ANBAR PROVINCE -- THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, STEPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004759 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ANBAR PROVINCE -- THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, STEPS FORWARD Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist. Reasons. 1 .4 (B) and (D) 1 (S) Summary: Anbar public opinion is antagonistic toward the Shia-led national government, with mixed attitudes toward Coalition Forces. Given that few of the province's Sunni majority residents voted in the last Provincial Elections, the Provincial Council (PC) is not viewed representative or democratic. Al-Qaeda Iraq steadily increased attacks throughout 2006, supported by a cadre of foreign fighters. Possible contributors to security and stability include the continued mobilization of tribal leaders, further development of the police, provincial elections, and improved relations between the provincial and central government. This is the first in a series of cables from Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Regional Embassy Offices (REOs) in every Province, with input from Embassy Baghdad, outlining key issues, noting key political leaders, and proposing steps that could help restore security and foster reconciliation End Summary. ¶2. (S) The Anbar Provincial Council fled to the relative safety of Baghdad last April amid insurgent threats in Ramadi. The Council holds meetings and conducts business in Baghdad, but it is effectively in exile. Council members say that security conditions in Ramadi are still too volatile to contemplate the Council,s early return to the province. The Council was elected in the January 2005 poll. Anbaris boycotted; only 3,700 votes were cast province-wide in a population of 1.2 million residents. The Sunni fundamentalist Iraqi Islamic Party won sufficient votes to form the Provincial Council. Thus the Council,s claim to legitimacy rests on the weak foundation of a slender turn-out in a boycotted poll. Elsewhere in the province, some municipal councils have dispersed because of insurgent pressure. Those that continue to meet are little more than legacies of the CPA days. Fearful of insurgent attacks, few civil servants appear at their offices at the government center in Ramadi. ¶3. (C) Public opinion in Anbar is antagonistic toward the Shia-led Maliki government. Anbaris generally do not have positive feelings about the Center,s fitful efforts towards national reconciliation. Attitudes towards the Coalition range from antagonism to grudging acquiescence. Ties between the central government and the Anbar provincial government began to improve in late 2006 with the PM's appointment of a sub-minister Cabinet official to represent Anbari interests, but they are still deeply troubled. ¶4. (C) There is no clear leader in the province either among secular political figures, or among Sunni clerics and tribal leaders. No one tribal sheikh is recognized as the undisputed leader. Key tribal figures have fled abroad. -------------- Economic Issues -------------- ¶5. (S) Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has disrupted the normal patterns of economic life through its campaign of violence and intimidation. AQI is also deeply involved in economic crimes, such as hijacking, highway extortion, black marketing, and control of gasoline stations. The organization is largely self-financed by these methods. There has been a flight of Anbar middle class, professionals, and senior clerics and sheikhs to areas of Iraq in which they feel more secure or to neighboring countries. Markets are rudimentary. There is no credit-based economy. The banking system is dysfunctional. Agriculture is on the subsistence level. There are indications of oil and gas deposits in the western part of the province, but they unexplored. Unemployment is between 40% and 60%, and at least eight state-owned companies are idle or operating below capacity due to unusable or outdated equipment, and the lack of a reliable supply of electricity. ¶6. (C) There is no telephone service in Anbar. Insurgents have destroyed cell-phone towers, ground cables, and switch centers. However, a public-private venture is scheduled to begin the roll-out of a wireless local loop cell-phone service in the first quarter of 2007. The province has not received consistent GOI resources for war-damage compensation and for post-battle reconstruction. -------------- BAGHDAD 00004759 002 OF 004 Security Issues -------------- ¶7. (S-NF) AQI, the dominant insurgent group, has eliminated or co-opted competition from Baathist insurgents, who are no longer a significant factor. Ansar Al-Sunna is also active. AQI,s