Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4572
2006-12-15 16:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
BAGHDAD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0018 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHGBA #4572 3491614 ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF6145 3491556 P 151614Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004572
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
BAGHDAD 00004572 001.3 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: BAGHDAD PRT LEADER JOE GREGOIRE. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004572
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
BAGHDAD 00004572 001.3 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: BAGHDAD PRT LEADER JOE GREGOIRE. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (U) THIS IS A BAGHDAD PRT REPORTING CABLE.
PAGE 02 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. (C) SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH FUNCTIONING, THE BAGHDAD CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM IS EXHIBITING STRESSES THAT, UNLESS CORRECTED,
WILL SERIOUSLY INHIBIT ITS LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS AND
SUCCESS. INADEQUATE INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL, POOR TRAINING
AND RESOURCES SHORTFALLS; MILITIA INFILTRATION WITHIN THE
IRAQI POLICE (IP); DELINQUENT RELATIONS BETWEEN POLICE AND
JUDICIARY; INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF DETAINEES BY POORLY
TRAINED AND UNDERPAID APPOINTED COUNSEL; AND PRISON
OVERCROWDING COMBINE TO CREATE A HIGHLY INEFFECTUAL SYSTEM.
FROM MAY TO NOVEMBER 2006 THE BAGHDAD PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT),RULE OF LAW SECTION (ROL),
CONDUCTED NUMEROUS ON-SITE ASSESSMENTS OF POLICE, COURT AND
PRISON FACILITIES IN THE BAGHDAD GOVERNATE AND HELD
DISCUSSIONS WITH A VARIETY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
CONTACTS. THIS REPORTING SYNTHESIZES THE PRT ROL
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS DURING THIS PERIOD. END SUMMARY.
--------------
POLICE LACK RESOURCES AND TRAINING
PAGE 03 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
--------------
3. (C) ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI POLICE (IP) ARE RELIED ON AS THE
LEAD INVESTIGATORS FOR CRIMES AND THE APPREHENSION OF
CRIMINALS, THE IP OFTEN SAY THEY ARE POORLY TRAINED AND
GENERALLY NOT UP TO THESE TASKS. SECOND OFFICER IN CHARGE
LT. ADIL OF POLICE STATION BELAT AL SHUHDA (RASHEED DISTRICT)
TOLD PRT STAFF EARLY SEPTEMBER THAT 70 PERCENT OF HIS STAFF
WAS INSUFFICIENTLY TRAINED TO CONDUCT THEIR WORK EFFECTIVELY.
IN A SIMILAR COMPLAINT, COLONEL RAAD FROM MANSOUR DISTRICT'S
AL KHADRA POLICE STATION CLAIMED THAT HIS STAFF ALSO RECEIVED
INSUFFICIENT TRAINING, PARTICULARLY IN WEAPONS USE. THESE
COMPLAINTS MATCH MANY OTHERS THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM LOCAL
BAGHDAD POLICE STATIONS.
4. (C) IP UNITS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL CHRONICALLY SAID THEY
LACKED BASIC FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE AND
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. DURING A VISIT IN SEPTEMBER, MAJOR SALEM
MARUSH AL-MALIKI OF GHAZALIYA POLICE STATION TOLD PRT STAFF
THAT HIS STAFF LACKED SUFFICIENT UNIFORMS, FIREARMS, AND
PAGE 04 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
VEHICLES TO CONDUCT THEIR WORK PROPERLY. HE ALSO COMPLAINED
THAT HIS STATION DID NOT HAVE FUEL TO SUPPORT THEIR
GENERATOR. COLONEL RAAD OF KHADRA POLICE STATION DESCRIBED
SIMILAR PROBLEMS, AND NOTED THAT THAT HIS OWN OFFICERS BUY
FUEL FOR THE STATION OUT OF THEIR OWN SALARIES. THESE AND
OTHER POLICE STATION HEADS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT SUPPORT FROM
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THESE
RESOURCES, IS SO POOR THAT POLICE ON THE STREET OFTEN DON'T
HAVE ACCESS TO VEHICLES, ELECTRICITY IN THE STATIONS,
AMMUNITION, OR OFFICE SUPPLIES.
