AL-HAKIM AND AMBASSADOR REVIEW POLITICAL AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004653

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AL-HAKIM AND AMBASSADOR REVIEW POLITICAL AND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: SCIRI leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim told the
Ambassador on December 19 that discussions on the moderate
front were continuing but no agreement had been reached. He
said that the IIP had raised some questions, and he also
criticized the IIP for supporting a recent conference in
Istanbul. After listening to the Ambassador's take on the
regional situation, al-Hakim said he was "ready" to visit
countries like Saudi Arabia if the opportunity arose.
Al-Hakim also offered his view on the principles that should
govern de-Baathification reform, which balanced compensation
to victims of the Baath regime with a reasoned approach to
former Baathists and their families. End summary.


2. (C) Al-Hakim opened the meeting by recounting in broad
terms his recent trip to the US, with Mohsin al-Hakim, also
present at the meeting, providing additional details about
the trip. Al-Hakim was clearly enthusiastic about the
breadth of interlocutors he had met and singled out his
meetings with President Bush and Secretary Rice as
particularly positive. He said he looked forward to further
meetings to follow up on some of the issues discussed in
Washington. The Ambassador said that the President and
Secretary Rice were very happy with al-Hakim's trip and

SIPDIS
agreed with al-Hakim on the need for follow-up.

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Revising the Baghdad Security Plan
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3. (C) The Ambassador briefed al-Hakim on current thinking on
a revised Baghdad security plan, noting that it should be a
combined GOI-Coalition plan under the leadership of Iraqi
forces that targeted all those causing insecurity and that
also contained improved provisions to protect Baghdad
residents. Al-Hakim agreed with the principles the
Ambassador put forward, emphasizing that "we cannot accept
any militias or actions outside the framework of the state."
He also noted the importance of improved equipment, improved
intelligence, more effective checkpoint procedures, and
developing a mechanism to make use of ideas and information
from "sincere elements" of the government's base of support
in Baghdad.

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The Moderate Front and Regional Developments
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4. (C) The Ambassador noted the importance of positive
political developments in complementing the security plan and
regional diplomatic initiatives and asked al-Hakim about
developments in building the moderate front. Al-Hakim said
there was "preliminary consensus" on the program, but it
needed more work to be realized. The coordination mechanism,
he continued, had also not been determined, with the IIP
"having some questions." The group, al-Hakim said, planned
"to study these issues, take decisions, and move forward."


5. (C) Al-Hakim expressed displeasure at two recent
developments related to the moderate front. First, he opined
that "the media regrettably caused embarrassment to some
entities" by portraying the front as being established to
marginalize the Sadrists. This portrayal, al-Hakim argued,
was incorrect: "we want to establish a strong state, not
confront a certain movement." He also criticized the IIP for
sending a representative to the Conference in Support of the
Iraqi People held in Istanbul the previous week and for
giving its support to the conference's statement. (Note:
According to one report, IIP official Ziyad al-Ani attended
the conference. We do not have evidence about an official
IIP statement of support. End note.) He also criticized
al-Hashemi for his remarks in the US about the Iraqi
government.


6. (C) The Ambassador told al-Hakim that the regional
situation was not positive at this point, with Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the UAE declining to host the final compact
meeting. While President Bush was ready to put more pressure
on the Saudis and others to take a better stance on Iraq, the
Ambassador continued, there needed to be positive action and
political development in Iraq. The Ambassador noted that it
might help if al-Hakim visited Saudi Arabia and other Arab
countries. Al-Hakim replied with a shrug, saying he was
"ready" but suggesting he did not have an invitation. The
Ambassador said that the US would help.

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Ministerial Changes and De-Baathification

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7. (C) The Ambassador asked al-Hakim if there was any
progress on ministerial changes, perhaps involving a formula
that would give the Prime Minister more flexibility in
exchange for more accountability. Al-Hakim said that SCIRI
supported the need to strengthen ministers and that they
should not be "party-affiliated." He said that SCIRI would
evaluate its ministers based on criteria including budget
execution and the quality and affiliations of the deputies
they appointed. The Ambassador noted that the minister's
compatibility with the Prime Minister should also be a
criterion. Badr leader Hadi al-Amri, who was present at the
meeting, voiced his agreement, saying that the "Prime
Minister and the minister's party" should be the "references"
for evaluating a minister's performance.


8. (C) Prompted by the Ambassador to discuss progress on
de-Baathification reform, al-Hakim noted he was not at a
recent PCNS meeting where the issue was discussed but offered
four principles that should govern the reform effort: 1) the
goal should not be revenge; 2) "we should not deprive
families of bread"; 3) consideration should be given to the
pressure put on Iraqis to join the Baath party ("joining the
Baath is not like joining al-Qaeda"); and, 4) offering
something to the victims of the Baath regime. Al-Amri
reinforced the importance of offering compensation to Baath
victims "so that they don't take revenge into their own
hands." Al-Amri and the Ambassador then discussed the
reintegration of former Badr Corps members into the Iraqi
security forces (ISF). The Ambassador noted that the Prime
Minister had given him a list several months ago of
approximately 900 Badr members who had been offered jobs with
the police. Al-Amri countered that he was still waiting for
implementation of an agreement that would bring 600 Badr
officers into the ISF. The Ambassador said that he would
follow up on the matter.
KHALILZAD