INITIAL REACTION TO JAFARI NOMINATION: MUTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000432

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2026
TAGS: PGOV PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: INITIAL REACTION TO JAFARI NOMINATION: MUTED
ENTHUSIASM

REF: A. BAGHDAD 374

B. BAGHDAD 402

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: The Shia Islamist Coalition (List 555)
February 12 voted 64-63 to renominate incumbent Ibrahim
Jafari as Prime Minister. Jafari was supported by his
Dawa Party, Dawa Tanzim, the Sadrists, and some
independents in the Coalition. Jafari's challenger,
Deputy President Adil Abd al-Mahdi, got the support of
SCIRI, the Badr Organization, the Fadhila Party, and
the majority of the Coalition independents. Two other
challengers, Fadhila Party's Nadeem al-Jabiri and
independent Hussein Shahristani, dropped out of the race
prior to the vote. By delivering the nomination to Jafari,
Moqtada Sadr's party has increased its status within the
Shia coalition. Abd al-Mahdi's SCIRI, still the largest
party in UIC 555, will likely to seek to keep its current
ministries, particularly the Ministry of Interior. SCIRI
leader Abd al-Hakim will seek to retain his position as
head of Shia Islamist Coalition (List 555). The Fadhila
Party and the independents who supported Abd al-Mahdi must
also struggle to find their place in the new government, as
they can no longer rely on Abd al-Mahdi's patronage to
secure the positions they desired. The Kurds and Sunni
Arabs were not enthused about the Shia decision. Jafari
has much work ahead to build a coalition government with
them. End Summary.

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Jafari's Stubbornness Pays Off
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2. (U) PM Jafari of the Dawa al-Islamiya Party survived a
tough struggle against Adil Abd al-Mahdi of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Republic in Iraq (SCIRI) to win
renomination for Prime Minister. At a meeting in a mosque
near SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's Baghdad compound,
UIC Council of Representatives members voted 64-63 to
nominate Jafari. Dawa, Dawa Tanzim, Sadr supporters and a
handful of independents gave Jafari his majority, while
SCIRI/Badr, Fadhila, and the bulk of UIC independents cast
their votes for Abd al-Mahdi.


3. (C) Shia independent Taha Der'a al-Saadi told PolOff
February 12 that SCIRI and Badr Organization members were
outwardly happy after the vote was announced and that al-
Hakim and Abd al-Mahdi were the first to congratulate
Jafari after his victory. After the election, List 555
leaders appeared at a press conference and talked about
party unity and the need to move Iraq forward. Even Ayad
Allawi stalwart Safiya Suhail al-Tamimi told Poloff she was
impressed by the way the losers in today's election
appeared gracious in front of the cameras.


4. (C) The other two candidates early on in the process --
independent hard-line and TNA Deputy Speaker Islamist
Hussein Shahristani and former Baghdad University professor
Nadeem al-Jabiri of the Fadhila party -- dropped out in the
days before the vote after receiving assurances that if
they voted for Abd al-Mahdi, they would get a Deputy
President and a Deputy Speaker position, respectively.
With Jafari's victory, all deals SCIRI was offering are now
off.

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Sadrists Major Force
--------------


5. (C) By delivering decisive support to Jafari, the
Sadrists have, at least for the near term, increased their
standing within the List 555 coalition. At a minimum, we
expect the Sadrists to increase the number of service
ministries they control. The Sadrists may also initially
demand that Jafari not allow Ayad Allawi into the
government. President Jalal Talabani announced February 12
that the Kurdistan Alliance would not support the new
government unless Allawi's party was included in the
government. Jafari may finally press the Sadrists to back
off in order to form a government, since he needs
additional support for his coalition government. Owing his
premiership to this staunch Sadrist backing, we can expect
Jafari to oppose or at least seek to stall any Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) action against the Sadrist-backed
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).

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Whither SCIRI?

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6. (C) Having lost the PM race, SCIRI will likely seek to
increase its ministerial positions, while holding on to key
portfolios such as the Ministry of Interior. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) Deputy Foreign Minister for Bilateral
Affairs Dr. Hamid al-Bayati told PolOff February 12 that he
was extremely disappointed in the results of the vote. He
said he expects Abd al-Mahdi will remain Deputy President
and that SCIRI will retain control of the Ministry of
Interior (MoI),in addition to seeking other ministries
such as the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of
Oil (MoO). Some of the technocrats who had come to
surround Abd al-Mahdi might find themselves elevated to
ministerial rank, instead of being in the kitchen cabinet
of an Abd al-Mahdi premiership that is not to be.


7. (C) If SCIRI retains control of MoI, we expect it to put
Bayan Jabr's name forward to continue as minister, or to at
least use him as a bargaining chip. Neither the Sunni
Arabs nor Allawi are likely to join a government with Jabr
at MOI. Once they make their position clear, SCIRI could
seek to slip in a "compromise" candidate such as Qassim
Daoud, hoping that he would face less opposition if
presented as an alternative to Jabr.


