DHI QAR PRT AND U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004168

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: DHI QAR PRT AND U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL
MEET WITH JAM OFFICIAL

Classified By: Acting Dhi Qar PRT Team Leader for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Dhi Qar cable.


2. (S) Summary: Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and
U.S. Army 1/34 Civil Affairs personnel met with a
representative of the Jaysh Al Mahdi Militia (JAM) on October
26 to discuss access to parts of the province under the
influence of the JAM. The interlocutors spoke for about 90
minutes and covered a wide range of topics including extent
of JAM control of Dhi Qar Province, JAM control over fringe
elements associated with JAM, and intent of JAM to resist or
cooperate with Coalition Forces (CFs) in reconstruction of
Iraq. There is some sentiment among the JAM in Dhi Qar to
cooperate with the CFs in reconstruction, but JAM members
have thus far resisted out of fear of reprisals from radical
fringe members over whom the JAM leaders have little or no
control. End summary.


3. (S) Dhi Qar PRT Provincial Program Manager and U.S. Army
1/34 Civil Affairs personnel met with a representative of the
JAM on October 26 to discuss access to sites and the
possibility of developing reconstruction projects in areas
under JAM influence. The meeting followed a breakfast
meetings with local Sheiks on October 24 in which PRT and
Civil Affairs personnel had private and separate
conversations with two Sheiks of the Gizzie tribe in Dhi Qar
province. The Sheiks asked why the United States was only
focusing its reconstruction efforts in Dhi Qar in the
Al-Baatha area, and with the Gizzie tribe. They indicated
that other tribes and Sheiks were becoming envious of the
Gizzie tribe. (Comment: it is possible given the context that
they feared some sort of reprisals against them for receiving
too much benefit from CFs.) PRT and Civil Affairs personnel
indicated that at this time it is difficult for CFs to effect
reconstruction projects in many parts of the province due to
lack of security, and then asked the Sheiks if they had any
connections with the JAM. (Comment: It is understood and
accepted that the local Sheiks will have such connections.)
Two days later they arranged a meeting with a local JAM
official.


4. (S) The interlocutors met in a tent and spoke for about
90 minutes. The representative of the JAM appeared to be in
his early 40's, about five feet and ten inches tall. He had a
full, but short beard, and was dressed in the black "uniform"
associated with the JAM. Our sense was that he belonged to
the Gizzie tribe, was probably either from Nasiriyah or lived
there now, and that he was local. In addition, he had the
bearing of an officer, but probably not senior. He
nevertheless spoke with knowledge of JAM activities and
personnel both in Dhi Qar and in the rest of Iraq. The JAM
interlocutor indicated that he was a liaison between the JAM
and other organizations, and that he reported to the
commander in Nasiriyah. He seemed genuinely nervous about
meeting with CF personnel.


5. (S) The U.S. interlocutors presented their case that the
CFs wanted to do reconstruction projects to benefit the Iraqi
people regardless of the political outcome. We need to be
able to do these projects without fear of reprisals or
attacks by the militia's in all areas of Dhi Qar. These
projects will restore essential services in areas where they
are desperately needed, and will benefit the local population
as well by providing critically needed employment. As it
stands now, the CFs are hampered in Dhi Qar from effecting
these projects due to lack of security.


6. (S) The JAM representative said that the official
position of the Office of Muqtadr Al-Sadr (OMS) and the JAM
is to not attack CFs, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),or Iraqi
Police (IP) unless first attacked. He stated, however, that
the JAM only controls about 80 percent of the militia members
who are aligned with the OMS. The other 20 percent represent
a radical fringe element, which, while loosely aligned with
the JAM, are nevertheless not under the JAM's immediate
control. There are elements within the JAM in Dhi Qar who
would be willing to cooperate with CFs on reconstruction
projects, but who refuse to do so out of fear of reprisals
form those extreme elements. According to the JAM
representative, one of the problems the more moderate
elements face is that the commander of the JAM in Nasiriyah
is weak and cannot crack down on these radical elements.


7. (S) The JAM representative went on to say that the
greater danger to the CFs came from the Badr Corps in the
province. According to the JAM representative, the Badr
Corps, the militia associated with the Supreme Council for

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the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),is extremely
resentful of CF presence in Dhi Qar. He said that the Badr
Corps will attack CFs at any opportunity. (Comment: In Dhi
Qar, many of the police officials are affiliated with Badr
Corps, while many of the rank and file officers are JAM.
This situation reflects a cultural divide between the two
organizations, with the Badrists being the more educated and
older, while JAM draws its ranks from the younger,
less-educated, and sometimes chronically unemployed members
of the province. We do not agree with the OMS
representative's assessment of the Badr Corps: to date, the
Badr Corps has not caused problems to CFs, and Nassariyah
police with know Badr Corps ties have cooperated with the
coalition on many occasions.)


8. (S) The JAM representative also discussed the difference
between JAM and the militia known as the Al Sharkie Group. Al
Sharkie is a religious leader who studied under Moqtada Al
Sadr's father. When Moqtada Al Sadr's father was killed, both
Al Sadr and Al Sharkie felt that they should be Al Sadr's
spiritual heirs. Al Sharkie went on to found the Al Sharkie
Group, which is not under the control of the JAM although it
draws its ranks from the same demographics as the JAM. The
Al Sharkie group is know for being more militant than JAM and
has no desire to cooperate with coalition forces.


9. (S) In addition, the JAM representative gave us an
indication of how closely related all the competing powers,
the JAM, the Badrists and the Sheiks are in Dhi Qar province.
When Civil Affairs officer asked him why Dhi Qar was so quiet
relative to the rest of Iraq, he responded by saying "we all
grew up with each other, and we work these things out
eventually."


10. (S) Comment: This meeting gave us an insight into the
different points of view within the JAM regarding their
openness to cooperate with CFs. There are many who are
willing to do so because they see that our efforts will
benefit Dhi Qar regardless of whether they agree with us on
political issues, but they cannot now push for it for fear of
being targeted by fringe elements of the JAM. The JAM
representative's life itself will be forfeit should it become
known that he is even speaking with CFs. We hope that this
meeting will begin a deeper dialogue with more moderate JAM
elements. End comment.
KHALILZAD