MAYSAN: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004756

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN: THE ISSUES, THE LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS
FORWARD

Classified By: Deputy PolCouns R. Gilchrist. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) Summary: Maysan provincial authorities hold tenuous
control over competing militias in the province, with
Sadrists holding the most sway. Maysan's porous border with
Iran is a crossing point for smuggled goods, including
weapons and other contraband used by anti-Iraqi government
groups. The province has significant undeveloped resources,
the most important being oil and gas. A resurrected Iraq
National Guard could safeguard critical infrastructure
installations and projects in the province, which are the
targets of looting. Consent winning projects could increase
Coalition influence with provincial authorities. This is one
of a series of cables issued by the US Embassy Baghdad in
conjunction with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
analyzing the governates of Iraq. End Summary.

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POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES
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2. (S/NF) Provincial authorities hold tenuous control over
competing militias in the province. Sadrists remain in
overall control; but the ability of Sadrist provincial
officials to direct the militias nominally is uneven.
Maysan's porous border with Iran is a crossing point for
smuggled goods, including weapons and other contraband used
by anti-Iraqi government groups.


3. (S/NF) Security issues in Maysan province both frame and
constrain all other types of engagement. The British
memories of the immediate Iraqi looting of Camp Abu Najii
after the UK withdrew in 2005 are sources of bitterness
toward provincial authorities. That experience, along with
UK domestic political considerations, has contributed to a
decision to hand over the province to Iraqi security forces
in early-2007. The terms and conditions of the Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC) Memorandum of Agreement between the CF
and Iraqi authorities will be crucial in determining how our
future engagement with Maysan will be shaped. The MOA will
have significant implications for the Provincial
Reconstruction Team,s efforts, for further UK/U.S. military
and civil affairs presence, and perhaps for the engagement of
non-conventional UK/U.S. forces.


4. (S/NF) Security issues will also partly determine the
extent and the composition of our political engagement with
Maysan authorities. MNF operations in Maysan have in the
past prompted provincial authorities to &boycott8 relations
with Coalition Forces. However, the imminence of PIC, the
visible fact that other provinces have received substantially
more in Coalition funding (especially neighboring Basra),and
the arrival of the first members of the civilian-led PRT
appear to have helped break the political logjam.

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ECONOMIC ISSUES
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5. (C/NF) Maysan has enormous needs and significant
undeveloped resources, the most important being oil and gas.
In fact, Maysan,s draft Provincial Development Strategy
describes the province as one of the poorest provinces on
the ground but the richest underground., The potential
exploitation of these oil and gas fields, rumored to be the
second largest reserves in Iraq, and the sharing of costs and
revenues, will be a defining issue for the province. Again,
security considerations are paramount. The passage of the
hydrocarbon law will be a step forward, but major oil company
investment (at least from Western companies) is years away,
and Iranian attempts to control at least part of the
resources cannot be discounted. In other economic areas,
Maysan is significantly underdeveloped. The sector that
appears to be a distant second in terms of economic
development potential is agriculture. Iraq once exported a
significant amount of foodstuffs, but would require intensive
rehabilitation and years of technical assistance to develop
the sector. Maysan officials optimistically highlight the
province,s tourism potential (Ziggurat of Ur; marshes in the
south) but development of tourist facilities at this point is
a pipe dream.

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KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS
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6. (SBU) Key among political players in Maysan is Governor
Adhil Mahoder Rahdi Al-Maliki, who was elected in 2005. A
former telecommunications engineer in his mid-thirties, the
governor comes from Al Majarr Al Kabir, but now lives in Al
Amarah. He understands a little English, but uses
interpretation in meetings with English-speaking officials.
He is a politically-savvy member of the Hussein Ideology
Forum (HIF),which is essentially a front for the Office of
the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and the largest political grouping in
the Provincial Council (6 out of 15 seats.) He has good
links with the Iraqi governmental apparatus in Baghdad and is
frequently in the capital. He traveled with Prime Minister
Ja,afari on a trip to Tehran in early 2005. The Baghdad
government established an Emergency Security Committee for
Maysan following the violence in October 2006, which has
reduced the governor,s role in security matters. He appears
to be very interested in making progress on reconstruction.


