HAMOUDI ON THE MODERATE FRONT: "WE WILL GET THERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004717

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: HAMOUDI ON THE MODERATE FRONT: "WE WILL GET THERE
WITH TIME"


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary: Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, SCIRI's leader at the
Council of Representatives (CoR),told PolCouns December 20
that the Constitutional Review Committee had formed three
subcommittees to pursue its work: one would focus on the
major political issues, the second on completing unfinished
work from the constitution such as the federation council,
and the third on sovereignty. Hamoudi counseled patience on
developing a moderate front given the "conditions" recently
imposed by the IIP. He characterized the moderate front as
in line with Ayatollah al-Sistani's two main priorities,
emphasizing that it did not represent a means to isolate the
Sadrists but rather a mechanism to draw on long-standing
relationships to support the government. End summary.


2. (C) Hamoudi, who appeared tired, began by expressing his
satisfaction with SCIRI leader Abdelaziz al-Hakim's recent
trip to the US. Hamoudi, who was part of the delegation,
said that al-Hakim had consciously emphasized some of Iraq's
major accomplishments, including the establishment of
democratic institutions and even economic progress in some of
the provinces, particularly in the center and south. Hamoudi
said that al-Hakim was very pleased with his meetings with
President Bush and Secretary Rice, and offered his view that
al-Hakim's meetings on Capitol Hill had been valuable as
well. Hamoudi, who is chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee at the (CoR),requested that visiting Congressional
delegations consider meeting with representatives of his
committee and of the committees that corresponded to the
delegation members' expertise in order to support the
democratic project in Iraq.

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CRC Developments
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3. (C) Hamoudi, the chairman of the CRC, said the CRC had
created three subcommittees: 1) a political committee,
chaired by Ayad al-Samari'e (IIP),which would cover the
major political issues like federalism, provincial powers,
the identity of Iraq, and natural resources; 2) a committee
chaired by Hamoudi that would deal with unfinished issues
from the constitution, primarily the federation council and
certain independent commissions; and 3) a sovereignty
committee chaired by Fouad Ma'soum (PUK). The CRC had
extended the deadline from December 20 to December 31 for
suggestions from the Iraqi public and civil society, as well
as from the political blocs. Iraqiyya had submitted its
suggestions that day, Hamoudi said, and Tawafuq would submit
its proposals in the near future. Hamoudi said he did not
expect the Sadrists, who were not represented on the CRC and
had indicated they did not want to play a role in the
process, to make any submissions.

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Hamoudi Counsels Patience on the Moderate Front
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4. (C) Hamoudi confirmed that the IIP's "conditions" for
joining the moderate front had stalled negotiations for the
time being. These should be "goals, not preconditions," he
argued. "The front needs a gestation period," he continued.
"We will get there with time but it cannot be pushed too
fast." He noted that the Dawa party was hesitating and said
that many of the UIA independents wanted to participate but
could not because "they are individuals, not a party," i.e.
they lacked the necessary discipline and organization. Asked
whether Shi'a leaders had consulted Ayatollah al-Sistani,
Hamoudi replied that SISTANI had two goals: 1) building
effective and responsive state institutions to pull Iraq out
of its current difficulties; and 2) avoiding a weakening of
the UIA, as he feared that could lead to fighting. Noting
that SCIRI had opened a dialogue with the Sadrists on this
issue, Hamoudi emphasized that the moderate front was not
meant to weaken the UIA or marginalize the Sadrists and
expressed his regr
et that it had been portrayed that way in the media.
Instead, Hamoudi described the front as a way to employ the
long-standing relationships between Talabani, Barzani, and
SCIRI and Dawa leaders to support Iraqi government
institutions.
SCOBEY