(U) KURDISH NEGOTIATOR SHAWAYS FRUSTRATED AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000422 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: (U) KURDISH NEGOTIATOR SHAWAYS FRUSTRATED AT DELAYS IN SERIOUS GOVERNMENT TALKS Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister and senior Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) member Rowsh Shaways told PolCouns and PolOff on February 9 that he was pessimistic that government formation negotiations would be finished anytime soon. Shaways expressed frustration at the bickering inside the Shia and Sunni Arab coalitions. He predicted the government would not be ready until April. Meanwhile, Kurdish President Barzani had business to attend in the North but is waiting for progress in Baghdad before returning to Kurdistan. (Shaways was referring to the unfinished merger of the two Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRGs) in Erbil and Sulymaniyah.) Notably, in our February 9 meetings with Shaways we did not hear much complaining about Abd al-Mahdi as Prime Minister, even though Shaways' boss Barzani so far has told us he is uncomfortable with Abd al-Mahdi's perceived Iran connection. We think some of the Kurds are starting to ponder whether a bigger shake-up at the top of the Iraqi Government would be useful. END SUMMARY. -------------- Shia Talks with the Kurds -------------- ¶2. (C) Shaways reported that the Kurdish government formation negotiating team - of which he is a member - met with members of the Shia Coalition on February ¶7. Shaways said that Hussayn Shahristani, Abu Isra (also known as Jawad al-Maliki or Nuri Kamel) and a representative from SCIRI and from the Sadrists told the Kurds that the Shia would not accept former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi or his Iraqi National Accord List as members of the new government. He said the Shia Islamist Coalition also wanted a government program that would facilitate launch of federalism in the South, take a hard line on security and keep constitutional changes to a minimum. Shaways said the Kurds want Allawi and his people in the government; he thought that within the Shia Coalition only the Sadrists rejected Allawi. The rest of the Shia proposals were quite acceptable to the Kurds, Shaways opined. Indeed, he concluded, it would be relatively simple for the Kurds to conclude a government program with the Shia Islamist Coalition. -------------- And the Sunni Arabs -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Shaways, the Kurds met next with a Sunni Arab delegation on February 8, which only the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) negotiators attended for Tawafuq. According to Shaways, the IIP told the Kurds that they had been approached by Allawi to form an opposition coalition to challenge the Shia Coalition's grip on the Prime Minister position, but that the IIP would refuse to join Allawi if the Kurds agreed to ally themselves with the IIP, rather than the Shia. Shaways expressed puzzlement with the Sunni Arab tactics and reiterated support for the four-block unity government. A big problem, Shaways continued, is that the Sunni Arabs are so fragmented that they themselves did not know whom they wanted to nominate, said Shaways. -------------- America Should Intervene -------------- ¶4. (C) In a separate discussion with PolOff on February 8, Shaways chided the Americans for not having done more to direct the parties in selecting candidates for the present administration. He urged the U.S. not to repeat its hands-off approach of spring 2005. The Iraqis would not have had to suffer under current Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr if the U.S. had spoken against him, he scolded. Prime Minister Ja'afari, for example, would be a very poor choice to continue on in his post, he said; SCIRI candidate Adil Abd al-Mahdi would be a better choice. As for Minister of Interior, either Nuri Badran or Tawfiq al-Yasiri would be good BAGHDAD 00000422 002 OF 002 choices. He liked Shia candidate Qassem Daoud personally, but was concerned about Daoud's health problems. -------------- (U) Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Shaways referred obliquely to Kurdish President Barzani having business to attend in the North while he is waiting for progress in Baghdad before returning to Kurdistan. (Shaways was referring to the unfinished merger of the two Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRGs) in Erbil and Sulymaniyah.) ¶6. (C) Shaways confirmed reports from one of the other Kurdish negotiators, Dr. Mahmud Othman, that the Shia have not agreed with Allawi's participation in the new government (see septel). Shaways is often well-connected into Barzani's thinking, and his apparent acceptance of Abd al-Mahdi - at least in principle - is interesting; Barzani's son Masrur is saying similar things to us in private. Clearly, some in the KDP, up to Barzani, realize that Abd al- Mahdi may be the choice of the Shia and are pondering what steps to take in response. A few are even wondering out loud to us whether Talabani should remain as President if Abd al-Mahdi, perceived as pro-Iranian, is the Prime Minister. This thinking leads the Kurds to new questions. The intra-Kurdish agreement had stipulated that other senior PUK leaders - like Barham Saleh would be limited as to what they can be offered because of Talabani's position as President of Iraq. That deal would be nullified if Talabani goes, opening up opportunities that would significantly alter the government formation game - and Kurdish politics. KHALILZAD