7. (C) Appointed in 2005, Provincial Council Chairman
Abdul-Jabbar Waheed Homaydi has been a difficult
interlocutor, prone to posturing and sometimes meaningless
obstruction. He was the primary instigator of a &boycott8
of relations with MNF during the past eight months, although
he has recently become more cooperative. Like the governor,
Homaydi is a member of the HIF. Unconfirmed reports say
Homaydi was previously the publisher of a newspaper backed by
Saddam,s son Uday. Provincial Security Council Chairman
Abdul-Ridha Hashim Hassan appears to be an honest broker, in
the PRT's view, and often acts as a negotiator between the
OMS and the IPS. He allies himself with HIF, although he is
of a different party, the Al-Ridha Center for Culture and
Cautioning


8. (SBU) Hussain Chalabi Hardan (aka Abu Muslim al-Saadi) is
a former national MP from the Transitional National Assembly.
He now has no formal political role in the province, but he
was reportedly founder of the HIF. When Abu Muslim set up the
bloc, it was not a front for OMS, but a forum for moderates.
Since the bloc,s alliance with OMS, Abu Muslim has all but
broken ties with it, and now has established himself as the
leader of an umbrella group advocating moderate parties,
views. Deputy Governor Mohan Abdullah Sultan Al-Ja,abiri
(aka Abu Mirriam) is the head of Harakat Hizbollah al-Iraq
(HH) in Al Amarah and with Abu Hatem (aka the Prince of the
Marshes) and Abu Maythem, is a leader of a main militia
group. He played a key role in brokering the cease-fire
between MNF and JAM/OMS in 2004. He ran under the United
Islamic Front in the January 2005 elections and was appointed
Deputy Governor.

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POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD
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9. (C/NF) Maysan,s strategic location on the Iranian
border, the influence of Iran in the province,s affairs, and
the presence of exploitable oil resources makes Maysan of
obvious strategic importance. Furthering USG interests in
Maysan will call for responses to several challenges, the
most serious being the security constraints. The transition
of militia leaders to responsible political figures and
militia members to productive contributors to the overall
development of the province will be crucial. One option to
consider is a reconstitution of the Iraq National Guard and
using it to safeguard critical infrastructure installations
and projects in the province, which are the targets of
frequent and destructive looting. However, this task begs
the question of whether we can develop and sustain a presence
in the province to ensure that training and performance is
adequate, and to build the relationships with provincial
actors that would be necessary to sustain a long-term
commitment.


10. (C/NF) The uncertain status of our and the UK,s
post-PIC presence will have tremendous implications for the
scope of what USG-led entities, both overt and covert, can
accomplish. Handover of the province to Iraqi control could
lead to an increase in cooperation of provincial authorities
with remaining military advisors/operational units and with
the PRT. However, the uncertainty of Iraqi capabilities
(military, provincial, and tribal) in controlling violence in
Maysan could make security more haphazard. Given this, the
USG needs to urgently address the consequences of PIC in
Maysan and what they will mean for our future work.

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11. (C/NF) The development process in Iraq has often focused
on the reconstruction effort and large, essential service
infrastructure projects, at the expense of capacity-building.
If possible, the tactical effects achieved by consent-winning
projects done by civil affairs specialists should be
incorporated into the overall development goals for each
province, including Maysan. By engaging as frequently as
possible with provincial officials on their overall
development goals, we have the potential to develop
relationships -- particularly with moderates -- that could be
politically useful in the long-term. These efforts could be
strengthened by additional USG attention and resources in the
province. The new PRT would also need practical security
support. If security conditions were to gradually improve,
the placement of a permanent presence, perhaps through USAID,
could provide a platform for mid to long-term development
programs in the province.
SCOBEY