SECURITY OF PALESTINIANS IN BAGHDAD DETERIORATING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004748

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY OF PALESTINIANS IN BAGHDAD DETERIORATING

REF: A. NEA/I CLASSIFIED O-I FOR NOVEMBER 16

B. 2006

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Margaret Scobey

This is an action cable. See paragraph 13-14 for action
request


1. (C) Summary: Nine Palestinians were killed on December
13 when several mortars hit their housing compound in
Baghdad. The hits were likely deliberate, and follow a
series of attacks, kidnappings, threats and harassment
against Palestinians. Iraqi officials lament this violence
and admit their impotence to stop it. In some instances,
Iraqi police reportedly collaborated with the perpetrators.
Prominent Shia leaders' have called for respect for the
rights of Palestinians, with limited success. Several
hundred Palestinians, hoping to find asylum in Syria, have
ended up camped in the border under harsh conditions.
Thousands of others are believed to have left Iraq on fake or
illegally obtained Iraqi passports. It is estimated that
between 6,000 and 15,000 Palestinians remain in Baghdad, down
from 23,000 to 25,000 in 2003.


2. (C) Summary continued: Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) militias are
reportedly responsible for the anti-Palestinian sectarian
violence. According to members of the Palestinian community,
the JAM suspects Palestinians of terrorism and support for
insurgents, resent their privileged status under Saddam, and
covet Palestinians' government-owned apartments. United
Nations High Commission for Refugees' (UNHCR) efforts to
secure a Palestinian safe haven in or outside of Iraq have
not bore fruit. UNHCR has suggested placing the Palestinians
under MNF-I protection in the military side of Baghdad's
International Airport. The hardship of Palestinians in
Baghdad is comparable to that of Sunni, Shia or Christian
victims of ethno-sectarian violence, but Palestinians'
options --to leave Iraq or to move to another part of the
country-- are circumscribed by their condition as stateless
refugees and their minority status.

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Background
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3. (U) Most Palestinians in Iraq are the descendants of the
4,000 to 5,000 refugees welcomed to the (then) kingdom of
Iraq in 1948, following the first Arab-Israeli war. A second
group, believed to be in the hundreds, arrived after the
six-day war in 1967. In 1991, the community grew with the
arrival of some one hundred Palestinian families expelled
from Kuwait after its liberation. The rights of Palestinians
are laid out in the Political Refugee Act of 1971, which:
grants refugees the right to work and access to education and
health; gives the Ministry of Interior authority to decide
where refugees live; and establishes an inter-ministerial
Permanent Committee for the Affairs of Political Refugees.
This committee currently includes the ministries of interior
(chair),defense, displacement and migration (MODM),the
ministry of state for national security, and the national
intelligence service.


4. (SBU) The Palestinians that entered Iraq in 1948 were
assigned apartments in government-owned housing compounds.
The 1948 Palestinians and many of their descendants continue
to live in these compounds throughout Baghdad. The
Palestinian compound of Baladiat (Nine Nissan District),the
largest of these housing projects, is comprised of 768
apartments in 16 buildings. Each apartment is generally home
to at least two families (twelve people). The second largest
compound is in the Al-Saha neighborhood of the Al-Doura
district, with 99 apartments. About 400 families not living
in government-owned apartments have their rents paid by UNHCR
through MODM. Other families live in privately-rented
apartments, generally adjacent or close to Palestinian
compounds.

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Instances of violence
--------------


5. (SBU) Palestinians are not alone in suffering sectarian
violence. On December 13, in addition to the nine
Palestinians, seventy-seven people were killed in sixteen
incidents of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad. Thousands
of Shias, Sunnis and Christians are internally displaced
persons (IDPs) or have left the country. In general, Sunni
IDPs have sought refuge with relatives or fellow tribes in
western Iraq, Shias have gravitated towards the south and

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Christians that have not left the country have headed north.
Palestinians are a minority concentrated in a handful of
neighborhoods in Baghdad. There are no communities of fellow
Palestinians that can host them outside the capital. As
stateless refugees, Palestinians don't have passports and are
not currently admitted in Syria, Jordan, or any other country.


6. (SBU) Some of the JAM attacks, killings, kidnappings and
threats against Palestinians in Baghdad since last September
that members of the Palestinian community have reported to
the Embassy Refugee Coordinator (RefCoord) include:

-- On September 25, JAM distributed threatening leaflets to
Palestinians in Al-Saha, Doura district. The threat demanded
"1967" Palestinian refugees to leave Iraq in twenty-four
hours or face decapitation. MNF-I preventatively increased
patrols in the area. On September 29, armed militias
returned to Al-Saha to renew their threats, which were not
carried out.