5. (C) THE IP MISSION AT THE STREET LEVEL IS ALSO HAMPERED BY
MILITIA INTERFERENCE AND PRESSURE, LACK OF LOCAL TRUST BY THE
POPULATION, AND FEARS FOR PERSONAL SAFETY. MNF-I POLICE
TRAINER REPORTS INDICATE A BELIEF THAT JAM HAS INFILTRATED
VARIOUS POLICE STATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE GHAZALIA POLICE STATION
IN A PREDOMINANTLY SUNNI AREA. RESIDENTS OF OTHER DISTRICTS
HAVE OFTEN ALLEGED TO EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT LOCAL POLICE
WERE INFILTRATED BY JAYSH AL MAHDI OR BADR CORPS MILITIA.
FEARING THIS INFILTRATION, MANY RESIDENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE
PAGE 05 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FROM SUNNI NEIGHBORHOODS SAY THEY DO NOT TRUST THEIR LOCAL
POLICE AND FEAR GOING TO THEM FOR HELP.
6. (C) THE IP HAVE INDICATED TO PRT OFFICIALS THAT SINCE THEY
GENERALLY LACK THE BASIC TRUST OF THE CITIZENS OF BAGHDAD
AND, BECAUSE OF SECURITY THREATS, THEY ARE OFTEN AFRAID TO DO
THEIR JOBS. THIS FEAR IS SO EXTENSIVE THAT IRAQI POLICE ARE
SOMETIMES EVEN UNWILLING TO INVESTIGATE THE MURDER OF FELLOW
OFFICERS. IN SOME AREAS OF THE CITY, POLICE OFFICIALS HAVE
OPENLY ADMITTED TO ROL OFFICIALS THAT THEY CAN INVESTIGATE,
AT MOST, ONLY 10% OF ALL SERIOUS CRIMES REPORTED.
-------------- -
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND JUDICAL SYSTEM
-------------- -
7. (C) WHEN AN ARREST IS MADE, THE LACK OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN IPS AND THE INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES OFTEN
PREVENTS CASES FROM BEING THOROUGHLY AND SUCCESSFULLY
INVESTIGATED AND PROSECUTED. IN THE IRAQI JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
PAGE 06 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES ARE THE INITIAL AND PRIMARY GATE KEEPERS
FOR PROSECUTIONS. IRAQI POLICE VIEW INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES,
AND THE JUDICIAL INVESTIGATORS THEY WORK WITH, AS DETACHED
FROM AND UNRESPONSIVE TO CASES SUBMITTED BY THEM. DEPUTY
CHIEF RAHIEM FROM MAMOUN POLICE STATION IN MANSOUR TOLD PRT
STAFF IN SEPTEMBER THAT INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES DO NOT COME TO
BAGHDAD 00004572 002.2 OF 003
the station to review cases nor to meet the police
investigators as they used to prior to 2003. Colonel Raad
from al Khadra police station complained in a separate visit
that communication between investigative judges and
investigative police is limited and never occurs face to
face, potentially affecting the quality of investigations.
8. (C) Investigative judges in turn often view the IP as
ineffective, corrupt and ill-prepared to investigate criminal
cases. LTC Adil from police station Behat al Shuhada
commented to PRT that the justice system does not understand
the problems facing IPs and perceive them to be corrupt.
9. (C) Investigative judges, who before 2003 actively visited
crime scenes to gather evidence and take witness statements,
are now generally bound to their courthouses and rarely visit
the police stations for which they are responsible. Instead,
investigative duties are delegated to the IP or judicial
investigators. Both the IP and investigative judges are
united in their belief that they have inadequate personnel
and training to perform their responsibilities and
consistently complain of the need for additional staffing and
training to perform their duties.
--------------
DETAINEES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE
--------------
10. (C) These systemic problems have resulted in many cases
of detainees being held for as long as two years awaiting
trial. In the visit to al Khadra station in September, four
of the 13 detainees held there claimed to have been detained
over one year without having gone to trial ) one detainee
said he had been in the holding cell for two years. These
detainees are often held in small and over-crowded local
police holding cells, neither intended nor suited for long
term confinement. Lengthy detention is aggravated by prison
over-crowding, resulting in local police station jail cells
serving as both pre-trail detention facilities and long-term
holding cells from convicted criminals.
