HAMOUDI ON THE MODERATE FRONT: "WE WILL GET THERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004717 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: HAMOUDI ON THE MODERATE FRONT: "WE WILL GET THERE WITH TIME" Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, SCIRI's leader at the Council of Representatives (CoR),told PolCouns December 20 that the Constitutional Review Committee had formed three subcommittees to pursue its work: one would focus on the major political issues, the second on completing unfinished work from the constitution such as the federation council, and the third on sovereignty. Hamoudi counseled patience on developing a moderate front given the "conditions" recently imposed by the IIP. He characterized the moderate front as in line with Ayatollah al-Sistani's two main priorities, emphasizing that it did not represent a means to isolate the Sadrists but rather a mechanism to draw on long-standing relationships to support the government. End summary. ¶2. (C) Hamoudi, who appeared tired, began by expressing his satisfaction with SCIRI leader Abdelaziz al-Hakim's recent trip to the US. Hamoudi, who was part of the delegation, said that al-Hakim had consciously emphasized some of Iraq's major accomplishments, including the establishment of democratic institutions and even economic progress in some of the provinces, particularly in the center and south. Hamoudi said that al-Hakim was very pleased with his meetings with President Bush and Secretary Rice, and offered his view that al-Hakim's meetings on Capitol Hill had been valuable as well. Hamoudi, who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee at the (CoR),requested that visiting Congressional delegations consider meeting with representatives of his committee and of the committees that corresponded to the delegation members' expertise in order to support the democratic project in Iraq. -------------- CRC Developments -------------- ¶3. (C) Hamoudi, the chairman of the CRC, said the CRC had created three subcommittees: 1) a political committee, chaired by Ayad al-Samari'e (IIP),which would cover the major political issues like federalism, provincial powers, the identity of Iraq, and natural resources; 2) a committee chaired by Hamoudi that would deal with unfinished issues from the constitution, primarily the federation council and certain independent commissions; and 3) a sovereignty committee chaired by Fouad Ma'soum (PUK). The CRC had extended the deadline from December 20 to December 31 for suggestions from the Iraqi public and civil society, as well as from the political blocs. Iraqiyya had submitted its suggestions that day, Hamoudi said, and Tawafuq would submit its proposals in the near future. Hamoudi said he did not expect the Sadrists, who were not represented on the CRC and had indicated they did not want to play a role in the process, to make any submissions. -------------- -- Hamoudi Counsels Patience on the Moderate Front -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Hamoudi confirmed that the IIP's "conditions" for joining the moderate front had stalled negotiations for the time being. These should be "goals, not preconditions," he argued. "The front needs a gestation period," he continued. "We will get there with time but it cannot be pushed too fast." He noted that the Dawa party was hesitating and said that many of the UIA independents wanted to participate but could not because "they are individuals, not a party," i.e. they lacked the necessary discipline and organization. Asked whether Shi'a leaders had consulted Ayatollah al-Sistani, Hamoudi replied that Sistani had two goals: 1) building effective and responsive state institutions to pull Iraq out of its current difficulties; and 2) avoiding a weakening of the UIA, as he feared that could lead to fighting. Noting that SCIRI had opened a dialogue with the Sadrists on this issue, Hamoudi emphasized that the moderate front was not meant to weaken the UIA or marginalize the Sadrists and expressed his regr et that it had been portrayed that way in the media. Instead, Hamoudi described the front as a way to employ the long-standing relationships between Talabani, Barzani, and SCIRI and Dawa leaders to support Iraqi government institutions. SCOBEY