BABIL PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004772 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: BABIL PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Summary: Babil is a Shi'a majority province, with a significant disenfranchised Sunni population. The province lacks respected leaders and, as in other parts of Iraq, has witnessed a marked increase in religious extremism and militia activity. Iraqi Army personnel staffed entirely from other provinces could help reduce corruption and sectarianism. Improved government services could increase respect for and faith in provincial government institutions. This is one of a series of analyses by Provincial Reconstruction Teams on each governate of Iraq. End summary. -------------- POLITICAL ISSUES -------------- ¶2. (C) Babil is a unique province within the Shia-dominated south central region because it has a large number of Sunni citizens residing in the north half of the province; this dynamic brings forth a number of issues. One of the top problems is a lack of Sunni participation, due to the Sunni election boycott in 2005. Recently, the Sunnis have expressed great interest in trying to become part of the political process; however, the province,s current leaders are not looking for ways to make this happen and are continually trying to remove what little Sunni presence does exist within the government, such as within the Babil security forces. ¶3. (C) The Province is also troubled by a surfeit of professional or respected leaders. The Governor of Babil claims to have received a degree from an Islamic theological institution in Tehran. However, the citizenry believes that the Governor only completed the fourth grade, and therefore he is seen as incompetent and ineffective. Regardless of his education history the Governor, who claims to be independent, receives tremendous support from the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),which has kept him in power. Under the quiet auspices of SCIRI, the Governor continually discredits his non-partisan colleagues within the Babil security forces and ministerial branches and uses his &popular committees8 as militant neighborhood watch groups to carry out his message. ¶4. (C) Also heavily supported by SCIRI, the Babil Provincial Council is also viewed by the citizenry as a corrupt, self-serving entity. From assisting the Governor in attacking non-partisan colleagues to strategically using provincial funds for projects that serve only its sympathizers, the PC adds fuel to the fire of discontent among the populace, who sees this governing body as another mechanism for Iranian control. ¶5. (C) As in many other parts of the country, Babil has also witnessed increasing religious extremism and growing sectarian violence: Although the presence of both Jaysh al-Mahdi and al Qa,ida is relatively low in Babil as compared to its neighbors, the sectarian violence around the province is steadily increasing, notably in the Sunni-dominated north. One of the contributing factors to this increase is the constant use of Shia police forces in Sunni areas under the orders of the Governor; as a result, the number of internally displaced persons and retaliatory actions has also risen to new levels. As the violence escalates, tribal sheikhs around the province are removing themselves from the political process and are taking up arms to protect their members. -------------- ECONOMIC ISSUES -------------- ¶6. (C) In what was a thriving center of agri-business, Babil,s economy has grown stagnant and now depends on importing a large majority of its major staples. Due to this stagnation, few new jobs are being created, young, eager Iraqis are becoming discouraged, and unemployment figures are rising. Unfortunately, this slowing economy has not prevented the price of fuel, when available, to steadily rise and ushered forth a sizeable black market and Iranian infiltration of services. BAGHDAD 00004772 002 OF 003 -------------- SECURITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Primary security concerns include the strength of Shia's militias and threats to ISF leaders, which have corresponded with increasing sectarian violence. ¶8. (C) In an attempt to give SCIRI a new, cleaner image, its militant wing, the Badr Corps, changed its name to the Badr Organization and is said to be geared toward public service. However, this change has not prevented SCIRI from organizing a new militant wing through its &popular committees.8 According to the Governor, these groups are supposed to be his &eyes and ears8 throughout the province, providing intelligence on matters in areas where he feels that the police presence is