-- On September 27, the Palestinian husband, son, and four
Iraqi brothers of an Iraqi woman were abducted and murdered
in Al-Huriya, Kadhamiyah district. The kidnappers did not
make any demands or asked for ransom. RefCoord learned about
this incident from more than one source, underscoring its
veracity.

-- On October 7, Palestinian in the Al-Huriya neighborhood,
Kadhamiyah district, were threatened and harassed. One
Palestinian was reportedly beaten.

-- On October 19, three Palestinians died from a mortar
attack on the Baladiat compound, and two others were
seriously wounded. MNF-I responded to the incident by
providing first aid and transportation to hospitals.

-- On November 4, between fifty and sixty Palestinian
families in Baghdad Al-Jadida, Nissan district, temporarily
vacated their homes after receiving threats. Most of the
families returned after the situation calmed down.

-- On November 8, an elderly Palestinian man was reportedly
abducted from his home. He was found dead two days later.

-- On November 24, Sheik Tawfiq Abdul Khaliq, a religious
leader from the Palestinian community, was kidnapped in the
Al-Doura district. On November 27, his dead body was found
with signs of torture.

-- On December 1, militias shot and killed a Palestinian man
in a street in Baladiat. Also on December 1, two
Palestinians in the Al-Fadl area of Central Baghdad were
reportedly kidnapped and later found dead.


7. (SBU) Grand Ayatollah Sayid al-SISTANI issued a statement
on April 30 forbidding attacks on Palestinians --as have some
other Shia clerics since-- which may have prevented a more
severe onslaught on the community but this has not stopped
the threats, harassment and the more recent attacks against
the Baladiat compound. In response to the November 4 threats
against the Baghdad Al-Jadida residents, members of that
community asked local Shia clerics to reign over the
militias. The clerics maintained they had no control over
the militias, and advised the Palestinians to leave their
homes, at least temporarily. The Palestinian Mission Charge
d'Affaires, Dalil al Kosos, approached Sadrist organizations
in October to plea for an end to the militias' harassment and
violence. Al Kosos received assurances that the Sadrists
were not against the Palestinians, but JAM threats continued.
The failure of clerics and Sadrist organizations to reign
over the JAM underscore the militias' impunity and hardly
restrainable behavior.

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Government attitude and response
--------------


8. (C) Within the GOI, MODM is formally responsible for the
welfare of Palestinians in Iraq, but its capacity to fulfill
this mandate is lacking. MODM has not taken any initiative
to better protect the refugees, and is relying on the
ministry of interior to complete a census of the
Palestinians. The chairman of the GOI refugee committee and
Director General of Passports and Nationality at the Ministry
of Interior, Major General Yasseen Al-Yassiri, has played a
constructive role in addressing the legal concerns of the
Palestinians. Yassiri has confirmed that refugees are exempt
from the onerous registration requirements laid out in Iraq's
residency law, and is working with the committee on a plan to

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issue refugee identity cards to the Palestinians. However,
these legal protection initiatives -- which may take months
to implement -- will have little effect against JAM threats
and violence. Iraqi authorities have asserted that the GOI
is not trying to force the Palestinians out of the country,
but maintain that they have an extremely limited capacity to
protect them from the JAM, noting that Palestinians face the
same security problems as Iraqis.


9. (C) The Refugee Manager at the Office of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in Baghdad, Mohammed Abed Al Wahid
(protect) has no doubt that JAM and Iraqi police cooperate in
carrying out threats and attacks against Palestinians. In a
meeting with the RefCoord on October 1, Al Wahid noted that
the JAM militias that had distributed threats in Doura on
September 25 did not seem to have any problems violating the
curfew in effect that day or clearing checkpoints with their
weapons. He said that the Palestinians do not trust and thus
do not call the police when they are threatened. Instead,
they call the Palestinian Mission in Baghdad, MNF-I, and the
American Embassy, adding that they only trust MNF-I to
protect them. Some in the Iraqi government view the
Palestinian community as a security risk. Abed Al Kareem, a
National Police General that monitors refugee populations at
the Ministry of Interior, stated to the RefCoord on October 2
that some Palestinians are supporting the insurgents and are
engaged in terrorism (NFI). RefCoord is aware that there is
a handful of Palestinians detained by MNF-I (on a recent list
nine out of over 13,000 detainees were Palestinians).
Palestinian websites (although not necessarily from Iraq)
have posted statements supporting Saddam and criticizing his
trial, which has contributed to the dislike many Iraqis feel
for them.


