WHAT A SADRIST WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI WOULD - AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004405

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: WHAT A SADRIST WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI WOULD - AND
WOULD NOT - MEAN

Classified By: Classified by Charge Margaret Scobey, reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Sadrist threat to pull out of Prime
Minister Maliki's government if he meets with President Bush
in Jordan is likely an empty one. The Sadrists have
threatened to suspend their Council of Representatives (CoR)
membership previously, but have not done so (although they
have boycotted sessions). Withdrawal of the 30 Sadrist MPs
from the CoR would not technically threaten the Maliki
government. Although Sadrist support for Maliki was critical
in the internal Shi'a coalition negotiations through which he
was nominated, Sadrist withdrawal from CoR at this juncture
would not directly increase the likelihood that a vote of no
confidence would pass. If the Sadrists withdrew their
ministers, they would forfeit a valuable source of patronage
and associated benefits. Further, Sadrist withdrawal from
the government, either from the CoR or from the ministries,
would strengthen their archrival SCIRI, which the Sadrists
want to avoid. It is more likely that the Sadrists will
continue their policy of unhelpful participation: using the
CoR as a platform for populist critiques of MNF-I and using
their ministries for patronage. End Summary.

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Withdrawal from the CoR - So What?
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2. (U) Sadrist MPs threatened in press conferences on
November 24 and November 26 to pull out of the CoR and the
government if Maliki met with President Bush in Jordan.
According to press reports, they issued a statement
"suspending their participation" in the CoR and government on
November 29. Noting that Sadrist support was critical to
Maliki becoming PM, some have suggested that this action
could lead to the fall of the Maliki government.


3. (SBU) However, the political mechanism by which the Shi'a
coalition selected Maliki as its candidate is distinct from
the constitutional mechanism by which a government could
fall. By virtue of controlling the largest number of seats
in CoR, the Shi'a coalition was able to nominate a candidate
for PM from within its ranks for approval by the CoR. Maliki
was the nominee partly because of Sadrist support for him
within the Shi'a coalition over SCIRI candidate Adel Abdel
Mehdi (and Jafari was the initial Shi'a Coalition nominee
over Adel Abdel Mehdi for the same reason). The only way the
CoR can remove Maliki is if at least 138 MPs supported a vote
of no confidence against him, and the withdrawal of the 30
Sadrist MPs would not make it more likely that a vote of no
confidence would pass. (Note: The Shi,a coalition would
still have 98 MPs, combined with 53 from the Kurdish
alliance, for an absolute majority of 151. End note.)


4. (SBU) Sadrist MPs have boycotted CoR sessions before,
notably in the run-up to the regions formation bill when they
were joined at times by Fadhila, Tawafuq, Hewar, and
Iraqiyya. On July 17, the Sadrists walked out of the CoR
session in protest of killings in Mahmoudiya. While these
boycotts made it more difficult for the CoR to achieve quorum
(and on more than one occasion prevented it from doing so),
it continued its work and was able to achieve quorum and pass
the regions formation law, for example. The CoR could
continue its work in the face of a sustained Sadrist boycott
or even the resignation of the Sadrist MPs, as it was able to
do so during the July Tawafuq boycott over the kidnapping of
CoR member Tayseer al-Mashadani.

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Withdraw from Ministries, and Lose Patronage?
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5. (C) The Sadrists hold five ministries: agriculture,
tourism, health, governorate affairs, and transportation. By
all accounts, the Sadrist ministers have used their posts as
jobs programs for their constituents, particularly at the
Ministry of Health. If they resigned, the Sadrists would
forfeit valuable sources of patronage as well as associated
opportunities for corruption and influence. They might
instead stay on as ministers but boycott meetings of the
Council of Ministers (CoM). Such a boycott would not prevent
the CoM from functioning.

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A Populist Threat With Few Teeth
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6. (C) The Sadrists are unlikely to withdraw completely from
the government - i.e., resign from the CoR and CoM - unless
doing so could lead to a better political position (e.g., as

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Hezbollah is trying to do in Lebanon) or unless the
government directly confronts them or the Jaysh al-Mahdi. As
noted above, the CoR could withstand complete Sadrist
withdrawal, and the Sadrists would lose valuable sources of
patronage if they resigned from the ministries. Furthermore,
Sadrist withdrawal would only strengthen the institutional
hand of SCIRI, their bitter rivals. While it is unlikely
that SCIRI would seek a vote of no confidence in Maliki after
a Sadrist withdrawal (as they would need the support of at
least three of the following groups: Shi'a independents, the
Kurds, Iraqiyya, and Tawafuq),SCIRI would emerge
strengthened politically and take over more committee and
ministerial positions.


7. (C) The Sadrists' recent threats are the latest example
of their tactic of using their participation in government as
a populist platform (and opportunity for patronage) to
increase their political appeal. For example, on September
26, Sadrist bloc leader Falah Hassen Shenshel threatened to
suspend Sadrist membership in CoR until their demands about
the "return of sovereignty" were met; they never followed
through on the threat, although they continue to raise the
issue of MNF-I withdrawal. If they indeed boycott the CoR or
CoM, the boycott would likely be temporary. While the
Sadrists do not talk with Embassy officials, Fadhila leader
Hassan Al-Shammari, who is close to several Sadrists in the
CoR, told PolOff that the boycott, should it occur, would be
temporary and represent a political reaction by Sadrist
politicians to the Bush-Maliki meeting, rather than a
strategic decision by Muqtada al-Sadr to withdraw from the
government.
SCOBEY