objective is to debilitate the Iraqi police (IP),keep pressure on the CF, and intimidate the local population. Attacks steadily increased throughout 2006, rising to about 430 incidents recorded weekly by mid-December from 230 weekly incidents a year ago. Two-thirds of the incidents took place in Ramadi. Recidivism is a continuing problem. Security detainees are typically not prosecuted because Anbar does not have a criminal justice system. There are an estimated 300 to 500 foreign fighters in the province, who enter primarily from Syria. ¶8. (C) Insurgents were able to intimidate Anbar,s population with relative ease early in 2006, but AQI was on the defensive by year's end, as the IA,s two divisions in the province continued to expand operations. There appears to be little desire by Anbari youth to join the army, which they view as a Shia organization. Police recruitment, however, is up. Some 8,400 policemen are on the province,s rolls today, compared to 1,000 policemen twelve months ago, and virtually none twenty-four months ago. ¶9. (S-NF) The most significant security development on the battlefield in 2006 was the emergence of a group of anti-insurgent tribal leaders in the Ramadi area, led by Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha. The movement comprises some 25 tribes and is making a bid to spread its influence both east and west through the Euphrates Valley. It claims to have killed 70-80 insurgents since September, while sustaining 35 &martyrs8 in its own ranks. -------------- Key Political Figures -------------- ¶10. (C-NF) Governor Ma,moun Sami Rashid al-Alwani is the the longest-serving post-Saddam al-Anbar governor, assuming his post in June 2005. He has been the target of numerous insurgent assassination attempts. He is affiliated with the Iraqi Islamic Party, but claims to be an independent. He has sometimes at odds with Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha and the Sahawa-al-Anbar (SAA) anti-insurgency group of sheiks. In PRT's view, he appears honest and diligent, making frequent visits to Baghdad to knock on GOI doors to advance his provinces interests. ¶11. (C) Dr. Abdulsalam A. Mohamed has been Chairman of the Anbar Provincial Council since April 2006. Supportive of the Coalition, he seeks USAID assistance to develop the skills of the province,s civil servants. He convokes meetings of the Provincial Council in Baghdad and handles such sessions with skill. Suspicious of Sheikh Sattar and the SAA, he believes that Sattar ultimately seeks to undermine the Council,s legal authority. He is also suspicious that PM Maliki is strongly influenced by Iran. ¶12. (C) Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Rishawi is leader of Sahawa al-Anbar (SAA),a group of Ramadi-based anti-insurgent sheikhs. His relationship with Gov. Ma,amoun has been strained, although he has access to PM Maliki, President Talabani, and the Defense and Interior Ministers. He has led the SAA in actively fighting AQI, and expanded SAA,s influence to other parts of the province. He has also actively recruited Anbaris to join the police. He was appointed al-Anbar Director of Counter-terrorism by the GOI, effectively superseding the interim provincial police chief, who is a fellow SAA member. He has publicly clashed with senior Sunni cleric, sheikh Harith al-Dari. He has a sometimes rocky relationship with Anbari sheikhs resident in Jordan. He reportedly amassed wealth by smuggling. ¶13. (S)Sheikh Hamid Farhan Heis al-Dhiyabi ) President of Sahawa al-Anbar and was the group,s initial candidate for deputy provincial governor(reportedly a lawyer(probably as important as Sheikh Sattar in the SAA leadership(his Dhiyabi tribe is supportive of CF and Iraqi forces(in the past reportedly affiliated with Faisal al-Gaoud,s Iraqi Solidarity Council and Ahmed Chalabi,s Iraqi National Congress. BAGHDAD 00004759 003 OF 004 ¶14. (S) Sheikh Hikmat Muhammad Samir al-Muhammadi ) Paramount sheikh of the Muhammadi tribe, which is one of the larger tribes in the Fallujah-Saqlawiyah area(reportedly one of the three most influential figures in the Fallujah area(currently believed to be out of the country. ¶15. (S) Sheikh Ghazi Sami Abbas al-Issawi ) Wealthy businessman(resident in Amman( member of the Amman-based Al-Anbar Central Council(head of one or several Albu Issa sub-tribes in the Amiriyah area. ¶16. (S) Sheikh Tariq Khalaf Abdullah al-Halboosi ) President of the Amman-based al-Anbar Central Council(wealthy businessman(supports Governor Ma,amoun and the provincial government(deeply involved in Iraqi and regional hydrocarbon industries. ¶17. (S) Sheik Khamis Hasnawi Aifan al-Issawi ) Paramount sheikh of the Albu Issa tribe(has been a proponent