10. (C) Al Kareem maintained that refugees that came to Iraq
in 1967 have no right to be in the country and should return
to Gaza or Egypt. He has promoted this view with MODM and
MOI officials, and even asked the RefCoord to support it. Al
Wahid told RefCoord that he thought Kareem's ideas had
reached the JAM, which would explain the September 25 threat
against "1967" Palestinians in particular. Fortunately, the
refugee permanent committee has not accepted this view and
considers all Palestinians in Iraq to be refugees. When
asked if the Iraqi police could do anything to crack down on
the threats and violence against the Palestinians, Al Kareem
said it could not. UNHCR's Officer in Charge for Central
Iraq, Mohammed Al Ani (protect),does not agree with a
sweeping characterization of Palestinians as terrorists or
insurgents. He lamented, however, that Hamas is present and
organized within the Iraqi Palestinian community (NFI).

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Search for a safe haven
--------------


11. (SBU) UNHCR has informally approached countries in the
region and beyond (NFI) to sound the possibility of
evacuating Palestinians out of Iraq. In May, the Syrian
government allowed entry to 294 Palestinians who had been
stranded at various border posts, but Syria is no longer
allowing Palestinians to enter. Approximately 350
Palestinians are currently camped in harsh conditions at the
At-Tanf border crossing between Syria and Iraq, hoping for
Syria to allow them entry or for UNHCR to find them third
country resettlement. Jordan is not admitting Palestinians
either. Canada has agreed to resettle 63 of the 150
Palestinians that Jordan had reluctantly admitted to its
Ruweished camp 50 miles from the border with Iraq. Some
other countries, including the US, may agree to resettle
small numbers of families from Ruweished. No country,
however, has agreed to admit a large number of Palestinians
from Iraq.


12. (C) Janvier de Riedmatten, UNHCR's Representative for
Iraq Operations (based in Amman) and RefCoord have discussed
with Kurdish Regional Government representatives the
possibility of allowing Palestinians to temporarily relocate
to Kurdistan. On November 28, RefCoord raised the issue with
Minister Dilshad Miran, Head of the Kurdish Region
Representation in Baghdad. Miran explained that the KRG is
already hosting thousands of IDPs fleeing violence in other
parts of the country, and implied that the KRG views Arab
immigration as a security liability. He added, however, that
he would present to the KRG council of ministers any proposal
that UNHCR may have. During a visit to Erbil in early
December, De Riedmatten discussed this possibility with Karim
Sinjari, KRG Minister of Interior. Sinjari recommended De
Riedmatten to present to KRG PM Nerchevan Barzani a formal
request, and said that if the KRG would agree to allow the

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Palestinians in, they would be placed in a camp under KRG
surveillance and their freedom of movement would be
restricted. De Riedmatten told RefCoord that his UNHCR
colleagues in Erbil were doubtful that the KRG would agree to
host the Palestinians. De Riedmatten added that he would
nevertheless write to Barzani.

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Possible Courses of Action
--------------


13. (C) Embassy Baghdad encourages the Department to
consider the following options for action:

a) Emergency assistance to establish a safe haven inside
Iraq: We would actively engage authorities in select
provinces to inquire about the possibility of relocating
Palestinians to these provinces. The provinces would be
selected for their relative security, and for their
ethnic/religious composition. The USG would commit to
finance projects in the host communities to entice their
acceptance of the Palestinians.

b) Demarche governments in the region to admit Palestinians:
The Department would decide which countries to demarche.
Several countries could each be urged to take a quota of
Palestinians, minimizing the burden on any one country. The
relocation could be proposed in terms of a temporary
humanitarian evacuation.

c) Admit Palestinians from Iraq into the US and encourage
other countries with formal refugee admission programs to do
the same. If countries in the region decline to admit them,
countries with formal admission programs should arguably be
less reluctant to accept Palestinian referrals.

d) Ask UNHCR and the GOI to provide housing allowances in
cash to allow Palestinian families that have been threatened
to rent houses in neighborhoods and cities where they may
feel safe. We would ask the GOI to allow the Palestinians to
move to neighborhoods and cities of their choosing, and the
government-owned housing that the Palestinians now occupy
would return to the GOI.

e) Our default, of course, is to continue to monitor the
situation of the refugees and planning for contingencies if
there is a need to take action more quickly. Indeed,
violence has become a fact of life affecting all ethnic and
sectarian groups in Iraq, and appears to have affected the
Palestinian population to date at virtually the same degree
as other groups. In addition, many of the Palestinians are
employed and integrated to varying degrees, in their current
locations. The drawback to this approach is that the timing
of an attack against the Palestinians -- as with any group in
Iraq -- may not be predictable.

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Comment
--------------


14. (C) None of the current options would provide a
near-term solution for the Palestinians. Post fully
recognizes the hesitance with which other countries in the
region may receive requests to accept these refugees and the
challenges encountered in seeking placement in the U.S.,
Canada, or Europe. With Department's concurrence and
guidance, we will continue to examine possible domestic
solutions, although this could face similar resistance. We
also request the Department examine what international
options and resources -- potentially beyond those laid out
above -- may be available and could provide a mid to
long-term solution.
SCOBEY