DIWANYAH: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004765 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DIWANYAH: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD Classified By: Classified by Robert Gilchrist, Political Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Diwaniyah is a province with a number of problems. Security is weak and the reconstruction process is virtually halted. Restarting the reconstruction process could provide an alternative to young men with a desire for employment, but that is only part of the solution. Free and fair provincial elections, a consistent relationship with the Embassy, and a sense of security could also help. This is one of a series of analyses by Provincial Reconstruction Teams on the governates of Iraq. End summary. -------------- Political Issues -------------- ¶2. (C) Diwanyah province has become something of a neutral battlefield for Shia militias. The violence and illegal activities that Al Sarkhi, Jaysh Al Mahdi (JAM) and Badr Corps will not conduct in Najaf is being played out in Diwaniyah. Assassinations, including that of the former governor Jamal Al Zamili have become more frequent. Open battles in the street between rival militias and the IP have become somewhat common. ¶3. (S) As a backdrop to the aforementioned violence, Governor Khalil Hamza has provided tepid leadership in the area of security and reconstruction. Hamza has become a mouthpiece and apologist for OMS/JAM. While he himself is SCIRI, he does not have enough political clout to either stand up to JAM or ally himself with an alternative such as Badr. Hamza has attempted to create &no-go8 zones for coalition forces (CF). These areas are often located near or in Sadrist strongholds. This has been a clear attempt to appease JAM, but has created more violence as the militia becomes more emboldened. The recent violent activity in Diwanyah has been one of the strongest indicators of Muqtada Al Sadr,s (MAS) loss of control over some JAM groups. As violence flairs in the province MAS has been forced to put aside his political ambitions and act as the leader of a militia organization. In Diwanyah JAM plans and carries out attacks without central tasking. For the time being MAS has been able to corral the JAM splinter groups in the province, but the weakness of the governor combined with Sadr,s political distractions have created fertile ground for violence. ¶4. (S) The strongest political player in the province is the PC Chairman Sheikh Hussein Al Kalidi. As a bloc SCIRI holds 20 of the 41 PC seats in the province. This allows SCIRI to drive the reconstruction effort and steer funding towards its interests. This will likely be used to their advantage as provincial elections approach. The greater factor in how provincial elections will turn out is the spending of civil organizations associated with OMS and SCIRI. A great deal of money is being spent on social services and providing &security8 for important voting blocs. One estimate saw OMS receive 500,000 USD to be used to assist the poor and displaced persons. While this occurs, SCIRI/Badr also have their own civil society organizations, but have become quite adept at utilizing their political power to keep their political enemies off balance (See security). ¶5. (S) The outcome of Provincial elections, if they occur in 2007, will be very difficult to predict. They are likely to spur violence between the rival militias. It appears however that the electorate will be looking for an alternative. There is too much unemployment and violence. Any alternative will have to be able to withstand withering attacks both rhetorical and violent by the Islamists. Saad Al Abdili is head of the IECI and seems conscientious and capable. He will work with CF and the other organizations to give the elections a fighting chance at being free and fair. He will need assistance. -------------- Economic Issues -------------- ¶6. (S) The Diwanyah economy is based on heavy industry such as textiles and rubber. Though those sectors have declined drastically. This began prior to 2003 and has continued to date. Construction and construction materials has been a stalwart of the economy in Diwanyah. Reconstruction has been going well in surrounding provinces and construction BAGHDAD 00004765 002 OF 003 materials have been in demand. In Diwanyah province, violence, and a Governor and PC that have frequently been at odds have stalled reconstruction. ¶7. (C) At present unemployment throughout the province excluding government employees hovers above 60%. The major employer of pre-retirement men is in the security sector. Many retired citizens have been forced to at least seek work to augment what they receive from a broken pension system. ¶8. (C) While the IDP crisis in Diwanyah has been less severe than in Karbala and Najaf there has still been a strain on social services. -------------- Security Issues -------------- ¶9. (S) The Province has seen a spike in violence in the last six months. JAM and Badr Corps relatively evenly divide the IP. There are schemes that have JAM paying 300 USD per position in the IP and Badr Corps carving out quotas for themselves. It makes for an ineffective force. ¶10. (S) Due to SCIRI,s political dominance in the province they utilize legitimate routes for illegitimate intimidation and elimination of political rivals. Often bringing spurious charges in front of a judge to have enemies arrested. The IP chief Abdul Khalia Badri has proven ineffective and somewhat uninterested in quelling violence. Leaving that task to the Iraqi Army. -------------- Key Political Figures -------------- ¶11. (S) Khaleel Ibrahim Hamza: Governor of Diwanyah. Hamza is a key player for his inability as much as anything else. He is incapable of standing up to JAM. He is affable and seemingly cooperative when speaking with CF, but has gone out of his way to not stand up to militias in his province. It is unlikely he could survive (politically) provincial elections. ¶12. (S) Hussein Al Khalidi: PC Chairman. Al Khalidi is a member of SCIRI and the strongest legitimate political figure in the province. He has more power than Hamza and tends to ignore the governor on key issues. If SCIRI were able to maintain their dominance in future elections, he is Hamza,s likely successor. ¶13. (S) Hayder Ali: Lead OMS PC member. Ali,s political power is minimal, but his unfailing support and cover for JAM in the province makes him vital. Any real political effort to slow JAM activity would be opposed by Ali. He is also the leader of the chorus for calling for CF withdrawal from all facets of life in Diwanyah. He claims CF are running their own death squads. ¶14. (S) Saad Al Abdili: Head of IECI-Diwanyah. Al Abdili is included here for his potential impact on provincial elections. He is an honest broker whose success will directly affect the way ahead in the province. He has fresh ideas regarding polling on Election Day and campaigning prior to the day. He will be in constant contact with the REO and CF. -------------- Possible Steps Forward -------------- ¶15. (S-NF) Diwanyah is a province with a number of problems. Security is weak and the reconstruction process is virtually halted. The first step in turning the province around may be through reinforcing the U.S. presence by putting the PRT or a USG representative at FOB Echo. At some point in the future a decision will be made regarding Provincial Iraqi Control. One way for helping ensure that an informed decision is made is by placing members of a reconstruction/diplomatic team in the province. ¶16. (S) To quell violence there will need to be a new governor and a rather heavy hand by the Iraqi Army. Restarting the reconstruction process will provide an alternative to young men with a desire for employment, but that is only part of the solution. Free and fair elections, BAGHDAD 00004765 003 OF 003 a consistent relationship with the Embassy and a sense of security will all play a role. SCOBEY