Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4767
2006-12-30 01:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
KARBALA PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,
how-toVZCZCXRO7020 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #4767/01 3640135 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 300135Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8827 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004767
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: KARBALA PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004767
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: KARBALA PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) Summary: Karbala, like nearby Najaf, is home to a
number of Shi'a religious sites and has become an important
tourist destination. Four Shi'a parties control local
politics. The JAM is increasing in power. The province
recently transferred from CF Control to Provincial Iraqi
Control (PIC),although some local officials feel the
province was not ready. A physical PRT presence could
strengthen relations with provincial officials. Moderate
political players could increase their influence in the
province with U.S. support. This is one of a series of
cables by Provincial Reconstruction Teams analyzing the
governates of Iraq. End summary.
--------------
POLITICAL ISSUES
--------------
2. (C) The four main parties in Karbala are SCIRI, Da,awa,
Islamic Virtue and Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) have begun
vying for prominence with regard to reconstruction efforts.
While the Governor Aqeel Al Khazali (Da,awa) is a force
within the province and a strong Governor, his power is
largely due to the largesse of the more powerful Islamist
parties (SCIRI and OMS). Karbala province has seen no open
signs of campaigning or open jockeying for power for new
provincial elections, if they occur in 2007.
3. (C) The Governor Al Khazali considers himself one of the
more prominent political figures in the region. He has been
somewhat problematic in his dealings with the Coalition. At
times he has cancelled or cut short Provincial Reconstruction
Development Committee (PRDC) meetings at his whim. This
sense of importance is likely the result of his feeling that
he needs to present a strong image of himself and his party.
It is relatively well known that Da,awa is dwindling in
power within the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and Al Khazali
governorship is important in the long term for the health of
the party.
4. (C) In a recent raid in Najaf a leading Sadrist, Sahib Al
Amiri, was killed. It was a joint IA/CF raid. This occurred
one week post-Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in the province
and produced a strong reaction by some local authorities,
including the deputy governor, who called for an end to CF
activities in the Province. Others provincial leaders felt
that PIC may be coming too early for the province.
5. (C) Karbala continues to deal with the issue of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). There are approximately
8000 families on the IDP register. There are an estimated
2000 more that have not been documented. The governor
considers the 2000 undocumented families to be a strain on
resources in the province. There has been an effort to
identify and repatriate these families to their homes either
in or north of Baghdad.
--------------
ECONOMIC ISSUES
--------------
6. (C) The Karbala economy is based largely on tourism, as
there a number of Shi'a holy sites in the province. It is
very similar to Najaf. Once Najaf,s opens a regional
airport, Karbala can count on a surge in religious pilgrims.
The effort to accommodate the influx of pilgrims is nascent
at this point, but there are talks underway to provide hotels
and restaurants for the surge. As a province, despite the
somewhat contentious relationship between the governor and
the PRDC there has been success in the reconstruction arena.
The governor is eager to exert full control of projects.
There is de facto provincial control of reconstruction, but
even minimal CF involvement causes the governor to bristle.
The new PRT has done a good job of connecting with the
provincial government and showing how their expertise can
enhance the effort. There is a good working relationship.
7. (C) The shortage of fuel in the province is of major
concern. This is a problem throughout Iraq, but with the
large population of IDP,s in the province it puts a
BAGHDAD 00004767 002 OF 003
particular strain on resources. Prices for fuel are high and
availability, except on the black market is low. Food rations
are suffering the same fate as fuel. The ability to feed the
citizens and IDP,s in the province is under great strain.
Obviously, undocumented IDP families receive no rations or
assistance other than that of local family members who are
citizens of Karbala. This is an invisible tax on families
willing to help fellow displaced Shia.
--------------
SECURITY
--------------
8. (C) The Province has a relatively new IP chief. Abu Al
Waleed was chosen by the central government to be the IP
chief of Karbala. This has caused some degree of friction
between his office and the Provincial Council who tend to
believe that they know best what sort of IP Chief the
province needs. Al Waleed arrived with some level of
notoriety for his work as the commander of the Wolf brigade
in Al Anbar province. Some people have seen his tactics as
heavy handed and others simply consider them effective.
9. (C) Al Waleed has brought in some of his colleagues from
outside the province and seems intent on fighting crime. It
is very early in his tenure and he has not taken on Jaysh Al
Mahdi (JAM) and it remains to be seen if that is his
intention. It must be remembered that much of the
&security8 that Governor Al Khazali enjoys comes from OMS
and by extension JAM.
--------------
KEY POLITICAL FIGURES
--------------
10. (S) Hamid Qunoosh: PC Member Karbala and Deputy head of
the Integrity Committee. Qunoosh is a very active member of
the security committee. He is considered a radical Sadrist.
