Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD414
2006-02-11 07:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK

Tags:  PTER PGOV KDEM IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3531
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0414/01 0420732
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110732Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2629
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000414 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK


Classified By: Tom Delare, Economic Counselor, for
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000414 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2016 TAGS: PTER PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: INSURGENTS DISABLE ANBAR TELEPHONE NETWORK Classified By: Tom Delare, Economic Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. From State Embedded Team Ramadi. Attacks on a Ramadi telecommunications office have left much of the province without landlines (no cell phone network has survived in the troubled province.) Local officials speculate that beyond satisfying the terrorist's goal of creating chaos, their intent may have been to disrupt citizens' ability to inform the CF of insurgent activity. Given the damage, it will be several months before any phone service (conventional) can be restored. The series of attacks on infrastructure continues to plague the life of Anbar's long-suffering civilians, but it is unclear whether the disruptions will foment a backlash against the extremists. The central government has an opportunity to prove its mettle by devising and implementing solutions, which would pay dividends in this crucial province. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ministry of Telecommunications' representative in Anbar, Engineer Mahmood Adelgabar Mutlaq, told PolOff on February 5, that insurgents had destroyed the second of two vital telephone switch facilities in Anbar a day before. According to Mahmood, to circumvent the tightly secured first floor of the Ramadi telecommunications facility insurgents utilized ladders to access second floor windows through which they poured quantities of gasoline and ignited the blaze. The ministry worker reported that two Ramadi city fire trucks responded to the fire, managed to extinguish the flames for a short period, but due to the large quantity of flammable liquids, the fire re-ignited and destroyed the facility. The Ramadi switches provided service to over 20,000 homes across Anbar. -------------- -------------- Coordinated: Second Telecommunications Site Hit Earlier -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Engineer Mahmood, en route to Baghdad to appeal for help from his minister, described the second attack on Anbar's communication network. He said the insurgents had simply blown up a second switching facility in Khalidiya, located between Fallujah and Ramadi. As with many difficult queries, Anbari officials replied with a question; in response to PolOff's query what did the attackers seek to gain from destroying the majority of landlines in the province, Mahmood asked "why do they try to kill you, why do they try and kill me?" He answered himself, "terrorism". The engineer stated his intention to lobby the Minister of Telecommunications for assistance in procuring a wireless switching system to replace the obliterated network. Even if the equipment could be moved immediately to the troubled province, the engineer estimated it would take one to two months to install. -------------- Isolated Before, Isolated Further -------------- ¶4. (C) Communicating in Anbar has been historically difficult. After a national cell phone network briefly established limited service west of Fallujah Summer 2005, insurgents quickly destroyed the newly erected towers. Few Anbaris own satellite phones, and Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed al Alwani noted that now even the terrorists cannot telephone a doctor if their relatives take ill. The governor interpreted the attack as not only an attempt to throw the province into further chaos, but to prevent Anbaris from communicating with the Coalition Forces (CF). He suggested the attack was related to the 'TIPs' line the CF maintains for citizens to report on noted insurgent activity. He remains concerned that establishing a cell phone network would facilitate insurgent communications more than civilians'. Ma'moon emphasized the restoration of landlines to the capital and affected cities west could prove the struggling government was dedicated to serving their constituents. ¶5. (C) Comment. The successive attacks on the province's weak communications could possibly presage further infrastructure attacks on the aging series of Euphrates barrages or fragile electricity grid. It could be months before telephone lines are functioning again in Ramadi and the regional cities and towns. It's an even bet whether the long-suffering Anbaris will blame and turn on the extremists or succumb to the paralysis of intimidation. The central government's bold and rapid response to Anbar's war (on terror) damage could win valuable points among hard-bitten Sunnis. It would be so entirely unexpected. End Comment. BAGHDAD 00000414 002 OF 002 KHALILZAD

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