NINEWA: SHAMAR CHIEF ON KURD EXPANSIONISM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA: SHAMAR CHIEF ON KURD EXPANSIONISM,
EMPLOYMENT, AND LAND DISPUTES

Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader James Knight. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message.

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Summary
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1. (C) The predominant Shamar Tribe chief in
Ninewa, Ahmad Abdullah al-Yawer, urgently met PRT
Team Leader Knight and Multilateral Division North
Deputy Commander BG Wiercinski's representative, COL
Lull, to express Shamar alarm at Kurd territorial
ambitions in Ninewa. A group of subordinate Shamar
leaders also attended to warn of violence if Kurd
territorial ambitions proceed unchecked. Abdullah
also asked for Coalition support for Shamar
recruitment into Iraqi security forces (especially
the Iraqi Army),and pointed out that disputes
arising from Shamar land given to settlers under
Saddam's Arabization program are being peacefully
resolved. End summary.


2. (C) PRT Leader Knight and COL Kenneth Lull,
Deputy Commander for the 25th Infantry Division
Tactical HQ (Forward),met Sheik Abdullah for lunch
2 Nov, at his home near Rabe'a and on his urgent
invitation. Knight and Lull were accompanied by PRT
Deputy Team Leader COL Brackney and representatives
of the 403d Civil Affairs Battalion team working in
the area. Abdullah had been trying to arrange this
meeting since the middle of Ramadan, and was clearly
relieved that we had accepted this invitation.

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We're not Kurds . . .
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3. (C) Abdullah opened the meeting by pointing out
that Shamars are closer to Coalition forces than to
GOI authorities, whom they have found unresponsive
and unengaged. He then showed a video taped during
his annual Eid al-Fitr meeting with several dozen
senior Shamar leaders, at which he exhorted them to
assure that insurgents are not allowed passage or
safehaven by Shamars. In his taped remarks he also
pointed out that, although Shamars have always
considered Kurds their brothers, they will refuse to
be incorporated into the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG). His final taped remarks
emphasized that resolution of land disputes by
Shamars must be peaceful. At Abdullah's request,
our PRT translator related Abdullah's remarks in
English.

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. . . and we don't want to be
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4. (C) After the video screening, Abdullah
explained at length that he and Kurd leaders have
always maintained a positive relationship, but that
he has reiterated many times to KRG leaders that,
although the Kurds are the Shamars' brothers,
Shamars are not Kurds and do not wish to be brought
under Kurdish control. In response to a Team Leader
query regarding Kurd responses in these discussions,
particularly in view of the efforts made to resolve
'disputed territories' in Ninewa, Abdullah
indicated only that discussion continues. (Note:
The disputed territories in Ninewa include Shikhan,
Makhmur, Sinjar, and Acre Districts, and parts of
Tal'Afar District as well. End note.) He
emphatically added that any referendum held to
determine adherence to the KRG would be rigged by
the Kurds to falsely reflect Shamar sentiment.

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They're keeping us out of the Army
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5. (C) Elaborating on his remarks about lack of
engagement by GOI authorities in his areas, Abdullah
pointed to the inability of Shamar youth to join the
Iraqi army. He produced a petition to him signed by
approximately fifty Shamar young men to complain
that they had not been permitted to enlist. He
added that Ninewa is the only area in Iraq except
Ramadi district (al-Anbar Province) in which
security forces are primarily staffed by individuals

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without roots in the areas where they serve.


6. (C) Abdullah insisted that while this problem is
somewhat less pronounced with the police, Shamar
have been almost uniformly unsuccessful in their
efforts to join the Iraqi Army. Abdullah also
indicated he has begun a series of meetings which
will culminate in a large meeting of traditional
tribal leaders in Mosul to address security concerns
in the province, including security forces
recruitment. (Note: Abdullah's efforts are
apparently not linked to Sheik outreach now underway
by Provincial authorities in Mosul. End note.)


7. (C) Abdullah made the same point in response to
COL Lull's query regarding the situation at the Port
of Entry at Rabe'a -- corruption continues to be a
problem there because so few of the officials are
recruited from the Shamar, who know the area. He
believes at least half the police and border
authorities -- include the leadership -- should be
drawn from localities around Rabe'a, which would be
mostly Shamar. These points were also detailed in
a letter from the Shamar leadership recently sent to
the Minister of Interior.

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Dealing with Saddam's settlers
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8. (C) When asked by Team Leader Knight to clarify
the land disputes addressed in his taped remarks,
Abdullah indicated that the disputes in question
arose from efforts by Shamar to reclaim land
distributed to Arab settlers under Saddam's
Arabization programs, mostly near Bayji. Abdullah
insisted those disputes are being resolved
successfully and peacefully.


9. (C) Abdullah provided his visitors with a
generous lunch, after which he asked Team Leader
Knight and COL Lull to hear the concerns of a group
of about 30 Shamar leaders who had gathered to meet
our party. Those individuals successively
reiterated Shamar concerns about Kurdish ambitions,
but emphasized the likelihood of violence if those
ambitions are not checked. They also emphasized the
responsibility of Coalition forces to oversee events
and protect the Shamar and others in the face of
these threats.

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Comment
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10. (C) Sheik Abdullah has enjoyed a generally
positive and mutually supportive relationship with
Coalition forces since their arrival in 2003,
although his occasionally murky economic interests
at the Rabe'a POE doubtless play a part in his
expressed concerns. However, at this meeting those
issues were emphatically secondary to his urgent
plea against Kurdish expansionism -- specifically as
it threatens to incorporate the Shamar and the areas
of Tal'Afar and Sinjar Districts where they
predominate into the KRG. The Sunni Shamar of
Ninewa are united with most non-Kurds in their alarm
at the snowballing Kurdish expansion agenda in the
province.


11. (C) Comment continued: Complaints of selective
recruiting into Ninewa's security services --
especially the Iraqi Army -- have been made by most
spokesmen for minority communities and by Ninewa's
predominant Sunni political leadership. This issue
is especially critical in the runup to eventual
resolution of Kurdish territorial ambitions, since
the Iraqi Army in Ninewa is widely perceived -- with
some justification -- as simply reflagged Kurdish
Peshmerga.


12. (C) Comment continued. The conversation with
Abdullah regarding repossession of lands
expropriated in support of Arabization under Saddam
was one of the few windows we yet have had on this
festering problem, apart from Kurds' dismissive
comments to the effect that the issue is
fundamentally irrelevant. The general perception is
that most Arabization settlers simply left after the

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fall of Saddam, but we will pursue clarification of
this matter. End comment.
Speckhard