Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD501
2006-02-17 08:32:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

LEADERS OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION DISCUSS "NATIONAL

Tags:  PGOV KDEM IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0668
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0501/01 0480832
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 170832Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2754
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000501 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: LEADERS OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION DISCUSS "NATIONAL
SALVATION FRONT"


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000501 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: LEADERS OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION DISCUSS "NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT" Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The leaders of the Kurdistan Alliance, Sunni Arab Tawafuq list, and Allawi's Iraqiyya List met on February 16 and agreed to work to form a united front to change the balance of power in the government formation process. Their first goal is a "National Salvation Front" that draws in SCIRI and Fadhila, breaks the Shia alliance, and forms a national unity government to block out extremists on all sides. If that proves impossible, they will push for a national unity government that puts tough constraints on Jafari, possibly by demanding that Sadrists be kept out of the cabinet. All sides decided to work speedily and in parallel to win over SCIRI and Fadhila to the National Salvation Front in the next two days. They held a joint press conference backing the Salah al-Din Principles following the meeting and agreed to reconvene on February 18. They also agreed to convene the new Council of Representatives without delay, most likely by February 25. END SUMMARY. -------------- Salah Al-Din Principles Affirmed -------------- ¶2. (S) The leaders of the Kurdistan Alliance, Sunni Arab Tawafuq list, and Allawi's Iraqiyya List met on February 16 and agreed to work to form a united front to change the balance of power in the government formation process. The meeting, which took place at President Jalal Talabani's residence, closed with a press conference in which all sides present voiced their support for the Salah al-Din Principles, i.e. a national unity government characterized by non-sectarian professional ministers and a national security council to bring all sides together on key policy decisions. Talabani warned that the Shia coalition seemed to be operating under the illusion that it possessed a majority in parliament and needed to be woken up. -------------- A National Salvation Front -------------- ¶3. (S) All sides present agreed with Barzani's suggestion that they form a "National Salvation Front" along with SCIRI and the Fadhila Party, but they remained unsure whether this would be possible. Such a bloc would be able to complete the government formation process on its own and set Iraqi politics on a cross-sectarian track that drives out extremists like the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr and some neo-Ba'athist Sunni Arabs in the parliament. All agreed that they had nothing less than a historic opportunity. Even Talabani, still smarting from his ally Adel Abd al-Mahdi's defeat, paraphrased a Quranic verse to the Ambassador and acknowledged, "'One may hate something that is in fact good for him.'" Talabani suggested that the Kurds put the idea of a "National Salvation Front" forward publicly as their own and call upon the Sunni Arabs and Shia coalition to study it. Such a step would avoid giving the Shia the impression that the plan was hatched against them. ¶4. (S) The group decided to meet again on February 18 after working in parallel to draw out SCIRI and Fadhila, particularly following Hakim's return from consultations with the Marja'iya in Najaf. Talabani said he believed that SCIRI and Fadhila would agree to secretly support a new front but might stop short of breaking with the Shia alliance. Barzani rejected that idea, warning it could lead to a showdown with the Shia alliance and fail to produce any change in the government process except ill-will with Jafari. SCIRI had to make a historic decision, he argued, and now was the time to do it. Talabani added that most kidnappings and assassinations in Iraq were being perpetrated by the Mahdi Army, not the Badr Corps, and the Sadrists were the enemy that needed to be eliminated. -------------- Still Considering Working With Jafari -------------- ¶5. (S) Allawi, Barzani and Talabani told the Ambassador in a smaller meeting following the roundtable talks that they could ultimately choose a different track if a National Salvation Front never materializes. In that case they would work to stand by the Salah al-Din Principles and set tough conditions on any future alliance in a Jafari government. Barzani argued that they should demand that Sadrists be excluded completely from any future governing alliance. Talabani and Allawi both nodded at that demand, describing the Sadrists as "murderers and criminals" who were aiming to BAGHDAD 00000501 002 OF 002 destroy Iraq, not build it up. Talabani said he believed Iranian policy had taken a dangerous turn in Iraq following the start of the showdown over its nuclear development program. Iran, he warned, has now decided to work with extremists like the Sadrists to destabilize the country permanently. KHALILZAD

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