PRT TIKRIT: POWER, CORRUPTION, AND AQIZ IN SALAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004407 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER KCOR KDEM IZ SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: POWER, CORRUPTION, AND AQIZ IN SALAH AD DIN Classified By: PRT Leader Stephanie Miley for reasons 1.4 b/d. ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. The disintegration of the social fabric of Salah ad Din (SaD), which started during the Saddam regime, was exacerbated by its fall and the subsequent aftermath, has caused political disarray in the province. With the diminution in authority of traditional tribal sheikhs and Saddam-backed sheikhs, a new group of individuals has acquired influence, the "Hawahsim sheikhs," or war-profiteers. Some former Baathists have been able to integrate into the new Hawahsim system, while others actively subvert it or remain in a wait-and-see mode to see which system will win out. The combination of politically discontent pro-Baathists and disarray in the changing patronage systems has provided a conducive environment for al Qaeda (AQIZ) operations and has generally eroded security. It is essential that those in a wait-and-see mode be persuaded to continue refuting violent alternatives; this will be accomplished by bringing them into the political fold. To do that, the debaathification process must be reformed and SaD residents must perceive greater Sunni participation in the national political decision making process. Restoration of a strong, professional Iraqi Army, inclusive of some of the debaathified officers, could also curb the political and economic flux in the province that AQIZ is exploiting. END SUMMARY. -------------- Three Types of Sheikhs in SaD -------------- ¶3. (C) Salah ad Din province has three types of sheikhs: the traditional tribal sheikhs, the Saddam-created "90's sheikhs," and the recent opportunistic Hawahsim sheikhs. Historically, tribal sheikhs in the province had full authority over their tribes and passed their authority down generationally along heredity lines. After the 1991 Shia uprising, in an effort to combat the influence of the tribal sheikhs throughout the country, Saddam Hussein systematically established new sheikhs within many tribes by offering money and direct access to Saddam to an individual in the tribe who pledged alliance to him. These "90's sheikhs," established throughout the decade, wielded their 
influence through a patronage system whereby they obtained government appointments and other government benefits through Saddam for members of their tribes, thus reducing the authority of the tribal sheikhs. As the influence of the 90's sheikhs grew, the Baath Party increased consolidation of its power. Many of the 90's sheikhs were locally influential members of the party. ¶4. (C) With the fall of the Saddam regime and the institution of debaathification regulations, many of the 90's sheikhs were no longer able to offer favors, thus diminishing their influence with their former constituencies. As the Coalition Forces began reconstruction efforts, many individuals became wealthy and acquired land through contracts, connections with the CF, and other means. SaD residents generally term these individuals the "Hawahsim," or "war- profiting," sheikhs. They have replaced the 90's sheikhs and have effectively re-established systems of patronage, increasing their newly acquired influence in the province. BAGHDAD 00004407 002 OF 004 -------------- -------------- Emerging Social Order in SaD Affects Local Politics -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Debaathification regulations and the presence CF forces have essentially re-organized the political infrastructure of SaD and brought the emergence of three types of political leaders: first, the 90's sheikhs who parleyed their influence into the new Hawahsim system; second, the disenfranchised 90's sheikhs who now actively support the pro-Baathist insurgent movement; and third, the majority of SaD residents and tribal sheikhs who are in a political wait- and-see mode. -------------- The Emergent Hawahsim Sheikhs -------------- ¶6. (C) The first group, the Hawahsim sheikhs, are leaders in the current provincial government and business community. Many of them openly support the democratic political process, while they amass wealth and administer personal patronage systems through their new positions and affiliations. Examples of this include Provincial Council (PC) Chair Sheikh Rasheed Ossman, who was a 90's sheikh who parleyed his way into the Hawahsim system, and Deputy Governor (General) Abdullah Ejbarah, who was a level four Baathist who now supports the inclusion of a reformed, democratic Baath Party into the political process. -------------- -------------- The Ousted 90's and Actively Pro-Baathists Sheikhs -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Some of the Baath loyalist 90's sheikhs support the pro-Baathist