of cooperation with the Coalition(a critic of the insurgency(was the target of an unsuccessful SVBIED attack in June 2005(.has expressed support for Sheikh Sattar,s SAA. ¶18. (S) Sheikh Majid Abdul Razzaq Ali Sulayman al-Assafi ) De facto leader of the Dulaymi Confederation(active in the provincial government until early 2004(his public support for CF caused him to be targeted for assassination(has fled to Jordan(has aspirations to be governor of Anbar(dislikes Gov. Ma,amoun. ¶19. (S) Sheikh Amer Abdul Jabaar Ali Sulayman ) Half-brother of Sheikh Majid(in early 2004 he was the chairman of the Provincial Council(pro-MNF, but distrusts democracy(supports the SAA. ¶20. (S) Sheikh Sabah Sattam Sharji al-Mahalawi ) Paramount sheikh of the Albu Mahal in the al-Qa,im area(lives in Amman(has expressed support for the SAA. ¶21. (S) Sheikh Bezia Najriss al-Gaoud ) Patriarch of the wealthy al-Gaoud family (Hamid, Jalal, the deceased Talal)(lives in Amman(a significant figure in the Albu Nimr tribe(cooperative with the Coalition since 2003. ¶22. (S) Sheikh Ali Hatim Ali Sulayman al-Assafi ) The ranking Dulaymi sheikh living in Iraq(politically active(appears to be socially conscious and seemingly secular(has been involved with SAA from its founding in September. ¶23. (S) Sheikh Mutab Mahrut al-Hadhal al-Anizi (and his brother Lawrence) ) The elderly leader of the Anzah tribe(purportedly related to the Saudi royal family(wealthy landowner(known as the sheikh of sheikhs(his tribe reportedly contains Sunni and Shi,a(has expressed support for the SAA. ¶24. (S) Farhan Tekan Farhan al-Ubaydi ) Mayor of Al-Qaim since late 2005(former Saddam-era general(opposed to the insurgency(allegedly targeted by AQI(well regarded for his leadership qualities. ¶25. (S-NF) A key opposition figure is Sheikh Mudhir Abdul Kareeim Thiab al-Kharbit. Hereditary sheikh of the Khalifa tribe and a former leader of the Dulaymi confederation, he is a former supporter of Saddam. Resident in Syria, Jordan, and France, he has supported insurgent causes. -------------- Comment: Possible Steps Forward -------------- ¶26. (C-NF) Coalition forces should continue to prepare the way for the deployment of the IP and IA in Anbar. Ramadi is an example. MNF-West forces launched major operations in that city in June; they are still underway. MNF-West has established a series of inter-locking combat outposts (COPs), forward positions set up in urban areas to deny space to the insurgents. The COPs are being set up sequentially; a new one is established as MNF-West forces push into different neighborhoods, and as ISF forces become available to follow up. From these positions, MNF-West maintains &overwatch8 activities and actively patrols key areas. Depending on conditions, security responsibilities are transitioned to the IA and later to the IP. In some instances, the IA co-locates BAGHDAD 00004759 004 OF 004 with CF on the same COP, or they set up their own outposts nearby. The operation proceeds in stages: isolate the area of interest; clear; retain; and transition to the ISF. The process as a whole is a visible sign to the local population that the Coalition and ISF are there to stay and are determined to eliminate the insurgents. ¶27. (C-NF) There are practical results to these security operations -- the mobilization of tribal leaders in Ramadi to fight AQI and the increase in applicants to join the police force did not happen merely because of local initiative. They happened as a result of CF and ISF security operations. The tribes of Ramadi would not today be making a common front against AQI and the youth of the area would not be applying as police recruits if they doubted the CF,s staying power. . ¶28. (C-NF) Assuming that the AQI threat will be neutralized, the next challenge on the horizon would be to set the stage for constructive relations between the Central Government and Anbar. Baghdad and Ramadi must find a way to resolve their mutual mistrust, and MNF-West and the PRT have roles to play in this regard. Another element missing in our counter-insurgency strategy is provincial and municipal elections. Anbaris recognize that they made a mistake boycotting the January 2005 poll. Today the PC hangs by a fragile thread of &legitimacy8 and the municipal councils are self-perpetuating legacies from the CPA days. Local elections would call AQI,s bluff. Elections may also help us on the battlefield. Evidence suggests that contested areas with functioning local governments tend to be more stable than those without them. But ultimately, local elections would allow the Anbaris themselves to search for their own political accommodations and have a voice in the future couse of their province. SCOBEY