KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004342 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016 TAGS: ECON EPET IZ KJUS KCOR PGOV EINV PBTS SUBJECT: KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS ON HYDROCARBON LAW COMPROMISE REF: A. BAGHDAD 04066 ¶B. BAGHDAD 03069 ¶C. BAGHDAD 03341 ¶D. BAGHDAD 03257 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C REL GBR) Summary. In a November 19 meeting with Economic Minister Counselor, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and KRG Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami presented their compromise proposal on contracting which denies signatory authority to the federal government on new hydrocarbon development, but includes a degree of federal government approval rights. Minister Ashti proposed that disputes between regions and the federal government over approval of particular contract provisions be settled through arbitration, though during a four-day dialogue in Sulaymaniyah with Government of Iraq (GOI) energy advisor, Thamir Ghadbhan, the two disagreed on the nature of the arbitrator. Ashti suggested an international body such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, and Ghadbhan wants an Iraqi entity to perform that role. ¶2. (C REL GBR) Barzani and Ashti also spoke of increasing Kurdish domestic pressure for the KRG to deliver on promises of economic growth and prosperity, and made it clear that they do not and will not trust Baghdad with the development of the hydrocarbon resources so critical to achieving this growth. Ashti reiterated that there is agreement in principle between the KRG and GOI on revenue sharing and acknowledged that a portion of hydrocarbon revenue should be allocated to the federal government. He also said, however, that the KRG aimed to reduce the Kurdistan Region's (KR) dependence on the federal government to the point where in three years the KRG will use hydrocarbon revenue to provide its own essential services, promised but not delivered by the federal government. The KRG will therefore no longer need to cede a part of its share of national hydrocarbon revenues for such services. The ministers also elaborated a proposed framework for gradually transferring authorities from a reconstituted Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) to nascent producing regions based on the authorities the KRG has defined for itself. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Persistent Contracting Issues and the Federal Petroleum Committee -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C REL GBR) Econ MinCouns travelled to Erbil for November 19 meetings with Prime Minister Barzani and Minister of Natural Resources Ashti. Based on Post,s discussions with former Minister of Oil and current GOI energy advisor Thamir Ghadbhan, and KRG Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami, the federal and regional governments seem to agree on the establishment of what Ashti called a "Federal Petroleum Committee" (FPC). Ashti described this body as reporting directly to the Iraqi Council of Representatives, with the Minister of Oil and representatives from the regional operating companies on its Board of Directors. Both parties agree that this new entity would be responsible for setting national hydrocarbon development policy, but disagree on the influence the FPC will have over hydrocarbon contracts. ¶4. (C REL GBR) The KRG sees the FPC as having approval authority over contracts for existing fields, but not for new fields. Ashti made the point that the FPC can wield contracting authority in nascent producing regions until these regions have adequately developed regional institutions to perform these functions, but the KRG insists on retaining contracting authority on new fields as, he argued, was enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution. These regions would also partner with the INOC during a transition period until their regional operating companies had the capacity to undertake development of existing fields independently. Ashti proposed that a separate arm of the INOC perform this function, and that transfer of responsibilities to the regions be determined by a two-thirds majority in the FPC. ¶5. (C REL GBR) Ashti explained that the role the KRG envisioned for the FPC with regard to new fields respected certain federal authorities. For example, regional contracting committees that review agreements negotiated by regional operating companies would include a representative from the FPC. Contracts would be submitted to the FPC to ensure that they adhere to national energy policy and meet standards set by model contracts for issues such as transparency (Note: The FPC would develop these model contracts. End Note.). It should be noted that even the BAGHDAD 00004342 002.3 OF 003 regional contracting committee as formulated by the KRG would not have approval authority, but would merely provide a report to the Minister of Natural Resources, who has the power to sign contracts which are then passed on to the Kurdish Council of Ministers for approval. Minister Ashti made it clear that the FPC would not have authority to approve contracts, but could comment and send them back to regional authorities to remedy. He said that if an inter-governmental dispute were to arise, the dispute could be submitted to binding arbitration. ¶6. (C REL GBR) The KRG favors international arbitration in the form of an international organization such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. Ghadbhan feels that this approach would undermine national institutions and has suggested an Iraqi arbitration body be established. Ashti said that the KRG did not believe an Iraqi body would be free of political influence. Both Ashti and Barzani repeatedly told us of their distrust of Baghdad, saying that no projects would be undertaken in the KR if the federal government had complete contracting authority. In order to preempt obstructionism, the KRG has proposed that there be parameters limiting the use of arbitration. Ashti volunteered the example that three consecutive arbitrations could trigger reversion of rights to the KRG to approve contracts unilaterally. ¶7. (C REL GBR) Despite agreement between Ghadbhan and Ashti that existing fields be jointly managed by the INOC and regional operating companies, Ashti told us that if the FPC does not include development of discovered fields in the