AL ANBAR: IRAQI SOLDIERS DISCUSS GOI,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004571

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/16
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AL ANBAR: IRAQI SOLDIERS DISCUSS GOI,
SECTARIANISM, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT; HOLD DUAL LOYALTIES?


Classified By: Political Al Anbar PRT Leader James Soriano, reasons 1.4
(b),(d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Al Anbar cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Al Anbar PolOff met in early and
mid-December 2006 with several Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi
Police (IP) units and Coalition trainers December 4-6 based
near Fallujah to discuss Baghdad violence, CF training
efforts, GOI logistical support, and possible sectarian
friction inside the IA and with the local Sunni Arab
population. Some IA soldiers said that Baghdad,s sectarian
fighting has increased tension in their units; others
downplayed the effect. All of them stated that local IA and
IP units remained largely dependent on CF for logistical
support (except for food). One IA commander, whose unit will
soon be reassigned to Baghdad, told PolOff that he had &big
concerns8 about the loyalty of his men should they be
ordered to engage militias. Units in Anbar are heavily
comprised of Shia recruits from Baghdad and southern Iraq.
END SUMMARY.

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LOGISTICAL SUPPORT LACKING
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3. (C) Al Anbar PRT PolOff met with several IA officers
December 4-6 in areas outlying Fallujah, where IA units
jointly patrol with Marines. All expressed dissatisfaction
with the level of logistical support from the Ministry of
Defense. Apart from food (which is locally contracted),the
officers said that due to MoD neglect, they depend almost
entirely on CF for fuel, ammunition, and parts for vehicles.
Local Iraqi police officers have difficultly to securing
parts for their U.S.-supplied Chevy trucks. One IA Brigade
commander said that he had not seen improvements since the
appointment of MinDef Abdul Qader . He added that Iraq,s
prior system )- before contracting became the norm, per
Coalition policy )- had been better. The IA, he noted,had
long been provided staples to meet its own internal needs
without contractor complications.


4. (C) A wounded IA soldier, who was being treated at a
Marine medical facility told PolOff December 9 that absent CF
logistical support, the IA would &fail quickly.8 Another
IA soldier being treated for IED wounds said that an increase
in CF trainers would be welcomed. He noted that the current
number of trainers assigned did not allow for enough joint
patrols. NOTE: Ongoing shortfalls in ISF recruitment in Al
Anbar, plus varying levels of IA and IP on duty at any given
time, could complicate plans to match Iraqis with new
influxes of CF trainers. END NOTE.

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GAP IN ISF MEDICAL TREATMENT
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5. (C) Medical treatment represents a key area of ISF
dependency on CF throughout Al Anbar Province. Coalition
facilities remain the primary trauma system for ISF; 50
percent of surgery in the province is conducted on wounded
Iraqi Army and police. The volume of IA/IP surgical loads is
expected to rise as battle space is increasingly handed over
to the IA. ISF physicians avoid Al Anbar work, due to the
dangerous environment, inability to have a private practice
in rural areas, and an effective murder and intimidation
campaign. Ministry of Health control by Moqtada Sadr allies
additionally complicates ISF medical support in Al Anbar
Province. NOTE: Marine medical staff note that wounded IA
and IP often refuse follow-on treatment at the &medical
city8 complex in Baghdad, fearing sectarian targeting.


6. (C) At the Karmah police station, IP officers noted
similar levels of dependence on CF. One officer remarked,
&the only help we get is from you Americans.8 He added
that the district headquarters (in Fallujah) did not offer
supplies, and there had been no resources provided from MoI
in Baghdad. Another officer indicated, however, that one
area tribal leader had been supportive of police efforts and
had provided some funds; he noted that other principal
sheikhs had fled to Syria or Jordan.

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SECTARIANISM IN IA: MIXED VEWS
--------------


7. (C) Two Sunni Arab IA officers stationed outside Fallujah
offered critical views of the loyalty of their Shia soldiers.
One said that he feared for his personal safety once the

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unit moved to Baghdad. He also criticized the §arian
attitude8 of the Shia soldiers under his command, noting
that some of them have allegedly been involved in the
mistreatment of locals. The officer stated that he believed
some of his men would not fight JAM because &they are part
of the militias.8 A brigade commander said that he had
&big concerns8 about possible dual loyalties within his
unit, adding that the current sectarian composition of the
government complicated matters. In contrast to the Sunni
officers, Shia IA soldiers stationed in the Karmah area (a
Fallujah suburb) showed little concern about the sectarian
killings in Baghdad. NOTE: CF trainers relate that they have
seen Moqtada Sadr posters on the walls of some IA units,
living quarters, and varying levels of open expressions of
support for Sadr, particularly among IA soldiers recruited
from Baghdad,s Sadr City. END NOTE.


8. (C) One CF trainer noted that the rise of violence in
Baghdad has caused some units in his area to separate into
Sunni and Shia groups. Some IA soldiers had to be watched
closely in order to prevent them from abusing the local Sunni
population. One Shia battalion executive officer, a Baghdad
native, said if the CF departed Iraq prematurely, the
country,s Shia-dominated army would &march west to kill
Sunnis.8 He favored the return of a strong man to lead
Iraq, adding that the current government was too weak to
address growing security problems.


9. (C) Two other IA officers complained about the perceived
willingness of the GOI to &negotiate8 with militias. They
cited two examples: the killing of IA soldiers in Diwaniyah
and policemen in Amarrah earlier in the year. In both
instances, they said government officials sought to placate
militias versus confront them.


10. (C) COMMENT: The GOI,s failure thus far -- whether due
to lack of capability or by design -- to provide sufficient
logistical support (fuel, food, equipment replacement, supply
parts, vehicle maintenance) to Iraqi Army and police units in
Al Anbar continues to undermine CF training and ISF
development efforts. Internal IA medical treatment gaps,
predicted to grow, will likewise complicate ISF transition
plans. Ongoing shortfalls in Sunni Arab recruiting in Al
Anbar will further frustrate plans to increase the size of
the IA and IP. Absent other ways to attract local Sunni
Arabs to the IA, the only recourse would be to source Shia or
other recruits from outside the province in the 1st and 7th
IA Divisions. Sectarian influences in the IA will need to be
watched closely, especially in units that are Shia-dominant
and possibly redirected to Baghdad. Should those units be
ordered to confront JAM directly, the outcome could add
significant volatility to the already inflamed capital city.
KHALILZAD