DIYALA: THE ISSUES, LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004755

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS ECON EAID PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DIYALA: THE ISSUES, LEADERS, POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Summary: Diyala is a mixed Province. Although the
Sunni represent a majority, they are underrepresented in the
Provincial Government due to their boycott of the January
2005 provincial elections. With a Shi'a minority government
trying to exert control over a Sunni-supported insurgency,
the provincial government is unable to pursue its goals and
programs. The situation has been exacerbated by Kurdish
expansion into northern areas of the province. New
provincial elections could relieve some pressure. A change
in military and police leadership, perceived as highly
sectarian, may also help. This is one of a series of cables
issued by the US Embassy Baghdad in conjunction with the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams addressing the questions of
what are the issues, who are the key players, and what are
possible steps forward for security and stability. End
Summary.

--------------
POLITICAL ISSUES
--------------


2. (SBU) Diyala is a mixed and complicated province
comprised of significant Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and Turkmen
populations. While Sunni Arabs comprise a majority within
Diyala province, they boycotted the last provincial elections
and as a result have only 14 out of 41 provincial council
seats. Within the Shia Alliance on the Provincial Council
SCIRI and Badr dominate, although there are a number of Dawa
party and independent Shia politicians. Sunni politicians
tend to be members of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),while
PUK and KDP are both represented within the Provincial
Council,s Kurdish Alliance.


3. (C) Diyala,s governor as well as the Provincial Iraqi
Police (IP) Commander and Iraqi Army (IA) Commander are all
Shia, a fact which has heightened sectarian tensions as
Sunnis feel increasingly marginalized in provincial
government. Combined with Sunni political disenchantment is
an increasing belief among Diyala residents from all
backgrounds that the provincial government is not working in
their best interests and is unable to counteract increasing
violence.


4. (C) Complicating matters further is the issue of Kurdish
expansion into areas within Diyala province. Diyala,s two
northern districts, Kifri and Khanaqin, have long been
Kurdish strongholds with many resources and even local
services provided by neighboring Sulaymaniyah province. It
has been anticipated that these two districts might try to
hold referendums as defined in Article 140 of the Iraqi
Constitution and vote to annex themselves to the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG). Recently, the KRG through its
draft constitution has claimed lands further south in Diyala
in areas which have not traditionally been Kurdish.


5. (C) With a Shia-minority, backed by high level Iraqi Army
and Iraqi Police commanders, trying to exert control over a
Sunni-majority population supporting the insurgency and a
Kurdish population determined to push forward its own agenda,
the provincial government is unable to move forward with its
goals and programs.

--------------
ECONOMIC ISSUES
--------------


6. (C) Diyala,s economy has historically been agrarian
based, with other business enterprises primarily located in
Baqubah, the provincial capital. Economic diversification
has always been a problem, although with Diyala,s
deteriorating security situation it has been even more
difficult to encourage investment and rebuild existing
businesses. The movement of goods into and out of the
province has also been severely affected by the security
situation leading shortages of essential items. Unemployment
continues to be a problem especially among male youths.
There is insufficient and unstable electricity which makes it
difficult to power industry, business or agriculture, further
crippling Diyala,s economy. Problems of corruption have
hindered Diyala reconstruction efforts and increased Diyala
residents, mistrust of local government officials. While
there have been reconstruction projects within Diyala,
identifying priorities and distributing the money is often

BAGHDAD 00004755 002 OF 003


based on a spoils system which increases sectarian tensions.


--------------
SECURITY
--------------


7. (C) Diyala is situated in the center of Iraq sharing a
border with Iran and Baghdad, Salah ad Din, Sulaymaniyah and
Wasit provinces. It is a former Baathist stronghold with a
strong Al Qaeda-Iraq (AQI) presence; former AQI leader
al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 in Baquba, Diyala
Province. Sunni Arab insurgents continue to attack both
Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Increasingly, Shia militias from Baghdad have entered into
Diyala, including Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),a militia affiliated
with extremist Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. There is strong
evidence suggesting Iran is taking advantage of the long and
poorly protected border to supply material and possibly
manpower to Shia militias in and through Diyala. Kurdish
territorial ambitions in northern Diyala have increased
sectarian tensions as Sunni Arabs resist what they consider
Kurdish effort to annex Diyala districts into the Kurdish
region.