insurgency and other AIF elements (whom they see as freedom fighters, not terrorists). Many of our contacts report that these Baath loyalists take direction from Izzat al-Duri - Saddam's former Vice President, who is believed responsible for planning and financing many of the anti-CF attacks in the province - and actively work to undermine the democratic political process and to expel the "occupying forces." -------------- The Wait-and-See Tribal Sheikhs -------------- ¶8. (C) The majority of SaD residents fall into a third group of figures who appear to be waiting to see if the political process has room for them (or who are waiting to see if Saddam will return as is heavily rumored throughout the province). This group is composed of many traditional tribal leaders. They do not feel as though the provincial government acts in their best interest. They view many of the provincial government leaders as self-interested Hawahsim sheikhs. However, these ?wait and see-ers? are equally not convinced that the pro-Baathist insurgents have a better solution. They romanticize the Saddam regime, even long for its return, but do not necessarily actively support its re-establishment. They seek reformation of the debaathification regulations, re-establishment of a strong, professional army, and greater Sunni participation in the national political process. -------------- -------------- Increasing Corruption through the Hawahsim System -------------- -------------- BAGHDAD 00004407 003 OF 004 ¶9. (C) While the Hawahsim system is re-defining political and social influence, its focus on wealth-based power and patronage systems is increasing corruption in the province. Provincial government leaders are largely perceived to have amassed wealth through their positions and connections with the CF. As others join the ranks of the Hawahsim sheikhs, inside deals and kickbacks from reconstruction projects and government contracts are reportedly becoming more commonplace. This institutionalized corruption system, as the foundation of the Hawahsim sheikhs' influence, defines the provincial government's operations. -------------- -------------- Conducive Environment for AQIZ, Erosion of Security -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S) The combination of political discontent among the actively pro-Baathist 90's sheikhs as well as the political disarray through the change of patronage systems has provided a conducive environment for AQIZ operations and has eroded security generally. As the CF continues focused operations in al Anbar and Baghdad, SaD has become a relatively "safer" operating platform for AQIZ. Additionally, AQIZ has exploited the refineries in Bayji for financing. In some cases, the pro-Baathists and AQIZ have found a marriage of convenience based on their common enemy, the CF. In other more economics-based cases, SaD residents, who have lost their livelihoods through debaathification and the change to the perceived to be CF-backed Hawahsim system, have aided (or at least turned a blind eye to) AQIZ operations. However, a growing number of people see AQIZ and foreign fighters as simply damaging Iraq. Many of the wait-and-see tribal sheikhs speak out against terrorist elements (but not pro- Baathist insurgents). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) None of the leaders we have met in the province is ready to see the Baath Party discarded completely. At the extremes, the Hawahsim sheikhs want a reformed version incorporated into the political process, and the ousted 90's sheikhs want a return of the Saddam-style Baathists. However, the majority of SaD residents are still in a wait-and-see mode until they see which side will win out and where they can plug into a benefit system. To bring them on board with the political process, the debaathification process must be reformed and they must perceive a greater Sunni participation in the national political decision making process. In the meantime, corruption is becoming institutionalized in the province government. ¶12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Most of our interlocutors fervently advocate for restoration of a strong, professional Iraqi Army, inclusive of some of the debaathified officers. If done properly, such a move could be part of the solution by eliminating some of the political and economic flux that is eroding security and that AQIZ is exploiting in Salah ad Din. Time is running out, however, as the province continues to stagnate economically and feel marginalized politically. If there is no positive movement by the central government and the National Debaathification Commission in the next few months, PRT is concerned that a proportion of the residents and BAGHDAD 00004407 004 OF 004 sheikhs in the wait- and-see mode could tire of inaction and cast their lot with the anti-CF and AIF forces. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog: http://blogs.csp.sgov.gov/blojsom/blog/ salahaddin/. SCOBEY