KR within two years, the KRG could independently proceed with development planning and management of these fields. Ashti defended this position by saying that it took the Ministry of Oil three years to enter into a service agreement, though he did not reference a specific project. Ashti and Barzani were adamant that the KRG not hitch their destiny to Iraqi political stability. Another role of the FPC that Ashti pointed out supports federal authority is its proposed apportioning of Iraq's OPEC quota to producing regions and governorates. He said that such a system would be self-regulating with regard to resource development when combined with revenue sharing, "Why would we deplete our resources at the expense of future generations if our share does not increase?" -------------- Revenue Collection and Sharing -------------- ¶8. (C REL GBR) When discussing revenue sharing, the KRG officials reaffirmed their commitment to sharing all revenues, but acknowledged that the mechanism to do so was still a matter of disagreement. The KRG position continues to require that an "offshore" trust account be established with sub-accounts for each region and province to be used at their discretion. Ghadbhan had told us at a November 18 meeting that the Ministry favored a process through which shares of oil revenues were added to ordinary provincial budgets after the federal budget was provided for, whereas the KRG wants their share before any revenue is consolidated into the national treasury. ¶9. (C REL GBR) Ashti presented us with a diagram through which percentage shares of oil revenue--defined as including crude and product sales, signature bonuses, and royalties--would be initially agreed upon and enshrined in law, but revised based on upcoming census figures. In addition to determining percentage shares, Ashti's diagram indicates that a financial value for services provided by the federal government to the provinces would also need to be determined, with the agreed upon value to be subtracted from regional/provincial revenue shares and the cash balance channeled into the provincial/regional sub-accounts. Minister Ashti and Prime Minister Barzani for the first time articulated a strategy for weaning the KR off of federal services. Ashti's diagram illustrates this three-year reduction in the portion of regional revenue share allocated to the federal government in exchange for services. -------------- KRG vs. GOI Approach -------------- ¶10. (C REL GBR) Ashti portrayed the KRG as "good listeners" who invited input on their draft laws and made them publicly available on the Internet (reftel A). He contrasted this approach with the federal government's isolation of the KRG--not only by failing to share GOI draft laws, but through public statements by Minister of Oil Husayn al-Shahristani regarding infrastructure development in the KR not determined in consultation with the KRG, such as a proposed pipeline BAGHDAD 00004342 003 OF 003 from Kirkuk through KR territory and the building of the Kouya Refinery. Ashti also questioned Minister Shahristani's priorities, citing Shahristani's pursuit of international unitization agreements with Iran--typically a complex process--rather than focusing on a national hydrocarbon law of critical importance to Iraq's political as well as economic future. ¶11. (C REL GBR) During a discussion of needed foreign investment, Ashti said that the KR offers potential investors a "basket of opportunities." If Kirkuk becomes part of the KRG, the international oil companies (IOCs) will have a role, but given limited exploration opportunities within the current borders of the KR, Ashti welcomed smaller companies that are willing to take more risk. ¶12. (C REL GBR) Ashti and KRG Spokesman Khaled Salih told us that regional contracting authority is critical to helping the KR establish political and commercial ties to Turkey and improve relations. More broadly, they see commercial cooperation as a vehicle of secularization to combat increased Islamicization of the region. -------------- Prospects for Consensus -------------- ¶13. (C REL GBR) Minister Ashti and Prime Minister Barzani agreed that national hydrocarbon legislation is urgently needed. Econ MinCouns stated that presenting draft legislation to the Iraqi Council of Representatives before its January recess is a priority for the US, and that flexibility and creative thinking on both sides is vital to reaching consensus. Ashti admitted that the primary intention of the KRG regional hydrocarbon law was to elicit action from the Ministry of Oil (MinOil),and said that the promulgation of competing drafts between MinOil and the KRG was more about establishing boundaries than working towards a good law (reftels B and C). He also said that neither the KRG nor MinOil drafts should be used as a starting point for drafting a joint law. During our November 18 meeting, Ghadbhan emphasized that the law must be drafted in Arabic by Iraqis and then translated into English only for international comment. He also said that mediation by the US would be important only if the parties were unable to break a deadlock themselves. ¶14. (C REL GBR) Ashti agreed that progress at the second Energy Committee "retreat" scheduled by Committee Chair and Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih to begin on Thursday, November 23 in Baghdad is crucial (reftel D). When asked how progress towards consensus might be facilitated, he said: 1) remove Shahristani as Minister of Oil due to his evident lack of commitment to resolving critical policy issues; and 2) broaden the composition of the Energy Committee to include representatives from each province. Acknowledging that changing the composition of the Energy Committee is unlikely, he recommended selecting provincial representatives to act as advisors during the negotiating process to counteract the "Green Zone mentality" in which the Committee members repeat positions without thought to their constituents or to a desired end-state. He emphasized that a new Minister of Oil would need to understand that the nature of the Ministry would change--being less about power and more about service. He also reiterated that the KRG has already offered sufficient compromises--agreeing to put themselves at the "mercy" of the FPC for production allocations and long-term strategy--and that the total surrender of regional contracting authority was not negotiable. KHALILZAD