11. (C) While waiting in their holding cells, detainees often
do not enjoy the rights typically associated with access to
justice. Although detainees who can not afford counsel are
guaranteed representation, this counsel is generally not
available until the day they are brought before an
investigative judge, often days or weeks after their initial
detention and interrogation. Even after receiving court
appointed counsel, appointed defense attorneys rarely, if
ever, see their clients. When asked about this, police and
investigators state that that defense attorneys have no
incentive to follow a case. Payments are based on service,
not performance. Defense attorneys receive 25,000 Dinar ($17
USD) when before an investigative judge and 50,000 Dinar ($34
USD) at the trial.
12. (C) A prominent exception to the problems referenced
above is the Baghdad Branch of the Central Criminal Court of
Iraq (CCCI). Significantly financed and supported by U.S.
personnel and operating within the International Zone, the
CCCI is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
some of the most prominent Baghdad criminal cases, including
those of terrorism and corruption. The success of the CCCI
demonstrates that, with sufficient attention to funding and
security, the Iraqi criminal justice system can work.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
13. (C) The Baghdad PRT ROL Team assesses that the Baghdad
criminal court system is functioning, but under apparent and
increasing pressure. The IP believe they have been abandoned
by the Ministry of Interior and lack the funding, training,
and resources to do their jobs well at police stations.
Militias continue to aggressively infiltrate or influence the
police forces, which compromises their ability to fairly,
uniformly, and aggressively enforce the law. Combined, these
frictions have led to a police force that is generally unable
to serve and protect the citizens of Baghdad and forward
cases into the Baghdad criminal justice system. Dependence on
Coalition Forces continues in the absence of viable MOI
support.
14. (C) The participation in training and operation of the
International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) has gives some
hope, but results are spotty and not all IP stations are
covered by IPLO staff. Cooperation between the Baghdad PRT
and the IPLO has resulted in new initiatives to integrate
investigative judges, judicial staff, and police
BAGHDAD 00004572 003.2 OF 003
investigators in the IPLO training programs in an attempt to
rectify some of the challenges we have uncovered. The PRT
ROL section recognizes that criminal justice matters comprise
only a part of the Iraqi justice system and will report
separately on Iraqi civil courts, law schools, human rights
organizations, and Sharia and tribal courts to determine how
these institutions are working to address a range of social
justice issues.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
BAGHDAD 00004572 001.3 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: BAGHDAD PRT LEADER JOE GREGOIRE. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (U) THIS IS A BAGHDAD PRT REPORTING CABLE.
PAGE 02 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. (C) SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH FUNCTIONING, THE BAGHDAD CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM IS EXHIBITING STRESSES THAT, UNLESS CORRECTED,
WILL SERIOUSLY INHIBIT ITS LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS AND
SUCCESS. INADEQUATE INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL, POOR TRAINING
AND RESOURCES SHORTFALLS; MILITIA INFILTRATION WITHIN THE
IRAQI POLICE (IP); DELINQUENT RELATIONS BETWEEN POLICE AND
JUDICIARY; INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF DETAINEES BY POORLY
TRAINED AND UNDERPAID APPOINTED COUNSEL; AND PRISON
OVERCROWDING COMBINE TO CREATE A HIGHLY INEFFECTUAL SYSTEM.
FROM MAY TO NOVEMBER 2006 THE BAGHDAD PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT),RULE OF LAW SECTION (ROL),
CONDUCTED NUMEROUS ON-SITE ASSESSMENTS OF POLICE, COURT AND
PRISON FACILITIES IN THE BAGHDAD GOVERNATE AND HELD
DISCUSSIONS WITH A VARIETY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
CONTACTS. THIS REPORTING SYNTHESIZES THE PRT ROL
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS DURING THIS PERIOD. END SUMMARY.
--------------
POLICE LACK RESOURCES AND TRAINING
PAGE 03 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
--------------
3. (C) ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI POLICE (IP) ARE RELIED ON AS THE
LEAD INVESTIGATORS FOR CRIMES AND THE APPREHENSION OF
CRIMINALS, THE IP OFTEN SAY THEY ARE POORLY TRAINED AND
GENERALLY NOT UP TO THESE TASKS. SECOND OFFICER IN CHARGE
LT. ADIL OF POLICE STATION BELAT AL SHUHDA (RASHEED DISTRICT)
TOLD PRT STAFF EARLY SEPTEMBER THAT 70 PERCENT OF HIS STAFF
WAS INSUFFICIENTLY TRAINED TO CONDUCT THEIR WORK EFFECTIVELY.
