SENIOR DAWA PARTY LEADER OFFERS SHI'A PERSPECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004531

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SENIOR DAWA PARTY LEADER OFFERS SHI'A PERSPECTIVE
ON STALLED ELECTIONS COMMISSION LAW


Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Dawa party leader and vice-chairman
of the Shi'a coalition Ali al-Adeeb told PolCouns on December
6 that negotiations on the Independent Higher Election
Commission (IHEC) had reached an impasse because the Kurds,
specifically Masoud Barzani, would not accept national
commission oversight of and the application of nationwide
standards to regional commissions' conduct of regional and
local elections. Although al-Adeeb agreed with PolCouns on
the importance of holding provincial elections, he said that
the Shi'a coalition was unwilling to jeopardize its alliance
with the Kurds by pushing them too hard at this point.
Al-Adeeb said that the Prime Minister and Shi'a coalition
leaders had agreed to send a delegation to Muqtada al-Sadr to
convince him to end the Sadrists' "temporary withdrawal" from
the government. To date, he said, al-Sadr had refused to
meet with the delegation, offering instead that it meet with
his "political committee." Finally, al-Adeeb reported that
the Shi'a coalition had rejected the first draft of the new
de-Baathification law proposed by Ahmed Chalabi and were
waiting to see a revised version. He characterized the first
draft as too strict and also as lacking provisions to
compensate victims of the Baath regime. End summary.

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Election Commission Law: "Talk to the Kurds"
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2. (C) PolCouns asked al-Adeeb why parliamentarians seemed
to have reached an impasse on the IHEC law. Al-Adeeb
explained that there was agreement that a national commission
with branch offices throughout Iraq should conduct
nation-wide elections, such as those for the CoR. There was
also agreement that regional commissions could conduct
regional and local elections. However the Kurds, according
to al-Adeeb, wanted "no interference" from the center on the
conduct of regional elections; their position was that the
regional commissions should "coordinate" with the central
commission (i.e., a "voluntary" action). The Shi'a, he
continued, were insisting that the law clearly give the
national commission "oversight" over regional commissions and
indicate that the regional commissions must follow national
standards (i.e., both obligatory steps). Looking at
compromise language the Embassy was proposing, al-Adeeb
described it as "technically" acceptable but too vague to be
implemented. He suggested that he and others worried the
Kurds would take advantage of any lack of clarity to rig
important elections through their regional commission, e.g.
by changing voter registration lists from one location to
another at the expense of other communities.


3. (C) PolCouns expressed the Embassy's sense of urgency on
the IHEC law, noting that it was necessary to pass this law
before the CoR went on winter recess (currently scheduled for
January and February) in order to have a realistic chance for
provincial elections in the fall of 2007. These elections,
she continued, were essential to continuing the democratic
momentum in Iraq and for allowing communities, such as the
Sunnis, that did not fully participate in the most recent
provincial elections (January 2005) to enter the political
process. Al-Adeeb agreed that the elections would serve as
an important mechanism in Iraq's democratic progress and
noted that even in Shi'a-dominated provinces there was a
strong desire for new provincial elections. Yet he said the
IHEC law was not an urgent priority for the Shi'a coalition
because it did not want to jeopardize its alliance with the
Kurds. He noted that the Kurds and other communities
distrusted the central government based on Iraq's recent
history, and that all Kurdish efforts were geared toward
trying to attain independence from the central government.
The Shi'a, he continued, could not change the Kurds' minds on
the election commission law because "they doubt us as we are
now the democratic majority." The U.S. had to convince the
Kurds, and particularly Masoud Barzani, if it wanted to get
an election commission law. "It's the same reason Secretary
Rice went to Kurdistan on the hydrocarbons law. President
Bush's vision of a united Iraq must be transferred to the
Kurds. Federalism should unite Iraq, not divide it."


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The Sadrist Challenge
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4. (C) Prompted by a question to turn to the Sadrist
"temporary withdrawal," al-Adeeb told PolCouns that the Prime
Minister and the Shi'a coalition had decided to send a
delegation (including al-Adeeb) to Muqtada al-Sadr after the

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PM's return from Jordan to convince his allies to return to
the government. Sadr's office, however, said that al-Sadr
would not see the delegation but that it could meet with the
five members of his political committee, which the delegation
refused. Most Sadrist MPs, al-Adeeb claimed, wanted to
return to the CoR floor, and he and others were encouraging
them to push their views within the Sadrist group. The
Sadrists, he noted, were angered that the CoR did not review
the Iraqi government decision to request an extension to the
multinational forces' mandate, and they felt that the
government and MNF-I could have prevented the recent bombings
in Sadr city but deliberately did not. Al-Adeeb explained
that the PCNS had approved the decision on the mandate with a
Sadrist representative, Dr. Qusay (whom we believe refers to
CoR member Dr. Qusay al-Suhail),present and in agreement.
The Sadrists, however, claimed that he did not represent
them. Al-Adeeb previewed the Shi'a coalition's argument to
the Sadrists by noting that the understanding reached between
President Bush and PM Maliki in Amman and even the Iraq Study
Group report both supported speeding up training of and
transfer of control to the Iraqi security forces, goals that
would lead more rapidly to eventual MNF-I withdrawal.


5. (C) Al-Adeeb said that the Sadrists had agreed to change
all of their six ministers. (Note: We believe they have
five ministers. End note.) They have proposed to the PM
three potential replacements for each minister. According to
al-Adeeb, the parties were urging the PM to tell them which
ministers needed to go so that they could propose potential
replacements. Al-Adeeb offered two examples of ministers
that clearly needed to be replaced: Minister of Culture Asad
Kamal al-Hashemi (IIP),whom al-Adeeb described as a
"terrorist"; and Minister of Justice Hashim al-Shibli
(Iraqiyya),whom al-Adeeb criticized for hardly spending any
of his budget.

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Shi'a Coalition Rejects First De-Baath Draft
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6. (C) Asked by PolCouns about the Shi'a coalition stance on
de-Baathification, al-Adeeb said that the coalition
"rejected" the first draft de-Baath law drafted by Ahmed
Chalabi's commission. He cited several reasons. First he
characterized the law as punishing too many people, giving an
example of an army officer who he knew to be an excellent
officer and who had joined the Baath party only so he could
move up in the army. Al-Adeeb said that he did not advocate
a cut-off line for de-Baathification provisions, but instead
that Baath party officials who "do not have blood on their
hands" should be allowed to recant and then even rejoin the
government. He noted that some officials might have to
accept forced retirement, but that consideration should be
given to their families. Putting a former government
official on the streets without his salary, al-Adeeb argued,
had and would continue to create sources of support for
insurgents. Finally, al-Adeeb argued that compensation for
the victims of the Baath regime should be part of the
de-Baathification process. He called for a balance between
the rights of former Baath party members and for the regime's
victims, noting that the bulk of the Iraqi population would
feel it unjust if the new law was less stringent on former
Baathists but provided no compensation. The Shi'a coalition,
al-Adeeb commented, was waiting for a second draft from
Chalabi. At that point, he said, he would urge the coalition
to form a small committee to develop coalition proposals in
more depth. "We want a durable solution, not to see one
error replaced by another," he concluded.
KHALILZAD