weak, but these committees have been associated with much of the sectarian violence in the north. In addition, Jaysh al-Mahdi,s presence is also growing within Babil, and it is taking credit for several attacks on USG convoys and indirect fire attacks on Regional Embassy Office Al-Hillah. ¶9. (C) Constantly working in fear of termination or assassination, the Babil ISF leaders use non-sectarian discretion in keeping the province out of the hands of the enemy. However, those leaders within the province who hold the power are constantly attempting to remove the current IP Chief for Babil, who is the only IP Chief within the region who has not been replaced since the January 2005 elections. In addition, the former Hillah SWAT Leader was assassinated in his office after several attempts were made to have him removed from office or arrested on trumped-up charges. -------------- KEY POLITICAL FIGURES -------------- ¶10. (C) Governor Salem Saleh Medhi al-Muslimawi: As the former head of SCIRI for Babil, the Governor claims to be independent, but he remains greatly tied to SCIRI and its direction. He has also been very unhelpful on matters of interest to the USG and Coalition forces, including reconstruction efforts and personal security concerns of the PRT. He is advised by two strong SCIRI political players: Ali Kadhum Kashash al-Kaseer and Abu Ali al-Isawi. ¶11. (C) Provincial Council Chairman Mohammad Ali Hussein al-Masoudi: The PC Chair also claims to be independent; however, he is also well connected with SCIRI. He is prone to be critical of the USG efforts in the reconstruction realm and is very easily insulted. ¶12. (C) Deputy Governor Hasoon Ali Hasoon: Similar to the Governor and the PC Chair, the Deputy Governor also claims to be independent but is connected to SCIRI. However, he has been known to disagree with the Governor on certain matters, such as the removal of the IP Chief, and has shown interest in better engagement with the PRT. ¶13. (C) IP Chief General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Mamouri: General Qais has proven time and time again to be a solid, trustworthy friend of the Babil PRT and a dedicated officer for Babil. Because he is non-sectarian, he is able to do his job without bias for one group over another, which contributes to the numerous attempts to have him removed from his position or assassinated. ¶14. (C) Hillah Mayor Imad Lefta al-Bayati: Mayor Lefta is also committed to the mission and is helpful when asked. However, he is also very passive and continues to wait for USG movements on trying to save the &moderates8 within Iraq. ¶15. (C) Chief Provincial Judge A,ad Hatif Jabbar: Judge A,ad is also dedicated to the PRT and has been a strong ally when judicial or legal matters arise. Similar to General Qais, A,ad also takes a non-sectarian approach to his job, which makes him unpopular with the Governor and Provincial Council and a target at times by militant groups. ¶16. (C) Sayyid Farqad Al-Husseini Al-Qazwini: A pro-CF Shia cleric who heads the Democratic Independent Iraqi Gathering. He has a radio station and a small university in the center of Al-Hillah. He is not as influential today as in CPA days. BAGHDAD 00004772 003 OF 003 ¶17. (C) Dr. Ali Ibrahim: Head of Iraqi Communist Party in Babil; Ali Hassan Jabur: Head of the Da,wa party in Babil; and Sheikh Muhanad: A Sadrist who encourages the informal, but deadly, shari,a courts and JAM intimidation. ¶18. (C) Sunni Tribal Leaders: Ahmed Aboob al-Janabi ) well-known follower of Saddam; Sheikh Muhammad Fatih ) leader of the biggest Sunni mosque in Babil; Mohammad Naif Qesab al-Jindeel ) former Iraqi Army Commander and supporter of Sunni insurgent activities in the north. -------------- COMMENT: PROPOSED STEPS FORWARD -------------- ¶19. (S) In the view of PRT Babil, one key toward achieving security and stability would be steps to ensure that as many IA personnel as possible in Babil are not from the province and that they obey given orders. Furthermore, provincial elections must be held, although this is a risky request in light of SCIRI,s power; Sunni participation in the government is critical. It is also imperative to recruit, train, and deploy more Sunni IP officers within the Babil IP, and these officers need to be placed in the Sunni north where they can retain control in an area where they are respected. In that the lack of basic services adds to the instability and frustration of the province, a speedy restoration of such services is an essential step in bringing stability. Finally, the province needs leaders who avoid party politics and who directly address growing levels of violence and reconstruction needs. SCOBEY