IRAQI PM MALIKI URGES IRAQI CONTROL OVER SECURITY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004195

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI PM MALIKI URGES IRAQI CONTROL OVER SECURITY,
IN MEETING WITH NSA HADLEY


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki expressed
appreciation for the President's continued support and
pressed for greater Iraqi control over security, during an
October 30 meeting with National Security Advisor Hadley and
the Ambassador. He said partition was not an option under
consideration by any Iraqi leaders, as the reconciliation
process and continued development of democratic institutions
served as powerful deterrents to terrorists and others
opposed to Iraq's democratic experiment. Rather than an
increase in MNF-I forces in Iraq, the PM supported greater
emphasis on standing up Iraqi forces. NSA Hadley reiterated
the President's interest in a regular dialogue with the PM on
common concerns. He said that the President agreed with
Maliki's assessment that the violence in Iraq was part of a
broader conflict supported by elements and governments
opposed to democratic change. End Summary.

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NSA HADLEY TO MALIKI: THE PRESIDENT SUPPORTS YOU
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2. (C) NSA Hadley expressed the President's and his own
appreciation of PM Maliki's leadership and commitment to
Iraqi democracy. He noted his visit earlier that day to see
firsthand what it looked like when authority over security
was turned over to Iraqis -- he was pleased with what he saw
and was impressed with the demonstrated ability of the Iraqi
forces (in Dhi Qar and Muthana). NSA Hadley reiterated the
President's strong support for Iraq's unity government and
specifically for PM Maliki, despite negative and erroneous
press reports over the previous week injecting uncertainty in
the minds of Iraqis over the state of the bilateral
relationship. He said the President had also clearly
received the message that PM Maliki and his government sought
to assume more responsibility and control over Iraq's
security. The President supported this objective and
discounted the notion that the US and Iraq were "struggling
over the steering wheel" to determine which country
controlled Iraq's security. The President believed "better
coordination with MNF-I" and "better communication between
U.S. and Iraqi leaders" would allay the PM's concerns. The
President hoped that his conversation with PM Maliki would be
the start of a regularized forum for dealing with such
issues. NSA Hadley then handed Maliki a letter, translated
into Arabic, from the President.


3. (C) After reading the letter, PM Maliki thanked the
President and NSA Hadley for their support -- there were no
longer "any doubts in his mind" about the U.S. commitment to
him and the unity government. The PM underscored that the
interests of the US and Iraq remained the same and that the
bilateral relationship remained strong, no matter what some
media incorrectly reported. Maliki agreed with the President
that there are those who sought to create a gap between our
two governments, but the "cost would be too high" if these
negative forces were allowed to succeed in creating such a
division. Although the struggle ahead may be long and hard,
Maliki said, the US and Iraq remained together on the right
track in confronting Saddamists, terrorists, and militias
that were working to undermine democracy.

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MALIKI: IRAQI FORCES CAN DEAL WITH SECURITY
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4. (C) At the same time, the PM said he and his government
sought more "determination and speed" in meeting Iraq's
security challenges, which he believed would come once the US
and Iraq reach agreement on how forces are deployed. He
expressed confidence that Iraqis could ultimately deal with
the security situation effectively because they understood
the situation on the ground. The PM also emphasized his
belief that the real battle is political, not military -- the
US and Iraq face terror that reflects the policies of other
backward countries in the region and outside the region. NSA
Hadley agreed with the assessment that this represented a
broader conflict between forces of moderation and forces of
extremism.


5. (C) NSA Hadley noted that there are voices outside of Iraq
that have called for partition of the country -- that there
was no longer hope for a national accord or compact among
Shia, Kurds, and Sunni. He said the President remained
highly resistant toward partition because he had not heard
Iraqis say they want that. He asked PM Maliki if there was
still realistic hope for a national compact. PM Maliki
responded that he hoped he would not be accused of being

overly optimistic or unrealistic, but that he still believed
that Iraq was moving toward a national accord. He opined
that this was why Iraqi leaders were not discussing
partition, nor would they ever likely raise the possibility.
He described the commission for national reconciliation,
which he had pressed for, as example of an endeavor in which
Shia, Sunni, and Kurds are participating together and which
will ultimately serve as "a lifeboat to take them all to
shore." Maliki argued that the reconciliation process, along
with Iraq's constitution a
nd elected government were important deterrents to terrorists
and others opposed to the Iraqi experiment -- "they
understand that we come from a position of strength."


6. (C) NSA Hadley also pointed out the debate in the US over
the number of coalition forces in Iraq. While some critics
of the U.S. Administration called for increasing troop
levels, others sought a withdrawal. Maliki opined that the
greater criticism in the US in recent months related directly
to the increase in U.S. casualties. The sooner Iraqi troops
could be stood up, the sooner U.S. troops could be removed
from the frontlines. He said he could not promise an
immediate reduction in violence, but asserted that if an
Iraqi soldier fights and dies, he is fighting for his country
which remains a noble cause. The PM said he sought increased
focus on strengthening and improving the effectiveness Iraqi
forces so they could take the place of MNF-I troops in a
short period of time. He repeated his belief that it was not
necessary to increase the number of MNF-I troops. In his
view, plans to increase the number and capability of Iraqi
troops would be sufficient.
KHALILZAD