He was allegedly a member of the force that fought CF in
Najaf in 2004. He has the grudging respect of PC members and
the Governor. (Probably as a result of fear as much as
anything else.)
11. (C) Akrum Al Zubaidi: Head of the Integrity Committee.
Al Zubaidi is anti-CF and someone who used to have a regular
Friday sermon in one of Karbala,s holy shrines. He is also
quite radical and is believed to be involved, at least
nominally, in Anti-Iraqi forces activity. His work on the
Integrity Committee has done little to move the province
forward.
12. (S) Jawad Al Hasnawi: Deputy Governor of Karbala. Al
Hasnawi enjoys the support of Muqtada Al Sadr and by
extension is very influential in the province. While Al
Khazali is the face of UIA, Hasnawi enjoys a real power to
affect the province. There is little question that his
relationship with Sadr puts him in position to change the
security and economic situation in Karbala. Thus far there
is little evidence that he has utilized his power in this
fashion.
13. (S) Abdul Al Yaseen Al Yasiri: PC Chairman Karbala. Al
Yasiri is an Islamist, but he is a follower of the Quietist
Hawza (Lead by Ayatollah SISTANI.) He has backed followers
of SISTANI in elections and will likely do the same in
upcoming elections. Though not a moderate by any stretch,
his relationship to the Marja,aya makes him predictable and
somewhat reasonable.
--------------
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD
--------------
14. (S) There is a real question about Karbala,s readiness
to go to PIC. While there are a number of strong
personalities, the work of the PRT has just begun. The PRT
will be able to sort out the actual leadership and players in
the province. It is obvious that a Da,awa governor in
Karbala is more a front than a reflection of political power.
That being said, an opportunity exists to bolster more
moderate forces.
15. (S) If there were a way for members of the PRT to be
located in the province it would make real a relationship
that has become somewhat hit or miss,. At this stage
development of a bureaucracy and the tourism industry are
BAGHDAD 00004767 003 OF 003
extremely important. Karbala is capable of being
self-sustaining with the appropriate tools. It is not a
long-term project as it is a strong province, but there are
still opportunities, with the right access to make a
difference.
16. (S) The potential for a thriving tourism industry will
help reduce violence. Efforts to forge as working
relationship between the PC and the IP Chief could also
facilitate improved security, by reducing suspicions between
the two and -- to the extent possible -- providing political
support for the IP's efforts against violence.
SCOBEY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: KARBALA PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD
Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) Summary: Karbala, like nearby Najaf, is home to a
number of Shi'a religious sites and has become an important
tourist destination. Four Shi'a parties control local
politics. The JAM is increasing in power. The province
recently transferred from CF Control to Provincial Iraqi
Control (PIC),although some local officials feel the
province was not ready. A physical PRT presence could
strengthen relations with provincial officials. Moderate
political players could increase their influence in the
province with U.S. support. This is one of a series of
cables by Provincial Reconstruction Teams analyzing the
governates of Iraq. End summary.
--------------
POLITICAL ISSUES
--------------
2. (C) The four main parties in Karbala are SCIRI, Da,awa,
Islamic Virtue and Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) have begun
vying for prominence with regard to reconstruction efforts.
While the Governor Aqeel Al Khazali (Da,awa) is a force
within the province and a strong Governor, his power is
largely due to the largesse of the more powerful Islamist
parties (SCIRI and OMS). Karbala province has seen no open
signs of campaigning or open jockeying for power for new
provincial elections, if they occur in 2007.
3. (C) The Governor Al Khazali considers himself one of the
more prominent political figures in the region. He has been
somewhat problematic in his dealings with the Coalition. At
times he has cancelled or cut short Provincial Reconstruction
Development Committee (PRDC) meetings at his whim. This
sense of importance is likely the result of his feeling that
he needs to present a strong image of himself and his party.
It is relatively well known that Da,awa is dwindling in
power within the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and Al Khazali
governorship is important in the long term for the health of
the party.
4. (C) In a recent raid in Najaf a leading Sadrist, Sahib Al
Amiri, was killed. It was a joint IA/CF raid. This occurred
one week post-Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in the province
and produced a strong reaction by some local authorities,
including the deputy governor, who called for an end to CF
activities in the Province. Others provincial leaders felt
that PIC may be coming too early for the province.
5. (C) Karbala continues to deal with the issue of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). There are approximately
8000 families on the IDP register. There are an estimated
2000 more that have not been documented. The governor
considers the 2000 undocumented families to be a strain on
resources in the province. There has been an effort to
identify and repatriate these families to their homes either
in or north of Baghdad.
