IRAQI PRESIDENT GIVES READOUT ON TRIP TO FRANCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004297

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR SY IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRESIDENT GIVES READOUT ON TRIP TO FRANCE,
PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 18, President Talabani gave
Charge a readout of his state visit to Paris earlier this
month. Talabani stated that he was received by President
Jacques Chirac, who had listened attentively as Talabani
requested more French aid in police training and economic and
trade assistance. Most importantly, Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari had talked privately with French Foreign
Minister Michel Barnier and had won the latter's support for
extending UNSCR 1546 on MNF-I mandate in Iraq. With respect
to reconciliation, Talabani agreed with the Charge that a
meeting of Political Party leaders was urgently needed to get
reconciliation back on track. The President noted the
intention to have this before the end of the month, but was
open to a meeting as early as November 23 when pressed by the
Charge. Talabani expressed, however, his impatience with
what he perceived to be American "softness" on the Sunni
Arabs. The Sunnis Arabs needed to learn that they could no
longer have one foot in the government and one foot in the
insurgency. The Shia also needed to understand that they
could not lead and continue to have extra-governmental
militia groups terrorizing Sunni Arab citizens. There would
be no reconciliation, Talabani stressed, unless the two main
Arab factions could openly agree on working toward two
things: real Sunni Arab engagement in the political process
and abandonment of the insurgency, and Shia determination to
control the extra-legal activities of their militia groups.
END SUMMARY.

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A Successful Visit to Paris
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2. (C) On November 18, President Talabani gave Charge a
readout of his state visit to Paris earlier this month.
Talabani stated that he was received by President Jacques
Chirac, who had listened attentively as Talabani requested
more French aid in police training and economic and trade
assistance. Most importantly, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar
Zebari had talked privately with French Foreign Minister
Michel Barnier and had won the latter's support for extending
UNSCR 1546 on MNF-I mandate in Iraq. Barnier also agreed to
open a French consulate in Erbil, Talabani reported.


3. (C) Talabani also pressed French Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy to extend France's police and
counterterrorism training to the Iraqi Armed Forces. Sarkozy
was very friendly, Talabani stated, and appeared willing to
consider increasing the amount of training for Iraqi security
forces. He then met with three members of the Socialist
bloc, including presidential candidate Segolene Royal.
According to Talabani, all three began by insisting that
Coalition Forces should immediately withdraw from Iraq;
however, after carefully explaining the situation, Talabani
convinced them that such a move would be counterproductive.
The French had coined a new phrase for the withdrawal issue,
with many influential journalists now referring to a
"horizon" for a timetable for withdrawal.

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The Political Party Leaders Meeting
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4. (C) Talabani agreed with the Charge on the importance of
getting together political leaders to get reconciliation back
on track. He was open to a meeting as early as November 23.
Talabani emphasized that the leaders needed to engage fully
and frankly on the key issues, otherwise it would be a waste
of time. He also noted that the top leaders of all the
parties had to attend; since Iraqiyya List leader and former
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi was seriously ill and could not
travel from London, his deputy Adnan Pachachi should be
required to attend in Allawi's place, Talabani stated.

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Time for the U.S. to Get Tough
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5. (C) Talabani expressed impatience with what he perceived
to be "softness" on the Sunni Arabs. The American Sunni
engagement plan was not achieving its goals, Talabani stated,
because the Sunni Arabs were not being forced to make a
public choice between being a part of the government - and
all the responsibilities that entailed - and being part of
the opposition. Sunni Arab politicians were given far too
much leeway to behave badly, saying reasonable things in
private and then whipping up the "Sunni street" into a frenzy
in public with their inflammatory rhetoric against the
government. For example, Muslim Ulema Council (MUC) leader
Harith al-Dari continually harangues listeners in his

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Arabic-language radio broadcasts to attack the Americans, and
yet neither the U.S. nor the neighboring Sunni Arab countries
do anything to discourage this behavior. In fact, Sunni Arab
countries are actively assisting Sunni politicians to
undermine the U.S. effort in Iraq. None of the Sunni Arab
politicians in Baghdad w
ere being held to account for their inability to lead the
Sunni Arab people away from violence and into full
cooperation and engagement with the Government of Iraq,
Talabani complained.


6. (C) The problem was not confined to the Sunni Arabs,
Talabani noted. Both the Sunni Arabs and the Shia had
rights, but also responsibilities. The Shia also needed to
control their militias like Badr Organization and the Jaysh
al-Mahdi. There would be no reconciliation unless the two
main Arab factions could openly agree on working toward two
things: real Sunni Arab engagement in the political process
and abandonment of the insurgency, and Shia determination to
control the extra-legal activities of their militia groups.
SPECKHARD