Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD414
2006-02-11 07:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK
VZCZCXRO3531 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHGB #0414/01 0420732 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 110732Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2629 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000414
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK
Classified By: Tom Delare, Economic Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000414
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK
Classified By: Tom Delare, Economic Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) Summary. From State Embedded Team Ramadi.
Attacks on a Ramadi telecommunications office have left
much of the province without landlines (no cell phone
network has survived in the troubled province.) Local
officials speculate that beyond satisfying the
terrorist's goal of creating chaos, their intent may have
been to disrupt citizens' ability to inform the CF of
insurgent activity. Given the damage, it will be several
months before any phone service (conventional) can be
restored. The series of attacks on infrastructure
continues to plague the life of Anbar's long-suffering
civilians, but it is unclear whether the disruptions will
foment a backlash against the extremists. The central
government has an opportunity to prove its mettle by
devising and implementing solutions, which would pay
dividends in this crucial province. End Summary.
2. (C) Ministry of Telecommunications' representative in
Anbar, Engineer Mahmood Adelgabar Mutlaq, told POLOFF on
February 5, that insurgents had destroyed the second of
two vital telephone switch facilities in Anbar a day
before. According to Mahmood, to circumvent the tightly
secured first floor of the Ramadi telecommunications
facility insurgents utilized ladders to access second
floor windows through which they poured quantities of
gasoline and ignited the blaze. The ministry worker
reported that two Ramadi city fire trucks responded to
the fire, managed to extinguish the flames for a short
period, but due to the large quantity of flammable
liquids, the fire re-ignited and destroyed the facility.
The Ramadi switches provided service to over 20,000 homes
across Anbar.
-------------- --------------
Coordinated: Second Telecommunications Site Hit Earlier
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Engineer Mahmood, en route to Baghdad to appeal
for help from his minister, described the second attack
on Anbar's communication network. He said the insurgents
had simply blown up a second switching facility in
Khalidiya, located between Fallujah and Ramadi. As with
many difficult queries, Anbari officials replied with a
question; in response to PolOff's query what did the
attackers seek to gain from destroying the majority of
landlines in the province, Mahmood asked "why do they try
to kill you, why do they try and kill me?" He answered
himself, "terrorism". The engineer stated his intention
to lobby the Minister of Telecommunications for
assistance in procuring a wireless switching system to
replace the obliterated network. Even if the equipment
could be moved immediately to the troubled province, the
engineer estimated it would take one to two months to
install.
--------------
Isolated Before, Isolated Further
--------------
4. (C) Communicating in Anbar has been historically
difficult. After a national cell phone network briefly
established limited service west of Fallujah Summer 2005,
insurgents quickly destroyed the newly erected towers.
Few Anbaris own satellite phones, and Governor Ma'moon
Sami Rasheed al Alwani noted that now even the terrorists
cannot telephone a doctor if their relatives take ill.
The governor interpreted the attack as not only an
attempt to throw the province into further chaos, but to
prevent Anbaris from communicating with the Coalition
Forces (CF). He suggested the attack was related to the
'TIPs' line the CF maintains for citizens to report on
noted insurgent activity. He remains concerned that
establishing a cell phone network would facilitate
insurgent communications more than civilians'. Ma'moon
emphasized the restoration of landlines to the capital
and affected cities west could prove the struggling
government was dedicated to serving their constituents.
5. (C) Comment. The successive attacks on the province's
weak communications could possibly presage further
infrastructure attacks on the aging series of Euphrates
barrages or fragile electricity grid. It could be months
before telephone lines are functioning again in Ramadi
and the regional cities and towns. It's an even bet
whether the long-suffering Anbaris will blame and turn on
the extremists or succumb to the paralysis of
intimidation. The central government's bold and rapid
response to Anbar's war (on terror) damage could win
valuable points among hard-bitten Sunnis. It would be so
entirely unexpected. End Comment.
BAGHDAD 00000414 002 OF 002
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK
Classified By: Tom Delare, Economic Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) Summary. From State Embedded Team Ramadi.
Attacks on a Ramadi telecommunications office have left
much of the province without landlines (no cell phone
network has survived in the troubled province.) Local
officials speculate that beyond satisfying the
terrorist's goal of creating chaos, their intent may have
been to disrupt citizens' ability to inform the CF of
insurgent activity. Given the damage, it will be several
months before any phone service (conventional) can be
restored. The series of attacks on infrastructure
continues to plague the life of Anbar's long-suffering
civilians, but it is unclear whether the disruptions will
foment a backlash against the extremists. The central
government has an opportunity to prove its mettle by
devising and implementing solutions, which would pay
dividends in this crucial province. End Summary.
2. (C) Ministry of Telecommunications' representative in
Anbar, Engineer Mahmood Adelgabar Mutlaq, told POLOFF on
February 5, that insurgents had destroyed the second of
two vital telephone switch facilities in Anbar a day
before. According to Mahmood, to circumvent the tightly
secured first floor of the Ramadi telecommunications
facility insurgents utilized ladders to access second
floor windows through which they poured quantities of
gasoline and ignited the blaze. The ministry worker
reported that two Ramadi city fire trucks responded to
the fire, managed to extinguish the flames for a short
period, but due to the large quantity of flammable
liquids, the fire re-ignited and destroyed the facility.
The Ramadi switches provided service to over 20,000 homes
across Anbar.
-------------- --------------
Coordinated: Second Telecommunications Site Hit Earlier
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Engineer Mahmood, en route to Baghdad to appeal
for help from his minister, described the second attack
on Anbar's communication network. He said the insurgents
had simply blown up a second switching facility in
Khalidiya, located between Fallujah and Ramadi. As with
many difficult queries, Anbari officials replied with a
question; in response to PolOff's query what did the
attackers seek to gain from destroying the majority of
landlines in the province, Mahmood asked "why do they try
to kill you, why do they try and kill me?" He answered
himself, "terrorism". The engineer stated his intention
to lobby the Minister of Telecommunications for
assistance in procuring a wireless switching system to
replace the obliterated network. Even if the equipment
could be moved immediately to the troubled province, the
engineer estimated it would take one to two months to
install.
--------------
Isolated Before, Isolated Further
--------------
4. (C) Communicating in Anbar has been historically
difficult. After a national cell phone network briefly
established limited service west of Fallujah Summer 2005,
insurgents quickly destroyed the newly erected towers.
Few Anbaris own satellite phones, and Governor Ma'moon
Sami Rasheed al Alwani noted that now even the terrorists
cannot telephone a doctor if their relatives take ill.
The governor interpreted the attack as not only an
attempt to throw the province into further chaos, but to
prevent Anbaris from communicating with the Coalition
Forces (CF). He suggested the attack was related to the
'TIPs' line the CF maintains for citizens to report on
noted insurgent activity. He remains concerned that
establishing a cell phone network would facilitate
insurgent communications more than civilians'. Ma'moon
emphasized the restoration of landlines to the capital
and affected cities west could prove the struggling
government was dedicated to serving their constituents.
5. (C) Comment. The successive attacks on the province's
weak communications could possibly presage further
infrastructure attacks on the aging series of Euphrates
barrages or fragile electricity grid. It could be months
before telephone lines are functioning again in Ramadi
and the regional cities and towns. It's an even bet
whether the long-suffering Anbaris will blame and turn on
the extremists or succumb to the paralysis of
intimidation. The central government's bold and rapid
response to Anbar's war (on terror) damage could win
valuable points among hard-bitten Sunnis. It would be so
entirely unexpected. End Comment.
BAGHDAD 00000414 002 OF 002
KHALILZAD