DPM CHALABI ON OIL MINISTRY CORRUPTION AND KURDISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000495 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET KCOR MARR MOPS PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: DPM CHALABI ON OIL MINISTRY CORRUPTION AND KURDISH "SAFE HAVEN" COMMENTS REF: A. BAGHDAD 0405 ¶B. 2005 BAGHDAD 4309 ¶C. BAGHDAD 0212 Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (C/REL GBR AUS) Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi, newly provided with expanded authority over the energy sector, is wrestling for results with the military and civilian bureaucracies. On other subjects, Chalabi cited a recent comment by Kurdish Regional President Mas'ud Barzani offering the KRG as a "safe haven" to indicted former Minister of Defense Hazem Sha'lan, told Economic Minister Counselor February 12 said that Committee for Public Integrity (CPI) chief Judge Hamza al-Radhi is coming under increasing political pressure. Chalabi said that he thought politically-motivated manipulation of contracts at the Ministry of Oil (MoO) might be a short-lived problem, since widespread dissatisfaction with Fadhila's performance thus far at MoO made it unlikely they would maintain control in the new government. End Summary. -------------- Party-based Corruption at MoO -------------- ¶2. (C/REL GBR AUS) In a meeting with Economic Minister Counselor February 12, Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi was already well-versed with the accusations of Fadhila Party-initiated corrupt activity at the Ministry of Oil (reftel). Calling the attempts to manipulate contracts for the financial benefit of the Fadhila Party "outrageous," Chalabi said he had asked Prime Minister Ja'fari to rein in his coalition allies. EconMinCouns recommended that PM Ja'fari send written instructions to Acting Minister of Oil Hashem al-Hashemi ordering him to refrain from undertaking any additional financial obligations at MoO during the current "caretaker" government. Chalabi accepted a joint U.S.-UK paper with points the PM might include in his instructions, but said he thought the problem was one that might eventually solve itself: widespread GOI dissatisfaction with Fadhila's performance to date at MoO made it unlikely the party would retain control of that ministry in the next government. If the problem persists, however, Chalabi recommended that the Ambassador follow-up directly with PM Ja'fari, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, and 'Adil abd al-Mahdi. -------------- CPI Under Pressure -------------- ¶3. (C/REL GBR AUS) What Chalabi described as an even more urgent issue was the increasing pressure being exerted on Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) head Judge Hamza al-Radhi. In response, we informed him that three of the five investigative judges at CPI recently submitted their resignations due to threats and intimidation directed at them and their families. Furthermore, Kurdistan Regional President Mas'ud Barzani had announced in an interview aired February 10 on al-Iraqiya television that "Kurdistan is open for anyone who is pursued for political reasons and who seeks protection," referring to former Minister of Defense Hazem Sha'lan who Barzani said is "under Kurdish protection." In the interview, Barzani says that the corruption case against Sha'lan is "part of a settling of political accounts," and that "the measures taken are unjust and not legal." Chalabi urged the U.S. to speak out against Barzani's claims that the Kurdish region is a safe haven and that the corruption case against Sha'lan (involving more than $1 billion in contracts that cannot be properly accounted for - see ref B) is politically motivated. -------------- Working on Fuel Situation -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On Iraq's increasingly difficult fuel situation, Chalabi said that an Iraqi delegation charged with striking a deal with the Turks to pay arrears over time and limit monthly imports to a set amount paid only by letters of credit was on the ground in Ankara. Chalabi said that Iraq's first tender to purchase 1.5 million tons of gasoline had driven up the offering price from $193 million to $204 million from Iraq's normal suppliers. "We will buy (elsewhere) at a lower price," Chalabi said. -------------- BAGHDAD 00000495 002 OF 002 "Warlord" Chalabi -------------- ¶5. (C/REL GBR AUS) Invited to join Chalabi's ongoing meeting with Ministry of Defense (MoD) and MNF-I officials, we observed Chalabi flexing his muscles under the recently issued letter empowering him to take all measures necessary to assure that oil and fuel products are available (ref C). Chalabi, despite having no direct sway over Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),has clear views on what he would like to see the Iraqi forces do -- and, equally clearly, remains frustrated in what he views as his efforts to get results. For example, Chalabi pointed out that the battle space of no less than four Iraqi Army divisions all converged in an area north of Baghdad where many attacks on infrastructure occur. The perpetrators, Chalabi said, are using the lack of coordination across divisional boundaries to evade capture. When Iraqi Army Chief of Staff LTG Abadi asserted that this was not the case and that the units were operationally integrated, Chalabi was dismissive: "We can't continue to call the operation successful when the patient is dead." ¶6. (C/REL GBR AUS) In another pointed observation, Chalabi accused MoD of looking at infrastructure security as an "auxiliary mission," rather than "the thing we must win." Chalabi said that Salahadeen, a province "manufactured" by Saddam, is home to much of the country's natural wealth (including 60% of Iraq's refining capacity at Bayji) and also its insurgent activity. This concentration of wealth and forces uniquely positions the province to starve or otherwise threaten Baghdad, Chalabi said, adding that the disposition of Iraqi forces, spread as they are across the country - even in areas where there is little or no insurgent activity - is too diffuse to be effective in the areas where they are most needed. -------------- Pot Calling the Kettle Black -------------- ¶7. (C/REL GBR AUS) Comment: Chalabi himself has often been accused of graft and corruption, including doing from October 2003 through May 2004 exactly what he said Fadhila is doing. Many in the political leadership have reservations about making him a minister because of it -- even while some acknowledge that he is a very competent manager. While we do not argue against Chalabi's stance on Sha'lan, it should be noted that Chalabi is hardly an impartial bystander in this issue. His rocky relationship with his cousin and political rival, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, colors his reaction to anything connected with Allawi and his administration. Finally, we note Chalabi's observations on "deficiencies" in the posture of the security forces -- an area in which he can request and advise, but has no operational control -- seem to come at the expense of focusing his attention on areas where he is authorized to act: within the Ministries of Oil and Electricity where he could be pushing, for example, Inspectors General to act more aggressively to root out corrupt officials responsible for both corruption and sabotage. KHALILZAD