8. (C) In addition to the previously mentioned elements,
there have been repeated charges of abuse by Diyala,s Shia
military and police commanders. Their sectarian agendas,
coupled with abuse allegations, have enflamed sectarian
tensions in an already volatile environment.

--------------
KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS
--------------


9. (C) Governor Ra,ad Rasheed al-Timimi (Shia) is the most
prominent Da,wa Party member in the Provincial government.
He is generally regarded as relatively non-sectarian,
although he has been hesitant to take action against ISF
Commanders who have demonstrated sectarian agendas and been
accused of abusing detainees.


10. (C) Ali Majeed Subruk al-Awsi (Shia) is the leading
SCIRI representative on the Provincial Council. There are
rumors that if the current governor leaves, al-Awsi will be
nominated to replace him.


11. (C) Ghassan al-Bawi (Shia) is the provincial police
chief and SCIRI party member. He has powerful connections in
Baghdad, has been accused of corruption and widespread abuse
of detainees.


12. (C) Auwf Rahumi al Rubai,i (Sunni Arab) is the
provinces Deputy Governor from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP).
He is one of three people controlling reconstruction
projects and funds, including Iraqi Development Funds.
Al-Ruba,i comes from Muqdadiyah from the center of the
province. .


13. (C) Sheikh. Hassan al-Mullah Ali al-Qaragholli (Sunni
Arab) is a spiritual leader and head of the Sunni endowment
(Waqf) in Diyala. He has considerable influence throughout
the province although he is currently under arrest for
suspicion of AQI activities.


14. (C) The mayor of Baquba, Khaled al Sanjery (Sunni Arab),
is possibly the single most powerful politician in the
Province. Strongly in favor of a peaceful solution to current
problems but also has strong connections to former
Ba,athists. .


15. (C) Ibrahim Bajillan, the Provincial Council chairman is
regarded as a mouthpiece for Iraqi President and PUK leader,
Jalal Talibani. The Provincial Council is regarded as
ineffective, and while Bajilan is not the sole source of the
Council,s problems, he has not taken concrete steps to
address the problems. He has been repeatedly accused of
corruption.

--------------
COMMENT: POSSIBLE STEPS FORWARD
--------------


16. (C) Security remains Diyala,s key challenge,
complicated by the various elements enflaming sectarian
tensions and pursuing disparate agendas. While countering
the AQI element will require joint CF-ISF operations,

BAGHDAD 00004755 003 OF 003


combating the Sunni insurgents, Baathists, Shia militias, and
criminal elements will require political as well as military
solutions. One of the immediate ways to address Sunni
marginalization within provincial politics is new provincial
elections. Assuming the Sunnis do not boycott future
elections, they would undoubtedly increase their number of
seats while Shia Arabs would see their numbers decrease.
This change in the balance of power could lead to more active
involvement in the political process from all members of
Diyala,s Sunni Arabs, including former Baathists and some
involved in the insurgency. In order for elections to occur,
the Council of Representatives (CoR) must pass the
Independent High Electoral Commission Law and eventually the
Provincial Powers Law.


17. (C) Another immediate way to diffuse increasing
sectarian tensions is the removal of the IA and IP Commanders
in Diyala, as long as they are replaced with professionals
who do not have a sectarian agenda. Diyala,s Governor
appears to support, at least to some degree, the removal of
the IP Commander Ghassan, although he has been concerned that
some of the replacements suggested by the central government
have been equally sectarian. Continued assistance, both
technical and operational, by CF will be required until ISF
can demonstrate to Diyala,s residents that they are not
targeting one group over another.


18. (C) Finally, investment in key infrastructure and
development of the Mansuriya/Hamrin gas field will be
critical to rebuilding and diversifying Diyala,s economy.
SCOBEY