--------------
ECONOMIC ISSUES
--------------
6. (C) The Karbala economy is based largely on tourism, as
there a number of Shi'a holy sites in the province. It is
very similar to Najaf. Once Najaf,s opens a regional
airport, Karbala can count on a surge in religious pilgrims.
The effort to accommodate the influx of pilgrims is nascent
at this point, but there are talks underway to provide hotels
and restaurants for the surge. As a province, despite the
somewhat contentious relationship between the governor and
the PRDC there has been success in the reconstruction arena.
The governor is eager to exert full control of projects.
There is de facto provincial control of reconstruction, but
even minimal CF involvement causes the governor to bristle.
The new PRT has done a good job of connecting with the
provincial government and showing how their expertise can
enhance the effort. There is a good working relationship.
7. (C) The shortage of fuel in the province is of major
concern. This is a problem throughout Iraq, but with the
large population of IDP,s in the province it puts a
BAGHDAD 00004767 002 OF 003
particular strain on resources. Prices for fuel are high and
availability, except on the black market is low. Food rations
are suffering the same fate as fuel. The ability to feed the
citizens and IDP,s in the province is under great strain.
Obviously, undocumented IDP families receive no rations or
assistance other than that of local family members who are
citizens of Karbala. This is an invisible tax on families
willing to help fellow displaced Shia.
--------------
SECURITY
--------------
8. (C) The Province has a relatively new IP chief. Abu Al
Waleed was chosen by the central government to be the IP
chief of Karbala. This has caused some degree of friction
between his office and the Provincial Council who tend to
believe that they know best what sort of IP Chief the
province needs. Al Waleed arrived with some level of
notoriety for his work as the commander of the Wolf brigade
in Al Anbar province. Some people have seen his tactics as
heavy handed and others simply consider them effective.
9. (C) Al Waleed has brought in some of his colleagues from
outside the province and seems intent on fighting crime. It
is very early in his tenure and he has not taken on Jaysh Al
Mahdi (JAM) and it remains to be seen if that is his
intention. It must be remembered that much of the
&security8 that Governor Al Khazali enjoys comes from OMS
and by extension JAM.
--------------
KEY POLITICAL FIGURES
--------------
10. (S) Hamid Qunoosh: PC Member Karbala and Deputy head of
the Integrity Committee. Qunoosh is a very active member of
the security committee. He is considered a radical Sadrist.
He was allegedly a member of the force that fought CF in
Najaf in 2004. He has the grudging respect of PC members and
the Governor. (Probably as a result of fear as much as
anything else.)
11. (C) Akrum Al Zubaidi: Head of the Integrity Committee.
Al Zubaidi is anti-CF and someone who used to have a regular
Friday sermon in one of Karbala,s holy shrines. He is also
quite radical and is believed to be involved, at least
nominally, in Anti-Iraqi forces activity. His work on the
Integrity Committee has done little to move the province
forward.
12. (S) Jawad Al Hasnawi: Deputy Governor of Karbala. Al
Hasnawi enjoys the support of Muqtada Al Sadr and by
extension is very influential in the province. While Al
Khazali is the face of UIA, Hasnawi enjoys a real power to
affect the province. There is little question that his
relationship with Sadr puts him in position to change the
security and economic situation in Karbala. Thus far there
is little evidence that he has utilized his power in this
fashion.
13. (S) Abdul Al Yaseen Al Yasiri: PC Chairman Karbala. Al
Yasiri is an Islamist, but he is a follower of the Quietist
Hawza (Lead by Ayatollah SISTANI.) He has backed followers
of SISTANI in elections and will likely do the same in
upcoming elections. Though not a moderate by any stretch,
his relationship to the Marja,aya makes him predictable and
somewhat reasonable.
--------------
POSSIBLE STEPS AHEAD
--------------
14. (S) There is a real question about Karbala,s readiness
to go to PIC. While there are a number of strong
personalities, the work of the PRT has just begun. The PRT
will be able to sort out the actual leadership and players in
the province. It is obvious that a Da,awa governor in
Karbala is more a front than a reflection of political power.
That being said, an opportunity exists to bolster more
moderate forces.
15. (S) If there were a way for members of the PRT to be
located in the province it would make real a relationship
that has become somewhat hit or miss,. At this stage
development of a bureaucracy and the tourism industry are
BAGHDAD 00004767 003 OF 003
extremely important. Karbala is capable of being
self-sustaining with the appropriate tools. It is not a
long-term project as it is a strong province, but there are
still opportunities, with the right access to make a
difference.
16. (S) The potential for a thriving tourism industry will
help reduce violence. Efforts to forge as working
relationship between the PC and the IP Chief could also
facilitate improved security, by reducing suspicions between
the two and -- to the extent possible -- providing political
support for the IP's efforts against violence.
SCOBEY