WHAT A SADRIST WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI WOULD - AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004405 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: WHAT A SADRIST WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI WOULD - AND WOULD NOT - MEAN Classified By: Classified by Charge Margaret Scobey, reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Sadrist threat to pull out of Prime Minister Maliki's government if he meets with President Bush in Jordan is likely an empty one. The Sadrists have threatened to suspend their Council of Representatives (CoR) membership previously, but have not done so (although they have boycotted sessions). Withdrawal of the 30 Sadrist MPs from the CoR would not technically threaten the Maliki government. Although Sadrist support for Maliki was critical in the internal Shi'a coalition negotiations through which he was nominated, Sadrist withdrawal from CoR at this juncture would not directly increase the likelihood that a vote of no confidence would pass. If the Sadrists withdrew their ministers, they would forfeit a valuable source of patronage and associated benefits. Further, Sadrist withdrawal from the government, either from the CoR or from the ministries, would strengthen their archrival SCIRI, which the Sadrists want to avoid. It is more likely that the Sadrists will continue their policy of unhelpful participation: using the CoR as a platform for populist critiques of MNF-I and using their ministries for patronage. End Summary. -------------- Withdrawal from the CoR - So What? -------------- ¶2. (U) Sadrist MPs threatened in press conferences on November 24 and November 26 to pull out of the CoR and the government if Maliki met with President Bush in Jordan. According to press reports, they issued a statement "suspending their participation" in the CoR and government on November 29. Noting that Sadrist support was critical to Maliki becoming PM, some have suggested that this action could lead to the fall of the Maliki government. ¶3. (SBU) However, the political mechanism by which the Shi'a coalition selected Maliki as its candidate is distinct from the constitutional mechanism by which a government could fall. By virtue of controlling the largest number of seats in CoR, the Shi'a coalition was able to nominate a candidate for PM from within its ranks for approval by the CoR. Maliki was the nominee partly because of Sadrist support for him within the Shi'a coalition over SCIRI candidate Adel Abdel Mehdi (and Jafari was the initial Shi'a Coalition nominee over Adel Abdel Mehdi for the same reason). The only way the CoR can remove Maliki is if at least 138 MPs supported a vote of no confidence against him, and the withdrawal of the 30 Sadrist MPs would not make it more likely that a vote of no confidence would pass. (Note: The Shi,a coalition would still have 98 MPs, combined with 53 from the Kurdish alliance, for an absolute majority of 151. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) Sadrist MPs have boycotted CoR sessions before, notably in the run-up to the regions formation bill when they were joined at times by Fadhila, Tawafuq, Hewar, and Iraqiyya. On July 17, the Sadrists walked out of the CoR session in protest of killings in Mahmoudiya. While these boycotts made it more difficult for the CoR to achieve quorum (and on more than ONE occasion prevented it from doing so), it continued its work and was able to achieve quorum and pass the regions formation law, for example. The CoR could continue its work in the face of a sustained Sadrist boycott or even the resignation of the Sadrist MPs, as it was able to do so during the July Tawafuq boycott over the kidnapping of CoR member Tayseer al-Mashadani. -------------- Withdraw from Ministries, and Lose Patronage? -------------- ¶5. (C) The Sadrists hold five ministries: agriculture, tourism, health, governorate affairs, and transportation. By all accounts, the Sadrist ministers have used their posts as jobs programs for their constituents, particularly at the Ministry of Health. If they resigned, the Sadrists would forfeit valuable sources of patronage as well as associated opportunities for corruption and influence. They might instead stay on as ministers but boycott meetings of the Council of Ministers (CoM). Such a boycott would not prevent the CoM from functioning. -------------- A Populist Threat With Few Teeth -------------- ¶6. (C) The Sadrists are unlikely to withdraw completely from the government - i.e., resign from the CoR and CoM - unless doing so could lead to a better political position (e.g., as BAGHDAD 00004405 002 OF 002 Hezbollah is trying to do in Lebanon) or unless the government directly confronts them or the Jaysh al-Mahdi. As noted above, the CoR could withstand complete Sadrist withdrawal, and the Sadrists would lose valuable sources of patronage if they resigned from the ministries. Furthermore, Sadrist withdrawal would only strengthen the institutional hand of SCIRI, their bitter rivals. While it is unlikely that SCIRI would seek a vote of no confidence in Maliki after a Sadrist withdrawal (as they would need the support of at least three of the following groups: Shi'a independents, the Kurds, Iraqiyya, and Tawafuq),SCIRI would emerge strengthened politically and take over more committee and ministerial positions. ¶7. (C) The Sadrists' recent threats are the latest example of their tactic of using their participation in government as a populist platform (and opportunity for patronage) to increase their political appeal. For example, on September 26, Sadrist bloc leader Falah Hassen Shenshel threatened to suspend Sadrist membership in CoR until their demands about the "return of sovereignty" were met; they never followed through on the threat, although they continue to raise the issue of MNF-I withdrawal. If they indeed boycott the CoR or CoM, the boycott would likely be temporary. While the Sadrists do not talk with Embassy officials, Fadhila leader Hassan Al-Shammari, who is close to several Sadrists in the CoR, told PolOff that the boycott, should it occur, would be temporary and represent a political reaction by Sadrist politicians to the Bush-Maliki meeting, rather than a strategic decision by Muqtada al-Sadr to withdraw from the government. SCOBEY