Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD4305
2006-11-20 21:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI VP HASHIMI ON REGIONAL TRAVEL, RECENT MEDIA

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4346
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4305/01 3242103
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 202103Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8111
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004305 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI VP HASHIMI ON REGIONAL TRAVEL, RECENT MEDIA
STATEMENTS


Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004305 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI VP HASHIMI ON REGIONAL TRAVEL, RECENT MEDIA STATEMENTS Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Iraq's Sunni Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi told Charge he was disappointed at the hesitation and lack of direction about Iraq he found among Gulf interlocutors during a recent trip to the region. Hashimi defended his recent public statements threatening Sunni withdrawal from Iraq's unity government, saying the Sunni Tawafuq bloc is still engaged in the political process. However, if the process failed, he would not "give up and go home"; instead, he would fight for the interests of the nation "by other means." He criticized the recent warrant issued against Muslim Scholars Association head Harith Al-Dari, claiming that it was intended to act as a distraction from the recent Ministry of Education kidnapping scandal. Hashimi expressed willingness to participate in an Iraqi political leadership meeting to address outstanding national reconciliation issues. He highlighted deteriorating security and the need for the GOI to consult more closely with Sunnis leaders on GOI decisions - especially security related - as his top priorities for the meeting. End Summary. -------------- WHERE ARE THE GULF COUNTRIES? -------------- ¶2. (C) Hashimi said that his recent tour of the Gulf states was busy but inconclusive. Hashimi had looked forward to neighboring states and other Arab states playing a more active role in Iraq, but he and other Iraqi Sunnis were disappointed in their hesitance and seeming lack of direction. Hashimi said that he gave a speech before Arab ambassadors in Qatar where he briefed on economic and political issues and national reconciliation and encouraged them to open embassies in Iraq and become more involved. -------------- NO SUNNI WITHDRAWAL YET -------------- ¶3. (C) The Charge raised the issue of VP Hashimi's November 7 Al Jazeera interview in which he threatened that the Sunni Tawafuq bloc would have no choice but to withdraw from the political process and take up arms if the security situation continued to deteriorate. VP Hashimi responded defensively, pointing out that Sunni political figures feel pressure from two directions: the government that continues to marginalize them on one hand, and the Sunni constituencies who feel their �
00A;elected leadership has failed them on the other. Hashimi said that in subsequent statements he had made it "perfectly clear" that Tawafuq had not yet given up on the political process. However, he refused to remain silent in the face of the deteriorating security situation. ¶4. (C) Since the fall of Saddam, Hashimi pointed out, his Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) had chosen the political process as the means of achieving Sunni interests. However, if this course failed and Tawafuq was pushed out of the government, Hashimi said, "I will not go home. I will defend the interests of my country in any way I can, by fighting if I have to." He raised the PM's recent statements on implementing the anti-terrorism law against those who made statements inciting violence and sedition. He opined that the Shia want to have it both ways. "They want to say they have a government of national unity that includes the Sunnis," he continued, but they "demand that we keep quiet." ¶5. (C) Hashimi criticized the recent warrant issued Sunni cleric Harith Al-Dari. He argued that this should not have been done without consulting the Sunni political leadership. He argued that publicly targeting people like Al-Dari "made a hero out of them" and further polarized Iraqi society. In his view, the warrant was an intentional distraction from the Ministry of Education kidnapping fiasco and the numerous kidnapped victims who remain missing. -------------- - HASHIMI READY FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MEETING -------------- - ¶6. (C) Hashimi said he would look forward to the possibility of a future gathering of political leaders to discuss outstanding issues of national reconciliation, and noted that he intended to emphasize the need for closer consultation with the Sunni community on key security decisions. He noted that any cabinet reshuffle must include the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and should be made in consultation with the Sunnis. Hashimi is unhappy with Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir, who he believes is not aggressive in addressing Baghdad's security crisis. The Interior Minister, Hashimi continued, does not even answer his phone calls. In any BAGHDAD 00004305 002 OF 002 event, Hashimi continued, more than a cabinet reshuffle is needed to correct the systemic problems facing the Council of Ministers. ¶7. (C) Charge told Hashimi that PM Maliki is equally concerned. He predicted that Maliki would target a range of Ministers in the upcoming shuffle, and that he had developed a selection process whereby each political party that "owned" a Ministry would be required to present a list of qualified replacement candidates. The Charge expressed concern that Sunni DPM Zawbaie was rarely present at Ministerial Council for National Security (MCNS) meetings and urged Hashimi to ensure that the Sunni voice was represented at this forum. It was the USG's hope, the Charge added, that this political leader's meeting could lead to the development of focused confidence building measures between both sides that would ultimately improve communication and cooperation on the national level. This would pave the way for a unified Iraqi message to the international community and increased support for the National Compact project. SPECKHARD

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