Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4346
2006-11-25 13:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
PURSUING AN ACSA WITH THE GOI
how-toVZCZCXRO8284 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #4346 3291345 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251345Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8179 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004346
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: PURSUING AN ACSA WITH THE GOI
REF: A. STATE 39912
B. BAGHDAD 1639
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons (a),(b),and (d
).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004346
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: PURSUING AN ACSA WITH THE GOI
REF: A. STATE 39912
B. BAGHDAD 1639
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons (a),(b),and (d
).
1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: As Iraqis move toward a more
mature security relationship with the USG, we believe DoD
should pursue an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement with
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense as soon as we have taken the
necessary steps to ensure the Iraqis are capable of managing
an ACSA. An ACSA would provide legitimate means, absent at
this time, for the U.S. and Iraqi military to exchange
logistical support on a reimbursable basis. We understand
the Department has already granted C-175 negotiation
authority to DoD, and that USCENTCOM also wants to proceed.
END SUMMARY.
Training on an ACSA
--------------
2. (C/REL MNF-I) Before any formal U.S.-Iraqi ACSA
negotiations begin, we ask that DoD develop and embed into
the rollout concept a training component for a discrete
number of MoD and subordinate officials to handle the
budgeting and management functions associated with an ACSA.
3. (C/REL MNF-I) To create the right conditions to begin
formal negotiations, we suggest senior MOD officials visit
mature ACSA programs resident in neighboring Arab countries
such as Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan.
Accountability
--------------
4. (C/REL MNF-I) A U.S.-Iraqi ACSA should stipulate strict
conditions under which the exchange of goods and services can
take place, to include a provision for MOD receipt of
periodic statements and identification of the discrete team
of MOD officials who can approve associated support.
5. (C/REL MNF-I) Iraqi forces currently require substantial
field logistical support. Much is provided at no cost and
with limited Iraqi accountability. Since Iraqi forces will
likely require substantial future logistical support, regular
periodic accounting statements and close oversight are
critical.
FUTURE POTENTIAL
--------------
6. (C/REL MNF-I) At a suitable time during the DoD-Iraqi MoD
ACSA development process, we will encourage the Iraqi MoD and
MoI to sign a parallel agreement allowing Ministry of
Interior's (MoI) potential indirect use of the ACSA.
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C/REL MNF-I) In pursuing an ACSA, DoD should recognize
Iraq's budget execution capacity limitations, probable
inability to provide adequate reimbursement through goods and
services, and lack of a mature budget oversight process.
Adapting ACSA implementation to these factors will be
critical for success.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: PURSUING AN ACSA WITH THE GOI
REF: A. STATE 39912
B. BAGHDAD 1639
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons (a),(b),and (d
).
1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: As Iraqis move toward a more
mature security relationship with the USG, we believe DoD
should pursue an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement with
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense as soon as we have taken the
necessary steps to ensure the Iraqis are capable of managing
an ACSA. An ACSA would provide legitimate means, absent at
this time, for the U.S. and Iraqi military to exchange
logistical support on a reimbursable basis. We understand
the Department has already granted C-175 negotiation
authority to DoD, and that USCENTCOM also wants to proceed.
END SUMMARY.
Training on an ACSA
--------------
2. (C/REL MNF-I) Before any formal U.S.-Iraqi ACSA
negotiations begin, we ask that DoD develop and embed into
the rollout concept a training component for a discrete
number of MoD and subordinate officials to handle the
budgeting and management functions associated with an ACSA.
3. (C/REL MNF-I) To create the right conditions to begin
formal negotiations, we suggest senior MOD officials visit
mature ACSA programs resident in neighboring Arab countries
such as Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan.
Accountability
--------------
4. (C/REL MNF-I) A U.S.-Iraqi ACSA should stipulate strict
conditions under which the exchange of goods and services can
take place, to include a provision for MOD receipt of
periodic statements and identification of the discrete team
of MOD officials who can approve associated support.
5. (C/REL MNF-I) Iraqi forces currently require substantial
field logistical support. Much is provided at no cost and
with limited Iraqi accountability. Since Iraqi forces will
likely require substantial future logistical support, regular
periodic accounting statements and close oversight are
critical.
FUTURE POTENTIAL
--------------
6. (C/REL MNF-I) At a suitable time during the DoD-Iraqi MoD
ACSA development process, we will encourage the Iraqi MoD and
MoI to sign a parallel agreement allowing Ministry of
Interior's (MoI) potential indirect use of the ACSA.
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C/REL MNF-I) In pursuing an ACSA, DoD should recognize
Iraq's budget execution capacity limitations, probable
inability to provide adequate reimbursement through goods and
services, and lack of a mature budget oversight process.
Adapting ACSA implementation to these factors will be
critical for success.
KHALILZAD