DHI QAR PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004766

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DHI QAR PROVINCE: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS,
POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD

Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Dhi Qar is a largely rural province, where
tribal loyalties are still very strong. Four Shi'a parties
largely control provincial politics, with the help of
affiliated militias. Reccurrent electricity shortages affect
Dhi Qar particularly hard since farmers need electricity to
power irrigation pumps. Security appears to be worsening,
largely from JAM and rogue JAM elements. Reconstruction,
employment, and checks on Iranian influence will be key
components in restoring stability and security in the
province. This is one of a series of analyses by Provincial
Reconstruction Teams analyzing the governates of Iraq. End
summary.

--------------
POLITICAL ISSUES
--------------


2. (SBU) The political landscape of Dhi Qar Province is
dominated by Shi,ite religious parties. Of the 41 seats on
the Dhi Qar Provincial Council, 33 are occupied by Shi,ite
Islamist groups. The main players are the Islamic Virtue
Party (Fadila) with 11 seats, the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 11 seats, and the Da,wa Iraq
Party with 10. Calculating seats on the PC, the mayorships
and the governor, who belongs to the SCIRI, are insufficient,
however, to understand the political landscape of the
Province. In addition to the parties that hold seats on the
PC, there is also a large group of individuals who are loyal
to the Office of the Martyr Al-Sadr (OMS) in the province.


3. (C) Dhi Qar is a largely rural province, and tribal
loyalties are still very strong. These loyalties frequently
take precedence over political loyalties. At the same time,
most of the major political parties have an attendant
militia, or military wing for protection, and which serves as
a means to achieve political advantage. These militias are a
significant political force in Dhi Qar, and serve as a
political force multiplier for those parties who have them,
strengthening their political influence beyond what the size
of their electorates or seats on the PC would tend to
indicate.

--------------
ECONOMIC ISSUES
--------------


4. (SBU) Dhi Qar,s economy is primarily rural, and
agriculturally based. The current electricity crisis in Iraq
is affecting Dhi Qar particularly hard since farmers need
electricity to power irrigation pumps necessary for
agriculture in the province. Some reports indicate that
farmers in some areas are only able to till about one forth
of their normally arable land because of this shortage.
Since the end of the previous regime, the economy of Dhi Qar
province has been undergoing a gradual transitional process
from a centralized State controlled economy to decentralized
market-based economy. This difficult process involves all
economic sectors. The transitional model followed is the
Eastern European model which has not given, so far,
satisfactory results. There is an active black market in Dhi
Qar, where everything from gas, cigarettes, videos, medicines
and food, to sophisticated military electronics, weaponry and
museum loot are traded. Some dealers are small-time
operators - many are just people trying to survive - but
others are part of highly organized, multi-million dollar
networks. At present, however, the most lucrative black
market commodity in Iraq appears to be gasoline and oil.
Another problem that Dhi Qar faces is widespread corruption,
which affects life at every level and in every sector. Most
of the population lives paycheck to paycheck, relying on
ration cards or other forms of assistance for their families.
Through the PDS (Public Distribution System) the Iraqi
government provides each person monthly with 2500 ID
(approximately $2.00 US)

--------------
SECURITY
--------------


5. (S/NF) The security situation in Dhi Qar appears to be
slowly worsening. The PRT estimates that at present there
are about 5,000 members of the Jayesh Al-Mahdi (JAM) militia
active in the province. In addition to that, there is a

BAGHDAD 00004766 002 OF 002


strong presence of Badr corps militia. Badr militia members
occupy many of the higher level security positions such as
police chiefs, etc. The PRT routinely cooperates with public
official who belong to the Badr organization on security
matters. Moreover, it assesses that most of the
anti-Coalition attacks in the Province have come from members
of the JAM, its attendant rogue militias not under JAM,s
immediate command and control, and from other assorted
militias such as the Al-Sharkie group (estimated to have
around 500 active member in the Province at this time. The
current security threats in the province are attacks on
Coalition Forces from the JAM and other militias, especially
in light of the threat by Moqtada Al-Sadr to proclaim a Jihad
against the Coalition if it does not relinquish control of
security in Iraq over to Iraqi control by January 2007, and
the potential for violence between the JAM and the Badr
Organization. The PRT believes that the Badr organization is
well armed and well trained, as well as well-financed by
Iran. The JAM on the other hand is also well-armed, but not
as well trained, and not as well financed by Iran.
Notwithstanding the reports that the JAM receives Iranian
funding, PRT sources indicate that the JAM,s financial
resources in Dhi Qar Province are exhausted.

--------------
KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS
--------------


6. (C) Kadhum Aziz Alwan (SCIRI) The Governor of Dhi Qar
Province. Strong connections with Iran and Abdul Aziz
Al-Hakim.


7. (SBU) Ihsan Talib al-Ta,ee (Fadila) Most senior Fadila
Party member in Dhi Qar and is Chairman of the Provincial
Council (PC) Influenced by Fadila founder and current head
Yaqobi. He has been to two training courses in Italy
sponsored by the MNF-I.


8. (SBU) Hassan Wirawish (Fadila) Chairman of the Provincial
Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC).


9. (SBU) Ahmed Al-Sheik (Da,wa) Vice-Governor of the
Province.

--------------
COMMENT: POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD
--------------


10. (C) Many of the issues that plague Dhi Qar Province
revolve around the chronic unemployment, and the severely
underdeveloped economy. In the short term, we should use
resources to address immediate needs to address key
infrastructure problems, including potable water,
electricity, and basic human needs. We should also focus on
continuing to build the agricultural sector. Also in thee
long run, it will be critical to build a good educational
system that will facilitate secondary and post-secondary
education for the residents of Dhi Qar. While we have no
accurate figure right now, the non-attendance rate in schools
is very high.


11. (C) In the medium term, we must focus on local
governance capacity, such that Iraqis themselves can ensure
basic needs are met in the province. In the long term, once
the local government has developed capacity, efforts should
focus on building private sector capacity, which will offer
the only long term solution to pervasive unemployment.


12. (S-NF) Coalition efforts to undermine the influence if
the militias and Iran remain critical, but go hand-in-hand
with broader economic and capacity building initiatives. The
PRT's contact with the JAM has also shown that many members
of that organization are very willing to participate in such
projects as they will benefit their local tribes and address
chronic unemployment.


13. (SBU) Finally, Dhi Qar province is very ripe for a
robust public diplomacy regimen. There are opportunities to
work local press and develop projects that present the
viewpoints and the many good works of the Coalition Forces to
the general public without these being distilled through the
prism of a hostile press.
SCOBEY