PM COMMITS TO UNVEILING AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004667

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: PM COMMITS TO UNVEILING AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY ON
BAGHDAD SECURITY, MOVING FORWARD ON DE-BAATH, FORGING
MODERATE FRONT


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki December 20
told the Ambassador he sought decisive action with the
development of a new plan for security in Baghdad and agreed
to announce the new plan at a speech in coming days. He also
agreed with the importance of following through with his
commitment at the recent Political Party Reconciliation
Conference for the reintegration of some members of the
former military into the current armed forces or the payment
of pensions to those who could not be reintegrated. The PM
expressed concern about preconditions the IIP had made for
participating in the proposed moderate political front, but
emphasized the importance of moving forward with the front as
a means for allowing the government to go after the Jaysh
al-Mahdi and extreme Sunni elements. He said the Ambassador
should follow up on Sunni extremist cleric Harith al-Dhari's
interest in a meeting if the Ambassador believes it would
produce results. The Ambassador and the PM also discussed
UAE interest in managing and potentially building a port at
Um Qasr. End Summary.

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MALIKI SEEKS DECISIVE ACTION ON BAGHDAD SECURITY
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2. (S) The Ambassador informed PM Maliki that the U.S. review
of Iraq policy continued, but that President Bush planned to
complete the project probably in early January. The
Ambassador recommended that PM Maliki deliver a statement or
speech on his security plan around the same time, but before
the President's speech. The Ambassador said the PM speech
should come at a time after the PM is certain that the
security plan would make a decisive difference, and when the
implementation of the plan has started or will start
immediately after the statement. PM Maliki agreed both that
he should deliver the speech and that he must be in a
position to act quickly and decisively. The Ambassador said
the plan or strategy should be to break the cycle of
violence. Otherwise the situation in Iraq could continue to
deteriorate, the government's standing decline further, and
the enemies become emboldened.

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RECONCILIATION, DE-BAATHIFICATION, AND THE MODERATE FRONT
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3. (S) Complimenting the PM on his December 16 speech at the
Political Parties Reconciliation Conference, the Ambassador
asked the PM if he had begun to develop a plan for
implementing policy steps raised in the speech. Maliki noted
that the Ministry of Reconciliation was due to release that
day a report of recommendations from the conference.
Especially important would be those addressing the problems
of dismissed members of the former army. His office was
looking to establish a commission to resolve the issue of the
former army. The Ambassador noted that he had heard Iraq's
new budget would include 100 million USD for paying pensions
to former army members and 150 million for employment
projects for those who were not of retirement age.


4. (S) The Ambassador related that he was speaking to Ahmed
Chalabi about the process of de-Baathification. He also
noted merit in a proposal by SCIRI leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim
that de-Baathification should follow the along the lines the
PM had proposed and also include a program for people who
suffered under Saddam as well as a mechanism to monitor any
resurgence of the Baath party. The PM emphasized it was
important to develop a process of compensation for martyrs
and political prisoners.


5. (S) The Ambassador said that KRG President Barzani was
concerned that the IIP was hesitating on the moderate front.
The Ambassador had seen their list of demands and asked the
PM for his reading of the situation. Maliki described the
IIP as being unreasonable in making the demands before the
front was even formed. This reflected uncertainty within the
IIP about the front and would open the door for other parties
to come in with preconditions. The Ambassador stated that
the IIP did, indeed, appear to be divided on the issue. They
seek reassurance from the PM that their program will be taken
seriously. Acknowledging the difficulties the PM and others
faced in forming the moderate front, the Ambassador said it
was important to move forward, ideally with Shia, Sunni, and
Kurdish moderates together. The PM underscored his continued
commitment to the establishment of the moderate front, which
he said was essential for Iraq to be able to deal with its
problems -- notably Moqtada al-Sadr on one side and fringe
Baathists on the other.

BAGHDAD 00004667 002 OF 002



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A MEETING WITH AL-DHARI?
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6. (S) The Ambassador told PM Maliki that Arab League Envoy
Lamani informed him Sunni extremist cleric Harith al-Dhari
was interested in reaching some sort of cooperative
understanding. Lamani had asked the Ambassador if he would
be willing to meet with al-Dhari; the Ambassador did not wish
to do so without consulting with Maliki first. The
Ambassador said he did not know al-Dhari's agenda for such a
meeting, or whether the latter would use it for propaganda
purposes. The Ambassador said he was inclined not to meet
with al-Dhari at the onset, but rather to send a lower level
Embassy representative to meet with him to get a sense of
what he seeks. Maliki replied that he would support any
dialogue with al-Dhari that could produce positive results.
It would be "a miracle," the PM stated, if al-Dhari truly
sought reconciliation, but no avenues should be closed.

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THE UAE AND THE PORT AT UM QASR
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7. (S) The Ambassador noted that during his recent trip to
the UAE, he had discussed Iraqi interest in rejuvenating the
port at Um Qasr with UAE Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamden
bin Zayed. Maliki said he wanted the UAE firm both to
reconstruct and to run the port, or to build a new port. The
Ambassador committed to convey this to Zayed. The Ambassador
related that Zayed said that one of the problems with the
port was that there remained a lot of damaged ships that
needed to be removed, but Zayed said this could be done by a
contractor specializing in ship removal. He had also
mentioned concern about port security, noting militia
activities nearby.
KHALILZAD