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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4425
2006-12-03 03:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI PRESIDENT'S LIST OF STEPS FOR IRANIANS TO

Tags:   PREL  PGOV  PINS  PINR  IR  IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4619
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4425/01 3370341
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030341Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8297
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
						S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004425 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRESIDENT'S LIST OF STEPS FOR IRANIANS TO
RESTORE SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRESIDENT'S LIST OF STEPS FOR IRANIANS TO
RESTORE SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: President Jalal Talabani provided the
Ambassador December 1 with a document that included steps for
Iran to take to help restore security and support the
government in Iraq. Talabani delivered the list to Iranian
leaders during his November 27-29 trip to Teheran.
Recommended measures included curbing support for the Jash al
Mahdi and other militias; compelling Syria to end support for
Ba'athists and terror groups in Iraq; exchanging security
information; and supporting Iraq diplomatically and
politically. Below is informal Embassy translation of the
document, which has been forwarded electronically in Arabic
to NEA/I-Pol. End Summary


2. Begin Embassy informal Translation:


I. The Regional Conspiracy against Iraq: The Main Reasons and
Its Goals.

II.

1. In this conspiracy, terrorism is a tool to convince the
United States it must resort to the Ba'ath and Sunni Arabs
opposed to democratically-elected government in order to
ensure the safety of its soldiers. This tool seeks to
portray these renegade forces alone as capable of achieving
security and stability in Iraq.


2. Terrorism is used to foil the democratically elected
government and demonstrate that the Shiites and Kurds are not
capable of governing and that only the reactionary Sunnis are.


3. Terrorism is used as a tool to kill the Shiites and
displace them, thereby executing a policy of ethnic
cleansing, particularly in Baghdad and Diyala.

III. The Syrians have a role in sponsoring, motivating and
supporting the terrorist, Ba'athist and Saddamist forces. It
is necessary to put an immediate end to such support by:


1. Recognizing the democratic experiment and the legitimate
government in Iraq.


2. Condemning terrorism in all its forms; refraining from
describing the renegade gangs as national opposition and

justifying their existence.


3. Ensuring Syrian media stands beside the people of Iraq and
their elected government against terrorist activities; it
should support national reconciliation and not the
resistance, political struggle, violence, assassinations and
bombings.


4. Expelling the Ba'athist and the Saddamist leadership from
Syria and not harboring anti-Iraq opposition forces; and
preventing the passage and entry of terrorists, in a serious
and decisive manner.


5. Extraditing to Iraq criminals who committed heinous crimes
and are wanted by the courts.


IV. The tangible contributions for Iran to make in achieving
security and stability in Iraq are as follows:


1. In Iraq: Curbing the Mahdi Army and the armed Shiite
factions associated with Iran and preventing members of these
forces from carrying out assassinations, abductions, killings
and acts of aggression against the state and its agencies.
Convincing these forces to respect the current government and
adhere to the laws and the legitimate constitution of the
country.


2. Persuading friends of Iran to support Al-Maliki's
government and its constitutional legitimacy, and to
cooperate and form an allegiance with it.


3. Supporting Al-Maliki's government politically,
diplomatically and in the media on both the regional and
international levels and demonstrating this support in the
Iranian official media.


4. Accepting U.S.-Iranian or Coalition Forces-Iranian
communication in order to achieve security in Baghdad as a
first step and stability in Iraq as a second step.

Note: These relations might be the first step toward reaching
satisfactory American-Iranian relations.


5. Compelling the Syrian side to support Iraq, renounce

BAGHDAD 00004425 002 OF 002


terrorism, and cease harboring Saddamist Ba'athists, forces
of terrorism, and armed operations.


6. Demanding that forces that are supported by and allies of
Iran, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, refrain from providing
political and media support to the terrorists under the
pretext that they are resistance and demanding that they
cease support for Al-Dhari followers against the legitimate
Iraqi government, and renounce the Tekfiris and condemn their
crimes against the Shiites in particular, and the Iraqis in
general.

Note: When Syria complies with the demands of Iraq, it will
then be possible to establish political, security,
commercial, oil and industrial relations, etc., and allow the
Syrian-based Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and its leadership
to work publicly and participate in public life and even in
the government.


V. Support should go to the Shiite-Kurdish Coalition and its
bid to win over moderate and reasonable Sunni partners such
as the Iraqi Islamic Party, which is a participating partner
in the governing and administration of the State.

VI. (Iran should agree to:)

1. Exchanging security information and forming a joint
committee for said purpose.

2. Contributing to the support and implementation of the
Baghdad Security Plan.

A. The trilateral Iranian-American-Iraqi agreement

B. The Iraqi-Iranian bilateral agreement

C. Agreement with the forces friendly to Iran.


VII. There should be a joint political, diplomatic and media
coordination against the campaigns inimical to the new Iraq
and against the fierce attack on the Shiites who are depicted
as infidels, agents of Iran, and Sufis; and defense of the
Kurds who are accused of betrayal and the Sunni Arabs who are
accused of being renegades.

VIII. Iran should not attack the Coalition Forces in return
for their pledge not to support terrorism in Iran.

IX. (Iran should) contribute, as much as possible, to the
mobilization and training of the Iraqi armed forces so they
may carry out their functions in maintaining security and
stability.


X.

1. (Iran and Iraq should) develop a common policy for
discussing the subject of withdrawal of Coalition Forces and
the timetable for their pullout under the right circumstances
for the Iraqi people or once security and stability are
established in Iraq.

2. (Iran and Iraq should) undertake joint efforts to prepare
and train Iraqi forces to replace Coalition Forces in the
cities, as Coalition Forces are redeployed to specific bases
in Iraq, and as authority over security is handed over to the
Iraqi government.

End Embassy Translation
Khalilzad