VP ABDEL MEHDI DESCRIBES "SETBACK" IN MODERATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004631 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: VP ABDEL MEHDI DESCRIBES "SETBACK" IN MODERATE FRONT NEGOTIATIONS REF: BAGHDAD 4609 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador on December 19 that there haQbeen a "setback" in negotiations oQthe moderate front. The IIP representative had come to the most recent meeting with a set of conditions that had to be filled before the party would join. There was also "hesitation" within the Dawa party, Abdel Mehdi said, although the Prime Minister was on board. When the Ambassador raised the need for ministerial changes, Abdel Mehdi criticized the Prime Minister's indecisiveness. FinallQ Abdel Mehdi offered several ideas to improve security, including moving key government institutions out of the green zone. End Smmary. -------------- "Setbacks" in Moderate Front Negotiations -------------- ¶2. (S) Moving immediately to progress on moderate front negotiations (reftel),Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador that there had been a "setback." He said that Ali Baban, Minister of Planning and the IIP representative on the negotiating committee in Vice President Tarik al-Hashemi's absence, had arrived at the last meeting "disappointed" because he had to relay an IIP decision he "personally did not agree with." This decision, Abdel Mehdi continued, was that IIP would demand that certain conditions be met before they would join the front. He handed the Ambassador a "non-paper" Baban had delivered to the group containing these conditions. (Note: These conditions centered on security concerns and included the formation of a balanced emergency force in Baghdad and an immediate announcement by the government of the disbanding and disarming of militias. Further discussion septel. End note.) Noting that al-Hashemi had expressed his dissatisfaction to Secretary Rice on Maliki's lack of action on issues of concern, the Ambassador commented that a way had to be found to bring al-Hashemi on board, perhaps by setting up some sort of implementing body. ¶3. (S) Abdel Mehdi observed that the IIP was just one side of a "two-sided problem." Though the Prime Minister was on board, he continued, senior Dawa party figures "were still hesitant." They feared, Abdel Mehdi claimed, that the moderate front represented an attempt to overthrow the Prime Minister and that it would weaken the UIA by explicitly marginalizing the Sadrists. Abdel Mehdi said that SCIRI was in bilateral discussions with Dawa to resolve these concerns, and that he and the two Kurdish leaders would meet December 20 to discuss the way forward. He noted that he had given a press conference earlier in the day where he had emphasized that the front was not against any group, was not meant to dissolve the UIA, was meant to support Maliki, and was an Iraqi not a U.S. initiative. -------------- Maliki "Needs to Take Decisions" -------------- ¶4. (S) The Ambassador raised the need for ministerial changes and for giving the Prime Minister flexibility in making these changes. "The key is where the decisions are made," Abdel Mehdi replied, "not the ministers themselves. The Prime Minister needs to be more resolved and take decisions that do not end up getting changed after late night discussions with other people. We have lots of plans but we need action. We have to find a way of activating our institutions. The Prime Minister has to move forward; he has our support." -------------- New Security Proposals -------------- ¶5. (S) Turning to security, Abdel Mehdi described the situation as "very bad," pointing to the recent attack and kidnapping at the Iraqi Red Crescent; an attack that morning on a bank in Karrada; and a recent attack on a convoy of his bodyguards while they were running an errand in Mansour. (Note: Abdel Mehdi was not in the convoy. End note.) He outlined several ideas to improve security in Baghdad, including 1) moving the Council of Representatives and the Prime Minister's Office out of the green zone and reinforcing them and other ministries with several hundred trained security personnel in each place; and 2) requiring all 18-year olds to enlist for military training and a short period of service as a "reserve force." The Ambassador recommended that these proposals be put on the next MCNS agenda. BAGHDAD 00004631 002 OF 002 KHALILZAD