office to assist the PM in working effectively with the Iraqi ministries. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) On February 13, Council of Ministers Secretary-General (SYG) Emad Dhia al-Khirsan told PolOffs SIPDIS that Jafari recognizes weaknesses in his administration. Dhia, who was head of the CPA Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC),described how he had been recruited by PM Jafari as an economic adviser. Dhia was one many Iraqi-Americans who served in PM Jafari's office, and he implied that he helped balance out Dawa loyalists like Jawad al-Malaki and 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Tamimi -- who Dhia said had served with Jafari since opposition days and whose loyalty Jafari valued, but who did not have sufficient experience in management. Dhia said he also believes that Iraq needs a change in its governmental culture and that efficient and effective ministries are a key to success in Iraq both for Iraqi and for U.S. interests. Such a change will take years, he said, and needs to start with an infusion of the right kind of expertise. ¶3. (C) Dhia asked the USG to fund Iraqi-American professionals to come to work in the PM's office. Dhia also referred to the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) as an example of how Iraqi-Americans could improve organizational culture and capacity in Iraqi ministries. Dhia said he regards it as essential that the people brought in be fluent in Arabic, that they have practical professional or business experience in their areas of specialty, and that their heritage be Iraqi (since other Arabic nationalities would raise political sensitivities for the GOI). Initially, Dhia explained, about four or five Iraqi-Americans would be responsible for coordinating with three or four ministries each. He said he would like to see the program expand, if resources are available, in order to have one Iraqi-American in the PM's office responsible for tracking the work of each ministry. ¶4. (C) Dhia said he is requesting USG funding for the program because he does not believe the GOI could afford to hire Iraqi-Americans to work in Iraq. Dhia revealed that he was offered a salary of 1500 USD per month to be one of PM Jafari's top advisers -- generous by Iraqi standards (Iraqi university professors earn 600 USD a month). Dhia said that health insurance alone for his family in the United States is 1200 USD per month, and therefore works pro bono and is selling off his personal property in the United States to fund his service in Iraq. From his IRDC and Future of Iraq experience, Dhia said he knows that the USG could pay Iraqi-Americans at a rate of around 120,000 USD to 130,000 USD per year, as was done by the IRDC. Dhia offered to find housing in the International Zone for up to 40 people working under this program. (NOTE: Dhia's position as Council of Ministers SYG is colloquially referred to by many as the Mayor of the Green Zone. END NOTE.) Dhia noted that he does not envision a large support base for this operation, hinting that he has specific people in mind whom he would like to hire. Poloffs told Dhia that resources are an obvious concern and that this idea deserved further study. ¶6. (S) COMMENT: Jafari may be the leading candidate for PM, but he does not have the job yet. It is noteworthy that key aides such as Dhia are thinking of ways to improve the professionalism of the PM's office. Dhia and other Western-oriented aides to Jafari are not the only ones competing for Jafari's ear. If Jafari stays on as PM, he will need all the help the USG can give him -- in which case we would want to be in a position to support the effort to improve the quality of his staff. Indeed, we should move immediately to have a program ready to implement irrespective of who emerges as PM, on the assumption that it will be somebody with whom we can work. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD