DHI QAR PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004766 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DHI QAR PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Dhi Qar is a largely rural province, where tribal loyalties are still very strong. Four Shi'a parties largely control provincial politics, with the help of affiliated militias. Reccurrent electricity shortages affect Dhi Qar particularly hard since farmers need electricity to power irrigation pumps. Security appears to be worsening, largely from JAM and rogue JAM elements. Reconstruction, employment, and checks on Iranian influence will be key components in restoring stability and security in the province. This is one of a series of analyses by Provincial Reconstruction Teams analyzing the governates of Iraq. End summary. -------------- POLITICAL ISSUES -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The political landscape of Dhi Qar Province is dominated by Shi,ite religious parties. Of the 41 seats on the Dhi Qar Provincial Council, 33 are occupied by Shi,ite Islamist groups. The main players are the Islamic Virtue Party (Fadila) with 11 seats, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 11 seats, and the Da,wa Iraq Party with 10. Calculating seats on the PC, the mayorships and the governor, who belongs to the SCIRI, are insufficient, however, to understand the political landscape of the Province. In addition to the parties that hold seats on the PC, there is also a large group of individuals who are loyal to the Office of the Martyr Al-Sadr (OMS) in the province. ¶3. (C) Dhi Qar is a largely rural province, and tribal loyalties are still very strong. These loyalties frequently take precedence over political loyalties. At the same time, most of the major political parties have an attendant militia, or military wing for protection, and which serves as a means to achieve political advantage. These militias are a significant political force in Dhi Qar, and serve as a political force multiplier for those parties who have them, strengthening their political influence beyond what the size of their electorates or seats on the PC would tend to indicate. -------------- ECONOMIC ISSUES -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Dhi Qar,s economy is primarily rural, and agriculturally based. The current electricity crisis in Iraq �00A;is affecting Dhi Qar particularly hard since farmers need electricity to power irrigation pumps necessary for agriculture in the province. Some reports indicate that farmers in some areas are only able to till about one forth of their normally arable land because of this shortage. Since the end of the previous regime, the economy of Dhi Qar province has been undergoing a gradual transitional process from a centralized State controlled economy to decentralized market-based economy. This difficult process involves all economic sectors. The transitional model followed is the Eastern European model which has not given, so far, satisfactory results. There is an active black market in Dhi Qar, where everything from gas, cigarettes, videos, medicines and food, to sophisticated military electronics, weaponry and museum loot are traded. Some dealers are small-time operators - many are just people trying to survive - but others are part of highly organized, multi-million dollar networks. At present, however, the most lucrative black market commodity in Iraq appears to be gasoline and oil. Another problem that Dhi Qar faces is widespread corruption, which affects life at every level and in every sector. Most of the population lives paycheck to paycheck, relying on ration cards or other forms of assistance for their families. Through the PDS (Public Distribution System) the Iraqi government provides each person monthly with 2500 ID (approximately $2.00 US) -------------- SECURITY -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The security situation in Dhi Qar appears to be slowly worsening. The PRT estimates that at present there are about 5,000 members of the Jayesh Al-Mahdi (JAM) militia active in the province. In addition to that, there is a BAGHDAD 00004766 002 OF 002 strong presence of Badr corps militia. Badr militia members occupy many of the higher level security positions such as police chiefs, etc. The PRT routinely cooperates with public official who belong to the Badr organization on security matters. Moreover, it assesses that most of the anti-Coalition attacks in the Province have come from members of the JAM, its attendant rogue militias not under JAM,s immediate command and control, and from other assorted militias such as the Al-Sharkie group (estimated to have around 500 active member in the Province at this time. The current security threats in the province are attacks on Coalition Forces from the JAM and other militias, especially in light of the threat by Moqtada Al-Sadr to proclaim a Jihad against the Coalition if it does not relinquish control of security in Iraq over to Iraqi control by January 2007, and the potential for violence between the JAM and the Badr Organization. The PRT believes that the Badr organization is well armed and well trained, as well as well-financed by Iran. The JAM on the other hand is also well-armed, but not as well trained, and not as well financed by Iran. Notwithstanding the reports that the JAM receives Iranian funding, PRT sources indicate that the JAM,s financial resources in Dhi Qar Province are exhausted. -------------- KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS -------------- ¶6. (C) Kadhum Aziz Alwan (SCIRI) The Governor of Dhi Qar Province. Strong connections with Iran and Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim. ¶7. (SBU) Ihsan Talib al-Ta,ee (Fadila) Most senior Fadila Party member in Dhi Qar and is Chairman of the Provincial Council (PC) Influenced by Fadila founder and current head Yaqobi. He has been to two training courses in Italy sponsored by the MNF-I. ¶8. (SBU) Hassan Wirawish (Fadila) Chairman of the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC). ¶9. (SBU) Ahmed Al-Sheik (Da,wa) Vice-Governor of the Province. -------------- COMMENT: POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD -------------- ¶10. (C) Many of the issues that plague Dhi Qar Province revolve around the chronic unemployment, and the severely underdeveloped economy. In the short term, we should use resources to address immediate needs to address key infrastructure problems, including potable water, electricity, and basic human needs. We should also focus on continuing to build the agricultural sector. Also in thee long run, it will be critical to build a good educational system that will facilitate secondary and post-secondary education for the residents of Dhi Qar. While we have no accurate figure right now, the non-attendance rate in schools is very high. ¶11. (C) In the medium term, we must focus on local governance capacity, such that Iraqis themselves can ensure basic needs are met in the province. In the long term, once the local government has developed capacity, efforts should focus on building private sector capacity, which will offer the only long term solution to pervasive unemployment. ¶12. (S-NF) Coalition efforts to undermine the influence if the militias and Iran remain critical, but go hand-in-hand with broader economic and capacity building initiatives. The PRT's contact with the JAM has also shown that many members of that organization are very willing to participate in such projects as they will benefit their local tribes and address chronic unemployment. ¶13. (SBU) Finally, Dhi Qar province is very ripe for a robust public diplomacy regimen. There are opportunities to work local press and develop projects that present the viewpoints and the many good works of the Coalition Forces to the general public without these being distilled through the prism of a hostile press. SCOBEY