Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4698
2006-12-24 13:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SECDEF MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PTER IZ 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8708
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004698 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SECDEF MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004698 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER IZ SUBJECT: SECDEF MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During Secretary of Defense Gates' December 21 meeting with Minister of Defense Abdul Qader Mufraji, Minister of Interior Jawad Bolani and National Security Advisor Mowaffuk al-Rubaie, Iraq's key security officials focused on institutional challenges and capacity building. They all described the similar challenges they face in building Iraq's immature security institutions and processes while trying to combat terrorism and insurgency. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Minister of Interior Bolani welcomed the new Secretary of Defense to Baghdad, describing it as a good opportunity to take stock of what had been accomplished in six months of democratic government. The situation varied by region, he said, with three Iraqi provinces having made the transition from coalition to provincial responsibility for security. He felt this demonstrated some progress in security and force development. The National Police were being retrained and re-qualified; two brigades had already completed the program, with a third about to start. ¶3. (S) Bolani acknowledged the importance of regaining the people's trust. It was important to understand the social and political context of the security situation, he said, and to build a police force suited to a democratic system. The force needed to uphold democratic values and be loyal. Bolani acknowledged the difficulty of doing so while adhering to democratic values. Nobody could be above the law. The other challenge was to develop the force while engaged in combat. There had been progress in this area, he asserted, listing the development of forensic capabilities, establishment of 13 police academies, construction of 258 border fortresses and 13 ports of entry. ¶4. (S) Reinforcing his belief in core values - loyalty and accountability - and effective performance, Bolani said that he was rehabilitating the Ministry of Interior. This would require patience and time. Procedures had been initiated for dealing with militia influence. Both corruption and sectarian extremists must be weeded out and practices that promote unity established. A key element in doing this was finding the right leader, Bolani asserted, and he had succeeded in finding these commanders. He concluded by remembering the 12,000 police who have so far been ki
lled in the conflict and expressing his confidence that good will triumph. ¶5. (S) Iraqi Minister of Defense Abdul Qader, who had briefly outlined a more decentralized approach to security operations in Baghdad in an introductory meeting with the Secretary the previous evening, devoted his attention to describing the development of Iraq's armed forces. Abdul Qader said that he was satisfied with the force's training system but the logistics system needs additional work. Plans to resolve this were now being prepared in cooperation with the Multi-National Security Transition Command. ¶6. (S) Abdul Qader said that new units were being raised and existing units manned at higher level. The challenge now was on increasing the force's mobility. Ten helicopters had been procured and were now being fitted with the protection equipment they lack. Sixteen Huey helicopters were also being acquired. The Iraqi Army 9th Division was a mobile unit with armored personnel carriers, T-72 tanks and wheeled armored vehicles such as BTRs. ¶7. (S) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance were also focuses of procurement, with the goal being to acquire Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for each brigade. The Iraqi Air Force had three C-130 transport aircraft and would acquire additional medium range planes. The Iraqi Navy would also expand with the procurement of light boats from Malaysia, he concluded. ¶8. (S) Responding to a question from Secretary Gates, Abdul Qader acknowledged that infiltration of the Iraqi armed forces by militia groups "could not be denied." This was not a major problem, he said, due the effective system of screening of new recruits. ¶9. (S) Iraq's National Security Advisor described the functioning of Iraq's "national security architecture." Important security discussions are held and decisions taken in the Ministerial Committee on National Security, presided over by the Prime Minister and including the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Justice, and the Minister of State for National Security, Commander of the Joint Forces and the Director of the National Intelligence Service. The Deputy BAGHDAD 00004698 002 OF 002 Prime Minister and other ministers, such as the Finance Ministers also sometimes participate. Rubaie said that the Deputy Committee for National Security and subordinate committees are charged with preparing the work of this committee and situation centers support its functioning. ¶10. (S) Turning to the intelligence side, he said that the National Intelligence Coordination Committee was chaired by the National Security Advisor and included heads of all the intelligence agencies. This committee had recently agreed on a draft Intelligence and National Security Law which could now be sent to parliament for approval. Rubaie said it is now time for Iraqis to develop a timeline to "take ownership" of these structures and to improve their functioning. (Note: much of the staff and administrative work for the committees and situation rooms continues to be done by MNFI). SCOBEY

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