Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD498
2006-02-16 21:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ZEBARI SAYS JAFARI DOES NOT HAVE LOCK ON

Tags:  PGOV PNAT KDEM 
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VZCZCXRO0190
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0498/01 0472119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 162119Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2747
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000498 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM
SUBJECT: ZEBARI SAYS JAFARI DOES NOT HAVE LOCK ON
PREMIERSHIP; HAKIM VISITS NAJAF, BUT MARJAIYA POSITION
UNCLEAR

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000498 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM SUBJECT: ZEBARI SAYS JAFARI DOES NOT HAVE LOCK ON PREMIERSHIP; HAKIM VISITS NAJAF, BUT MARJAIYA POSITION UNCLEAR Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY FM Zebari told PolCouns February 16 that Jafari does not have a lock on the premiership, although Zebari doubted SCIRI and Fadhila would leave the Shia Coalition as that would be contrary to the wishes of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. SCIRI Chief of Staff Haitham al-Husseini, told PolOff February 16 that Abd al-Aziz al- Hakim has not yet made a decision on SCIRI's next move. Hussein said that, whatever decision Hakim makes, it would have the backing of the Marjaiya. He did not indicate whether Grand Ayatollah Sistani had given Hakim any indication of support for a break with Jafari during Hakim's February 15-16 visit to Najaf. We now see at least three tracks of talks underway. One is between the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds; another is between the Shia and the Kurds; a third is between the Kurds and the Allawi-Sunni Arab group. There are also talks between SCIRI and Fadhilah and the Sunni Arabs, although we do not know if those have touched on program or identified minister candidates. In other February 16 conversations, PolOffs heard that Jafari has convened meetings with Sunnis and Kurds concerning government formation. A second track of talks, meanwhile, is underway between the Kurdish Alliance, Allawi and Tawafuq. Shia "independent" Shatha al-Mousawi told PolOff that Allawi should be excluded from the government of national unity. Kurdish political leader Arif Taifour told PolOff that the Kirkuk issue must be satisfactorily addressed in the new government's program and that the Kurdistan Alliance would seek to keep the positions of President, Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Speaker (which Taifour held in the TNA) and Foreign Minister. END SUMMARY -------------- Zebari: Jafari Prospects Uncertain -------------- ¶2. (C) In a February 16 meeting, Foreign Minister Zebari told PolCouns that Ibrahim Jafari does not yet have a lock on the premiership. Zebari reported that on February 15 Adil Abd al-Madhi had sought his advice on whether or not the Kurds would join with SCIRI, Fadhila, Tawafuq and Allawi to block Jafari's PM nomination. Zebari said he told Abd al-Madhi that the Kurds might join, but only after SCIRI and Fadhila break with the Shia Coaliti
on. The Kurds would not move ahead of SCIRI, Zebari cautioned; they do not want to appear to be forcing a confrontation with the Shia Islamist Coalition. Zebari was confident that no move would be made until SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim returned from his February 15-16 trip to Najaf. Zebari said he doubted that the Najaf clerical establishment led by Ayatollah Sistani would want to break up the Shia Islamist Coalition by letting SCIRI and Fashilah break ranks. SCIRI and Fadhilah would not quit the Coalition against Najaf's wishes, Zebari believed. ¶3. (C) Zebari reported that the Kurds have already met four times with the Shia Coalition separately to discuss government programs and ministerial selection rules. He said that they will meet next week to finalize these plans. Zebari described the upcoming government negotiations between parties as confusing. He said to expect more than a four-way negotiation, because it was still unclear which Sunni Arabs would be representing which groups. For example, the Iraqi Islamic Party might launch quiet, separate negotiations on its own. He said that when the Kurds met with the Tawafuq negotiating team on February 14, Allawi supporters Rasim al-Awadi and Adnan al-Janabi were present. According to Zebari, Sunni Arab negotiators Abdel Nasser al-Janabi and Mahmud Mashadani told both the Kurds and the Allawi delegates that the Sunni Arabs would "coordinate" with the Allawi team but that they were not an integrated team. ¶4. (C) Zebari said that the Sadrist member of the Shia negotiating team, Qusay as-Suheil, still is arguing against the inclusion of the Allawi list in the unity government. Qusay has argued that the parliament will need an opposition and the Allawi group could be it. The Kurds are responding that the Shia, Sunni Arabs and Kurds should conclude a government program amongst themselves and then present it to the Allawi team if they would like to sign on and join the unity government as well. Zebari noted that it would be much easier for the Kurds, who want to get Allawi in the unity government and are arguing with the Sadrists, if the Sunni Arabs and the BAGHDAD 00000498 002 OF 003 Allawi group would unify into a single bloc. -------------- Najaf's Position Unclear -------------- ¶5. (C) SCIRI Chief of Staff Haitham al-Husseini, told PolOff February 