IRAQIYYA PARLIAMENTARY BLOC LEADER MOUSA DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004557 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: IRAQIYYA PARLIAMENTARY BLOC LEADER MOUSA DISCUSSES AYAD ALLAWI AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Iraqiyya Council of Representatives (CoR) bloc leader Hameed Majeed Mousa told the Ambassador December 12 that Iraqiyya bloc leader and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi feels he has been marginalized and excluded from the decision-making. Mousa acknowledged at the same time that Allawi's absence has left a big gap and has been part of the problem. Allawi is working with other Arab countries to hold conferences to bring together Iraqi forces willing to fix the situation and confront the Iranian threat. This group would present options to the GOI for short-term or immediate implementation. Mousa expressed his fear that the Shia Coalition received the wrong message from the Prime Minister Maliki/President Bush meeting, and are now overconfident and will be inflexible. He said flexibility is needed now since Iraq is in a very difficult situation. Mousa stated that Iraq needs quick reconciliation and dialogue, and stressed that the GOI should institute security and military procedures to cont rol sectarian strife. END SUMMARY. -------------- Ayad Allawi Feels Excluded and Marginalized -------------- ¶2. (C) Iraqiyya CoR bloc leader and head of the Iraqi Communist Party Hameed Majeed Mousa told the Ambassador December 12 that Iraqiyya bloc leader and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi feels he has been marginalized and excluded from the decision-making - Mousa acknowledged at the same time that Allawi's absence has left a big gap and has been part of the problem. Mousa said he recently told President Jalal Talabani and KRG President Masoud Barzani to contact Allawi to convince him not to remain outside the political process. Mousa added that he had also asked Shia Coalition members to put pressure on Shia Coalition leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim to ask Allawi to return. Mousa stated that Saudi Arabia could also play a positive role in convincing Allawi to return. ¶3. (C) According to Mousa, Allawi believes that the final word in Iraq is now Iran and that the US has handed the situation over to Iran. Mousa said a front needs to be established to counter the Iranian threat since the government is unable to confront this challenge. For this reason, he continued, Allawi is working with other Arab countries to hold conferences to bring together Iraqi forces willing to fix the situation. This group would present options to the GOI for short-term or immediate implementation. He said certain forces (Gulf countries, Egypt, and Jordan) are pushing Ayad Allawi in a certain direction for their own self interests. These countries are looking at Iraq only from the Iran perspective. Mousa stated that he told Ayad Allawi to push for National Reconciliation and to be careful of outside pressures. Mousa mentioned talk of taking away the oversight responsibility of the Ministries of Interior and Defense from the Prime Minister and politically giving them to the Deputy Prime Minister (with the security file). He later recommended fellow Iraqiyya member and former Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) Hajim al-Hassani as a possible DPM candidate to replace the current DPM Salam al-Zawbaie, saying that the Kurdish Alliance and IIP like Hassani. -------------- National Reconciliation Ideas -------------- ¶4. (C) Mousa told the Ambassador that the Shia Coalition (UIC) is not taking into consideration the reaction of other parties and are holding on to the Constitution and their legitimacy from the election results. He expressed his fear that the UIC received the wrong message from the Prime Minister Maliki/President Bush meeting, and are now overconfident and will be inflexible. He said we need flexibility since we are in a very difficult situation. Such flexibility does not mean the other side is in control either. Extremists are in control (takfeerees and Saddamists vs. Jaysh al-Mahdi and other militias). ¶5. (C) Mousa stated that Iraq needs quick reconciliation and dialogue. Mousa said the GOI should institute security and military procedures to control sectarian strife. He insisted that the GOI can do something to control the violence (even if not action, at least by words). He stressed the importance of building a political environment through actions like detainee releases, victim compensation, and the return of the displaced. He highlighted the need to take firm and direct position against the militias; such an action BAGHDAD 00004557 002 OF 002 would give a positive message to reconciliation. In addition, there is a need to limit revenge measures in De-Ba'athification; the GOI must concentrate on bringing back Ba'athists (not Saddamists). -------------- Iraqiyya Divided on Role in GOI -------------- ¶6. (C) Mousa told the Ambassador that nine Iraqiyya members met December 11. Some wanted to release a strong statement with a warning to GOI that they would withdraw from the government if certain conditions were not met. Eventually, they decided not to issue such a statement. Mousa stated that Allawi knows that a number of Iraqiyya members would reject the stance of withdrawal from the government. KHALILZAD