GROUPS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION PONDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000454 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: GROUPS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SHIA COALITION PONDER APPROACH TO JAFARI Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kurdish leadership, Ayad Allawi, and Tawafuq leaders met the morning of February 13 to consider their reaction to Ibrahim al-Jafari's nomination to the premiership. Their discussions included two options: (a) forging a contract with Jafari on the basis of a clear government program, the inclusion of the four leading parliamentary blocs, and agreement on a decision-making mechanism drawn from the Salah al-Din principles; and (b) forming a bloc that would be larger than the Shia alliance and could put forward its own PM nominee. Shia coalition member Nadeem al-Jabiri, leader of the Fadhila Party, told the Ambassador February 12 that he thinks the groups outside the Shia alliance should unite to block the Jafari nomination. Jabiri recommended that these groups nominate Ayad Allawi for the premiership and then offer to settle on a compromise candidate - namely himself. Leaders of Tawafuq appeared interested in such an approach at the February 13 meeting, but all sides agreed to study the issue further and then meet February 14 to determine their stance. END SUMMARY. -------------- The Opposition Convenes -------------- ¶2. (C) The Kurds, Allawi, and Tawafuq leaders met on the morning of February 13 to consider their reaction to Jafari's nomination to be PM. The Ambassador, President Talabani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masud Barzani, and Tawafuq leaders Adnan al-Duleimi and Tariq al-Hashimi attended. The participants quickly restated their determination to see the Salah al-Din Principles guide the formation of the government -- i.e., to place independents in the security ministries, to include the four leading lists in the government, and to establish a leadership body that aims for consensus on key decisions. Talabani emphasized to Allawi and the Tawafuq leaders that the Kurds would not "leave (them) behind." Barzani asked the Tawafuq leaders to be reasonable in their government demands, asking them not to "embarrass us." ¶3. (C) The group contemplated the possible benefits of forming a larger coalition in order to nominate someone to challenge Jafari. All agreed that they have the ability to draw together a bloc of some 144 parliamentarians, significantly larger than the 130-member Shia alliance. Salah al-Mutlak's 11 members would be sure to join them, Hashimi said, and Allawi reported that Mishan Jaburi's 3 seats also are ready to join the alliance. Along with the Kurdistan Islamic Union and a few other individuals, such a bloc would be larger than the Shia alliance by a safe margin. Tawafuq leader Adnan Duleimi led the push for the group to form such a bloc and prevent Jafari from returning to office. Duleimi bluntly asked the group how much conviction it has in Jafari, which elicited laughter from the room and an agreement to study whether practical alternatives are truly available before reconvening on February 14. -------------- Jabiri Outlines a Counter-Maneuver -------------- ¶4. (C) After Jafari's nomination on February 12, Fadhila Party leader Nadeem al-Jabiri met with the Ambassador and recommended that an effort be made to bloc the Shia coalition nominee. Jabiri said that he hopes the remaining parties in parliament will form a larger bloc and put forward their own nominee for prime minister, as allowed under the constitution. Jabiri said that the counter-bloc should nominate Ayad Allawi while expressing a readiness to agree to a compromise candidate. Jabiri explained that such an announcement would send the Shia coalition into flux, at which point he (Jabiri) would be able to emerge as the compromise candidate for PM. Jabiri predicted that SCIRI and others, upset over Jafari's return to power, would be prepared to back Jabiri at that point. Jabiri said that he would not be willing to break with the Shia coalition as a first step, preferring instead to emerge as a compromise choice in order to avoid giving the Shia community any impression that its rights were under attack. -------------- Gauging the Shia Reaction -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that any effort to work against the Jafari nomination nevertheless could provoke BAGHDAD 00000454 002 OF 002 a strong negative reaction in the Shia community. Jabiri disagreed, arguing that a clearly constitutional maneuver like the one he described would be understood for what it is: a fair challenge in parliamentary politics. Jabiri emphasized that the counter-bloc should make clear that it is looking for a compromise, not a showdown. The Ambassador asked whether this action might provoke the Sadrists -- who are betting on a Jafari premiership -- to resort to violence. Jabiri responded that the Sadrists could resort to violence at any moment anyway and that opposing parties cannot let such threats determine their actions. -------------- Atmosphere During the PM Vote -------------- ¶6. (C) Recounting the Shia coalition vote on the premiership, Jabiri said that Jafari succeeded amidst an atmosphere of threats and fear. Jabiri opined that all sides felt that Adil Abd al-Mehdi had secured the nomination the evening of February 11 when he won over the Fadhila Party's support. At that moment, however, a cloud of pressure fell over the independents in the coalition, he said. Jabiri said the Sadrists may have threatened some of the independents to vote for Jafari. The final vote count indicated that the support of several independents allowed Jafari to pull off his victory. -------------- Jabiri Ready to Consider Security Slot -------------- ¶7. (C) Jabiri asserted that he remains convinced that neither Jafari nor Abd Al-Mehdi is the right man for the job. He said he had been swayed toward Mehdi by the promise of ministries and a slot as Deputy Speaker of parliament. Jabiri told the Ambassador, however, that he would be willing to serve as a security minister if his premiership chances evaporate and all sides consider him the only acceptable candidate for such a job. He noted that Iraqis usually expect a military man for such a job when in fact a skillful politician might be best equipped to handle its rigors. -------------- -------------- Fahdila Spiritual Leader's Cousin in the Oil Ministry -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked Jabiri whether rumors were true that Fadhila Tourism Minister Hashim al-Hashimi had authorized a relative of Fadhila spiritual leader Ayatollah Muhammad Ya'acubi to undertake all work in the Oil Ministry. Jabiri said that it is true but the circumstances are not as nepotistic as they seem. First, Jabiri said, Hashim al-Hashimi is attempting to direct both the Tourism Ministry and the Oil Ministry following the dismissal of Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloom. This is an extremely large burden, he pointed out. Second, he added, the Fadhila Party initially had nominated Kathem Ya'acubi, the relative in question, to serve as Oil Minister in the early stages of forming the transitional government. Jabiri claimed that Ayatollah Ya'acubi had actually rejected that nomination himself because Kathem is his cousin. Hence, Kathem only assumed the post of Director General in the Oil Ministry. Lastly, Jabiri said, Hashim al-Hashimi only authorized Kathem to take on ministerial responsibilities for a short period while Hashimi traveled on the Hajj. The Ambassador thanked Jabiri for the explanation but warned that the whole affair cast Fadhila in a negative light and that it would be best not to repeat it in the future. KHALILZAD