16 that Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has not yet made a decision on SCIRI's next move. Husseini said that, whatever decision Hakim makes, it would have the backing of the Marjaiya. He did not indicate whether Grand Ayatollah Sistani had given Hakim any indication of support for a break with Jafari during Hakim's February 15-16 visit to Najaf. He told PolCouns late February 16 that Sistani had promised to back al-Hakim. (Comment: we sense that it may, in fact, be the reverse. Hakim may take no decision that would not have the backing of Najaf. End Comment.) -------------- Sunnis Talk with Jafari -------------- ¶6. (C) Salih Mutlak told PolOff February 16 that he had met with Jafari the preceding day. Mutalk said the PM had sought his advice on how to achieve a united Iraq, but had not offered him a job. Mutlak said that Ja'fari is confident that he can form a government. Sheykh Fahran Sadeed, a Sunni leader from Salah al-Din who ran in Mutlak's coalition, also was summoned to Jafari for a similar discussion. Sadeed told PolOff February 16 that Jafari has a better than 50-50 chance of forming the government. Mutlak, Sadeed and Allawi ally Saad Janabi individually also told PolOff February 16 that they would meet with Jabiri in the coming days. Tariq al-Hashimi told PolOff on February 16 that talks among the Kurds, Allawi and Tawafuq on a joint negotiating position are going well. -------------- Shia Independent Considers Allawi a Red-line -------------- ¶7. (C) In a February 16 meeting, a self-declared Shia Coalition independent Shatha Mosa Sadiq al-Mousawi expressed her disdain for Ayad Allawi, insisting that he be excluded from the new unity government. "Dr. Allawi only represents himself and has no connection with the Iraqi people," asserted Mousawi. She said several of her Independent colleagues side with the Sadrists who believe that Allawi will bring Ba'athists back into government. She added that Allawi abandoned many of the people who had campaigned for him. (She mentioned Saad Saleh Jabr and Rend Rahim.) Mousawi said that Allawi coalition member Hamid Moussa of the Iraqi Communist Party was duped into doing most of Allawi's campaign work - a thankless task. ¶8. (C) Mousawi told PolOff that there should be no National Security Council created that would undermine the authority of the Council of Representatives. She predicted that Nadim al-Jabiri's bid to leave the Shia Coalition is untenable because Najaf would not allow it. She said she resented the Embassy's Sunni outreach efforts and our insistence on including Allawi. She warned that many Iraqis perceive an Embassy change in policy that is a slap in the Shia face. PolOff stressed the importance to the U.S. of having a unity government that represents Iraqis and is made up of competent national leaders. -------------- -------------- ARIF TAIFOUR: KIRKUK IS A RED-LINE FOR KURDISH ALLIANCE -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) In a February 16 meeting with PolOff, Deputy TNA Speaker Arif Taifour identified the issue of Kirkuk as a red-line for the Kurdish Alliance. They will not negotiate with any party if this is not part of the government program. He said the Kurdish Alliance is negotiating independently with the different parties and not as part of larger bloc. (Comment: Zebari confirmed this. End Comment.) He estimated that it would take 45 days to form the government and said the Kurdish Alliance negotiating team will remain in Baghdad until the talks are complete. He stated that specific names for government positions have not yet been discussed in the negotiations, but that the Kurdish Alliance would like to keep the positions of President, Deputy Prime Minister, BAGHDAD 00000498 003 OF 003 Deputy Speaker, and Foreign Minister. He said the Kurds do not differentiate between Shia and Sunni Arabs and therefore consider themselves to be the second largest group in Iraq. They feel entitled, therefore, to either the Presidency or Prime Ministership. ¶10. (C) Taifour told PolOff that he had heard a report that the U.S. wanted a Sunni Arab to be President of Iraq in lieu of Jalal Talabani. He said he hoped this was not true. PolOff responded that the choice of government leaders would be Iraq's, not the USG's. Taifour said the Kurdish Alliance is in favor of the national security council idea. When asked whether the Kurdish Alliance will push for more executive powers for the Presidency, he answered that this will largely depend on the outcome of the negotiations on the national security council. If the council has executive powers, then the Kurdish Alliance may not push for increased presidential executive powers. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Unlike the two-way discussions between the Shia and Kurds in the spring of 2005, this time the government formation talks are much more complicated. We have identified at least three active tracks: (a) a Shia List 555 discussions with the Kurds that is making some progress on a program; (b) a Sunni Arab/Allawi dialog with the Kurds to create a list larger than the List 555 list - this one is waiting to see whether SCIRI and Fadhilah jump out of the List 555; (c) Sunni Arab/Allawi/Kurd group talking to SCIRI and Fadhilah about a possible grand coalition. We have also heard of discussions between Shia Islamists to engage with Sunni Arab Islamists, but so far the Sunni Arab Islamists seem not too interested in a separate deal with their Shia brothers. KHALILZAD

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