LEADERS OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION DISCUSS "NATIONAL

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: LEADERS OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION DISCUSS "NATIONAL
SALVATION FRONT"


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The leaders of the Kurdistan Alliance, Sunni
Arab Tawafuq list, and Allawi's Iraqiyya List met on February
16 and agreed to work to form a united front to change the
balance of power in the government formation process. Their
first goal is a "National Salvation Front" that draws in
SCIRI and Fadhila, breaks the Shia alliance, and forms a
national unity government to block out extremists on all
sides. If that proves impossible, they will push for a
national unity government that puts tough constraints on
Jafari, possibly by demanding that Sadrists be kept out of
the cabinet. All sides decided to work speedily and in
parallel to win over SCIRI and Fadhila to the National
Salvation Front in the next two days. They held a joint
press conference backing the Salah al-Din Principles
following the meeting and agreed to reconvene on February 18.
They also agreed to convene the new Council of
Representatives without delay, most likely by February 25.
END SUMMARY.

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Salah Al-Din Principles Affirmed
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2. (S) The leaders of the Kurdistan Alliance, Sunni Arab
Tawafuq list, and Allawi's Iraqiyya List met on February 16
and agreed to work to form a united front to change the
balance of power in the government formation process. The
meeting, which took place at President Jalal Talabani's
residence, closed with a press conference in which all sides
present voiced their support for the Salah al-Din Principles,
i.e. a national unity government characterized by
non-sectarian professional ministers and a national security
council to bring all sides together on key policy decisions.
Talabani warned that the Shia coalition seemed to be
operating under the illusion that it possessed a majority in
parliament and needed to be woken up.

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A National Salvation Front
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3. (S) All sides present agreed with Barzani's suggestion
that they form a "National Salvation Front" along with SCIRI
and the Fadhila Party, but they remained unsure whether this
would be possible. Such a bloc would be able to complete the
government formation process on its own and set Iraqi
politics on a cross-sectarian track that drives out
extremists like the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr and some
neo-Ba'athist Sunni Arabs in the parliament. All agreed that
they had nothing less than a historic opportunity. Even
Talabani, still smarting from his ally Adel Abd al-Mahdi's
defeat, paraphrased a Quranic verse to the Ambassador and
acknowledged, "'One may hate something that is in fact good
for him.'" Talabani suggested that the Kurds put the idea of
a "National Salvation Front" forward publicly as their own
and call upon the Sunni Arabs and Shia coalition to study it.
Such a step would avoid giving the Shia the impression that
the plan was hatched against them.


4. (S) The group decided to meet again on February 18 after
working in parallel to draw out SCIRI and Fadhila,
particularly following Hakim's return from consultations with
the Marja'iya in Najaf. Talabani said he believed that SCIRI
and Fadhila would agree to secretly support a new front but
might stop short of breaking with the Shia alliance.
Barzani rejected that idea, warning it could lead to a
showdown with the Shia alliance and fail to produce any
change in the government process except ill-will with Jafari.
SCIRI had to make a historic decision, he argued, and now
was the time to do it. Talabani added that most kidnappings
and assassinations in Iraq were being perpetrated by the
Mahdi Army, not the Badr Corps, and the Sadrists were the
enemy that needed to be eliminated.

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Still Considering Working With Jafari
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5. (S) Allawi, Barzani and Talabani told the Ambassador in a
smaller meeting following the roundtable talks that they
could ultimately choose a different track if a National
Salvation Front never materializes. In that case they would
work to stand by the Salah al-Din Principles and set tough
conditions on any future alliance in a Jafari government.
Barzani argued that they should demand that Sadrists be
excluded completely from any future governing alliance.
Talabani and Allawi both nodded at that demand, describing
the Sadrists as "murderers and criminals" who were aiming to

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destroy Iraq, not build it up. Talabani said he believed
Iranian policy had taken a dangerous turn in Iraq following
the start of the showdown over its nuclear development
program. Iran, he warned, has now decided to work with
extremists like the Sadrists to destabilize the country
permanently.
KHALILZAD