IN A SIMILAR COMPLAINT, COLONEL RAAD FROM MANSOUR DISTRICT'S
AL KHADRA POLICE STATION CLAIMED THAT HIS STAFF ALSO RECEIVED
INSUFFICIENT TRAINING, PARTICULARLY IN WEAPONS USE. THESE
COMPLAINTS MATCH MANY OTHERS THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM LOCAL
BAGHDAD POLICE STATIONS.
4. (C) IP UNITS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL CHRONICALLY SAID THEY
LACKED BASIC FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INFRASTRUCTURE AND
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. DURING A VISIT IN SEPTEMBER, MAJOR SALEM
MARUSH AL-MALIKI OF GHAZALIYA POLICE STATION TOLD PRT STAFF
THAT HIS STAFF LACKED SUFFICIENT UNIFORMS, FIREARMS, AND
PAGE 04 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
VEHICLES TO CONDUCT THEIR WORK PROPERLY. HE ALSO COMPLAINED
THAT HIS STATION DID NOT HAVE FUEL TO SUPPORT THEIR
GENERATOR. COLONEL RAAD OF KHADRA POLICE STATION DESCRIBED
SIMILAR PROBLEMS, AND NOTED THAT THAT HIS OWN OFFICERS BUY
FUEL FOR THE STATION OUT OF THEIR OWN SALARIES. THESE AND
OTHER POLICE STATION HEADS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT SUPPORT FROM
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THESE
RESOURCES, IS SO POOR THAT POLICE ON THE STREET OFTEN DON'T
HAVE ACCESS TO VEHICLES, ELECTRICITY IN THE STATIONS,
AMMUNITION, OR OFFICE SUPPLIES.
5. (C) THE IP MISSION AT THE STREET LEVEL IS ALSO HAMPERED BY
MILITIA INTERFERENCE AND PRESSURE, LACK OF LOCAL TRUST BY THE
POPULATION, AND FEARS FOR PERSONAL SAFETY. MNF-I POLICE
TRAINER REPORTS INDICATE A BELIEF THAT JAM HAS INFILTRATED
VARIOUS POLICE STATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE GHAZALIA POLICE STATION
IN A PREDOMINANTLY SUNNI AREA. RESIDENTS OF OTHER DISTRICTS
HAVE OFTEN ALLEGED TO EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT LOCAL POLICE
WERE INFILTRATED BY JAYSH AL MAHDI OR BADR CORPS MILITIA.
FEARING THIS INFILTRATION, MANY RESIDENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE
PAGE 05 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
FROM SUNNI NEIGHBORHOODS SAY THEY DO NOT TRUST THEIR LOCAL
POLICE AND FEAR GOING TO THEM FOR HELP.
6. (C) THE IP HAVE INDICATED TO PRT OFFICIALS THAT SINCE THEY
GENERALLY LACK THE BASIC TRUST OF THE CITIZENS OF BAGHDAD
AND, BECAUSE OF SECURITY THREATS, THEY ARE OFTEN AFRAID TO DO
THEIR JOBS. THIS FEAR IS SO EXTENSIVE THAT IRAQI POLICE ARE
SOMETIMES EVEN UNWILLING TO INVESTIGATE THE MURDER OF FELLOW
OFFICERS. IN SOME AREAS OF THE CITY, POLICE OFFICIALS HAVE
OPENLY ADMITTED TO ROL OFFICIALS THAT THEY CAN INVESTIGATE,
AT MOST, ONLY 10% OF ALL SERIOUS CRIMES REPORTED.