8. (C) Former Oil Minister Thamer Ghadban, however,
wondered aloud to PolOff on February 12 whether SCIRI would
stay in the Shia Islamist coalition. Withdrawing from it
would risk incurring the wrath of Sayyid Muhammad Ridha al-
SISTANI, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI's son. While a
split is unlikely, SCIRI may try to engineer a vote of no
confidence against Jafari in the future. It would take
only 138 votes to bring down the government, and the Kurds,
Allawi and the Sunnis have nearly that on their own without
SCIRI prodding them forward.

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Fadhila: The Would-Be Giant
--------------


9. (C) After campaigning for the premiership himself,
Nadeem al-Jabiri was able to strike a deal with Abd al-
Mahdi to become Deputy Speaker of the Council of
Representatives in exchange for supporting Abd al-Mahdi's
candidacy. Abd al-Mahdi also offered Fadhila control of
two ministries. Under PM Jafari, Fadhila can reasonably
expect one ministry. Nadeem al-Jabiri's fate remains
uncertain, but he may have to resign himself to being a UIC
backbencher in the Council.


10. (C) Potential Interior Minister Qassim Daoud told
PolOff on February 12 that while most Fadhila Party members
voted for Abd al-Mahdi, some may have cut a deal with
Jafari so that Fadhila can retain control over the Ministry
of Oil. On the other hand, as Ghadban told PolOffs and
EconOff today, Fadhila's performance in the Oil Ministry to
date has been so dismal that there will be strong voices
calling for the Oil Ministry to go to someone else, with
Ghadban himself the most likely alternative.

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How the Independents Voted
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11. (C) The independents did not vote as a bloc. Taha
Der'a al-Saadi told PolOff on February 12 that Shahristani,
after withdrawing from the PM race in favor of Abd al-
Mahdi, could not persuade the independents to cast their
votes for Abd al-Mahdi. Our best estimate of the secret
ballot is that about 18 independents voted for Abd al-Mahdi
and 12 voted for Jafari. At this time it is unclear if any
side deals were made; we may be able to deduce this once
candidates for the ministries are announced.

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Kurds Divided Over Outcome
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12. (C) PM Jafari and President Talabani's relationship,
never very close to begin with, has becoming increasingly
strained in recent months with their private arguments
often spilling over into the public sphere. We can expect
this to continue, assuming both are returned to their
current positions. President Talabani evinced no great
enthusiasm with the Ambassador February 12 (septel).
Even Masoud Barzani's KDP will now probably support
increased Presidential powers for rival Talabani, in
part to pressure Jafari on key issues for the Kurds such
as Kirkuk, regional control over natural resources, and

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protecting the Constitution's provisions on federalism.
(COMMENT: Barzani previously told the Ambassador that if
SCIRI candidate Adil Abd al-Mahdi became the Shia nominee,
that the KDP would not support Talabani's renomination for
President, fearing that Abd al-Mahdi and Talabani's close
relationship would give Barzani's rival too much power in
Baghdad. END COMMENT.)

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Sunni Arabs Disappointed
--------------


13. (C) Sunni National Dialogue Council figure Abd al-
Nasser al-Janabi predicted to PolOff February 12 that a
weak Jafari may have difficulty getting his programs
passed in the Council of Representatives. Janabi said he
would have preferred Nadeem al-Jabiri as the PM. His
second choice was Abd al-Mahdi because he expected that Abd
al-Mahdi would have moved against Hakim if he was PM.
Moreover, Jafari, with his ties to the Sadrists, is just as
bad as Abd al-Mahdi with Iran, al-Janabi opined.
Separately, Professor Hassan al-Bazzaz, political advisor
to Adnan Dulaimi's Gathering of the Iraqi People, also
called the Jafari nomination bad news, "worse" than Abd al-
Mahdi. Jafari, he told Poloff February 12, was a disaster
as PM when he had the full backing of both the Kurds and
the Shia. Bazzaz wondered what he could do from a weaker
political position. The Sunnis, with a weak PM, will now
seek more assurances, in terms of getting their people into
key ministries. Both Janabi and Bazzaz conceded that
Jafari's views on federalism are better than Abd al-Mahdi's
but they both would have preferred the pragmatic Abd al-
Mahdi to Jafari.

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The Scorecard
--------------


14. (C) According to our information, the support for each
candidate was as follows:

63 For DP Mahdi:

15 SCIRI
15 Badr
15 Fadhila
18 Independents

64 For PM Jafari:

12 Dawa
13 Dawa Tanzim
27 Sadrists
12 Independents

Sadrist Hassan Tuma was not present for the vote, but most
likely would have voted for Jafari.

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Comment
--------------


15. (C) Comment: Despite Jafari's dismal track record as
Prime Minister (ref b),he was able to pull together enough
votes to win renomination. One bright side of the day was
that the Shia Coalition resolved a gridlock with a
democratic election. Much of the problem with Iraqi
governing processes to date has been the unwillingness to
put issues to a vote and move on. Whether this outcome
will be seen as beneficial is still an open question to the
Iraqi political class. Also, the closeness of the vote
underscores the tensions within the Shia List 555; we are
hearing some political wags wonder if some of the List 555
members might not join in an anti-Jafari coalition. Jafari
has far to go to unite List 555 behind him, bring in the
Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Allawi, and form a true national
unity government. End Comment.
KHALILZAD