DEPUTY PM SALEH DISCUSSES VIOLENCE, NEED FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004372

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PM SALEH DISCUSSES VIOLENCE, NEED FOR
CONTINUED MNF-I PRESENCE, AND PCNS MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN
KING, AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh asserted
to Representative Steve King (R-IA) November 25 that a MNF-I
withdrawal from Iraq without victory would embolden
terrorists, Syria, and Iran. Although alarmed by the recent
spike in violence, he cited the International Compact and the
draft law on hydrocarbons as potential benchmarks the
international community could use for gauging progress in
Iraq. Congressman King proposed the Alaska model of direct
payments to citizens as a formula for distributing oil wealth
in Iraq; and suggested increased use of electronic banking.
He reaffirmed his firm support for the U.S. commitment to
Iraq, but expressed personal concern that some of his
colleagues had begun to speak of retreat. In a separate
meeting, Saleh provided the Ambassador and the UK ambassador
a read out of security discussions taking place between the
parties, noting little progress thus far. He saw merit in
the proposal to use Peshmerga to protecting oil pipelines
coming from the north. He expressed hope that some of the
incoming ministers following the PM's proposed cabinet
shakeup would be more qualified than the last. End Summary.


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Rep. King to Saleh: "We Need Demonstrable Signs of Progress"
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2. (C) Deputy PM Saleh initiated the discussion by expressing
appreciation to Representative King for his commitment to
Iraqi democracy. The security situation remained tough, and
Saleh was particularly alarmed by the increase in violence in
Baghdad in recent days. He noted that many observers had
begun to compare the situation in Iraq to the war in Vietnam,
but he described Iraq as different. Iraq was part of a
globalized war, and this time the enemy could strike the U.S.
on its own territory. Success would not be easy in Iraq, he
told Rep. King, but failure would be catastrophic. Rep. King
replied that he long believed if the U.S. could help develop
a stable democracy in Iraq, that it would be easier to solve
other problems in the region. He expressed concern, however,
that the U.S. public was growing impatient.


3. (C) Rep. King noted the importance of measurable
benchmarks in Iraq to show the international community
progress in Iraq. Saleh acknowledged the difficulty in
identifying key elements of progress in Iraq that would be
easy to explain in international media. Nonetheless, he saw
forward movement on many fronts. This included the
International Compact that lays down a vision of
reconciliation and development for the GOI. He also saw
progress in current negotiations on the draft hydrocarbons
law, which would ensure equitable distribution of proceeds
from oil and gas. He noted Iraq's continued export of
petroleum, which led to a government budget of some 40
billion USD. Saleh also saw progress on infrastructure
projects. Rep. King suggested the model used in Alaska for
distributing oil monies. He also posited electronic banking
as one means for helping produce economic development and
ensuring efficient payment to Iraqi troops and other
government workers. Saleh replied that Iraq's remaining
external debt poses a problem with regard to electronic
banking, as it presents an opportunity for foreign
governments that have not forgiven all of Iraq's debt to
seize assets. Only one bank in Iraq thus far had
successfully implemented electronic banking, and for reasons
Saleh did not know, had not had problems with international
creditors.


4. (C) Rep. King asked if there was a sense of urgency in
Iraq with regard to the worsening security situation. Saleh
expressed concern about a lack of leadership to date,
describing the Shia as still learning how to exercise their
power. He hoped political leaders would see federalism as a
way to bridge the sectarian divide. Saleh also underscored
his firm belief that an exit strategy by the U.S. should only
come with victory, as any perceived weakness would embolden
Syria, Iran, and terrorists. Present circumstances were very
serious -- the militias were a "virus" and terrorists a
"cancer" that could kill a democratic Iraq if allowed to
continue at the current pace.

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Deputy PM Saleh: Modest Results from PCNS
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5. (C) After Rep. King's departure, the U.K Ambassador joined
the Ambassador and Deputy PM Saleh for a readout from Saleh
of the expanded Policy Council on National Security (PCNS)

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meeting held earlier that day. Saleh described results to
that point as very modest, noting that the PCNS had discussed
the organization of two committees, one to liaise on security
and the other to discuss ways to control extremism in the
media. Saleh also raised many other issues the political
parties needed to address, including Maliki's interest in
making changes in the cabinet. Saleh also noted proposals to
deploy Peshmerga in regions south of Kurdistan to help with
security. In his view, deployment into Baghdad would be a
mistake, as it would place the force directly between Shia
and Sunni groups. He did see merit, however, in using
Peshmerga along with MNF-I forces in defending oil pipelines
and other infrastructure outside of Baghdad.


6. (C) Both ambassadors and Saleh doubted that Moqtada
al-Sadr would follow through on his threat to withdraw from
the governing coalition if Prime Minister Maliki followed
through with plans to meet with President Bush in Amman.
Saleh said it would be a blessing if Sadr actually withdrew,
but it would need to be under circumstances that painted him
in a negative light. With the planned cabinet shakeup, Saleh
expressed hope that the PM would appoint ministers based more
on qualifications than for sectarian reasons. Specifically,
he said Maliki was considering replacing the Minister of
Interior. However, Saleh expressed concern about the PM's
judgment, pointing to the poor caliber of individuals the PM
had chosen for his immediate staff. To date, the parties had
viewed cabinet formation as a way of "dividing up the pie"
among themselves rather than in putting the best people in
the best positions. "Maliki views himself as a national
leader," asserted Saleh, "but he still pursues a Shia
sectarian agenda, as this is the lens through with he sees
Iraq."
KHALILZAD