-------------- -
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND JUDICAL SYSTEM
-------------- -
7. (C) WHEN AN ARREST IS MADE, THE LACK OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN IPS AND THE INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES OFTEN
PREVENTS CASES FROM BEING THOROUGHLY AND SUCCESSFULLY
INVESTIGATED AND PROSECUTED. IN THE IRAQI JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
PAGE 06 RUEHGBA4572 C O N F I D E N T I A L
INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES ARE THE INITIAL AND PRIMARY GATE KEEPERS
FOR PROSECUTIONS. IRAQI POLICE VIEW INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES,
AND THE JUDICIAL INVESTIGATORS THEY WORK WITH, AS DETACHED
FROM AND UNRESPONSIVE TO CASES SUBMITTED BY THEM. DEPUTY
CHIEF RAHIEM FROM MAMOUN POLICE STATION IN MANSOUR TOLD PRT
STAFF IN SEPTEMBER THAT INVESTIGATIVE JUDGES DO NOT COME TO
BAGHDAD 00004572 002.2 OF 003
the station to review cases nor to meet the police
investigators as they used to prior to 2003. Colonel Raad
from al Khadra police station complained in a separate visit
that communication between investigative judges and
investigative police is limited and never occurs face to
face, potentially affecting the quality of investigations.
8. (C) Investigative judges in turn often view the IP as
ineffective, corrupt and ill-prepared to investigate criminal
cases. LTC Adil from police station Behat al Shuhada
commented to PRT that the justice system does not understand
the problems facing IPs and perceive them to be corrupt.
9. (C) Investigative judges, who before 2003 actively visited
crime scenes to gather evidence and take witness statements,
are now generally bound to their courthouses and rarely visit
the police stations for which they are responsible. Instead,
investigative duties are delegated to the IP or judicial
investigators. Both the IP and investigative judges are
united in their belief that they have inadequate personnel
and training to perform their responsibilities and
consistently complain of the need for additional staffing and
training to perform their duties.
--------------
DETAINEES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE
--------------
10. (C) These systemic problems have resulted in many cases
of detainees being held for as long as two years awaiting
trial. In the visit to al Khadra station in September, four
of the 13 detainees held there claimed to have been detained
over one year without having gone to trial ) one detainee
said he had been in the holding cell for two years. These
detainees are often held in small and over-crowded local
police holding cells, neither intended nor suited for long
term confinement. Lengthy detention is aggravated by prison
over-crowding, resulting in local police station jail cells
serving as both pre-trail detention facilities and long-term
holding cells from convicted criminals.
11. (C) While waiting in their holding cells, detainees often
do not enjoy the rights typically associated with access to
justice. Although detainees who can not afford counsel are
guaranteed representation, this counsel is generally not
available until the day they are brought before an
investigative judge, often days or weeks after their initial
detention and interrogation. Even after receiving court
appointed counsel, appointed defense attorneys rarely, if
ever, see their clients. When asked about this, police and
investigators state that that defense attorneys have no
incentive to follow a case. Payments are based on service,
not performance. Defense attorneys receive 25,000 Dinar ($17
USD) when before an investigative judge and 50,000 Dinar ($34
USD) at the trial.
12. (C) A prominent exception to the problems referenced
above is the Baghdad Branch of the Central Criminal Court of
Iraq (CCCI). Significantly financed and supported by U.S.
personnel and operating within the International Zone, the
CCCI is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
some of the most prominent Baghdad criminal cases, including
those of terrorism and corruption. The success of the CCCI
demonstrates that, with sufficient attention to funding and
security, the Iraqi criminal justice system can work.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
13. (C) The Baghdad PRT ROL Team assesses that the Baghdad
criminal court system is functioning, but under apparent and
increasing pressure. The IP believe they have been abandoned
by the Ministry of Interior and lack the funding, training,
and resources to do their jobs well at police stations.
Militias continue to aggressively infiltrate or influence the
police forces, which compromises their ability to fairly,
uniformly, and aggressively enforce the law. Combined, these
frictions have led to a police force that is generally unable
to serve and protect the citizens of Baghdad and forward
cases into the Baghdad criminal justice system. Dependence on
Coalition Forces continues in the absence of viable MOI
support.
14. (C) The participation in training and operation of the
International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) has gives some
hope, but results are spotty and not all IP stations are
covered by IPLO staff. Cooperation between the Baghdad PRT
and the IPLO has resulted in new initiatives to integrate
investigative judges, judicial staff, and police
BAGHDAD 00004572 003.2 OF 003
investigators in the IPLO training programs in an attempt to
rectify some of the challenges we have uncovered. The PRT
ROL section recognizes that criminal justice matters comprise
only a part of the Iraqi justice system and will report
separately on Iraqi civil courts, law schools, human rights
organizations, and Sharia and tribal courts to determine how
these institutions are working to address a range of social
justice issues.
KHALILZAD