DEPUTY PRESIDENT MADHI AND VICE PRESIDENT ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004125

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PRESIDENT MADHI AND VICE PRESIDENT ADVISOR
HANNAH DISCUSS AMENDMENTS TO UNSCR 1546, CURRENT VIOLENCE

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy President Adil abd al-Mahdi informed
John
Hannah, National Security Advisor to the Vice President,
October 19
that Iraq is ready to take more risks in exchange for
additional
responsibilities in maintaining security and suggested adding
amendments to UNSCR 1546 that would grant further sovereignty
to the
Iraqi Government. Mahdi believed such a step had Sadrist
support and
would encourage moderates to take a stand against extremism
while
sending a message of hope to the Iraqi people. At the same
time, Mahdi
insisted Baathists are perpetuating most of the violence and
it is time
to take a stand against them. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Madhi Presses For Additional UNSCR Amendments
--------------


2. (C) Deputy President Adil abd al-Mahdi informed John
Hannah,
National Security Advisor to the Vice President, October 19
that during
a recent Policy Council on National Security (PCNS) meeting,
all
participants agreed amendments should be added to UNSCR 1546
that would
grant more sovereignty to the GOI and act as a sign of
goodwill toward
the people of Iraq. Mahdi asserted that the GoI was willing
to take
more risks in exchange for additional responsibilities on
security
matters. He believed such a step had Sadrist support and
would
encourage moderates to take a stand against extremism while
sending a
message of hope to the Iraqi people.


3. (C) Mahdi insisted Iraq and the U.S. need a bilateral
security
agreement that would define the GoI's responsibilities and
those of the
U.S. Madhi believed amending the UNSC resolution would be the
best way
to outline these responsibilities, but if amendments were not
possible
on such short notice, a separate bilateral agreement between
the U.S.
and Iraq should be created. Mahdi alleged to Hannah that as
far back
as February 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld had agreed that such a
bilateral
accord between the U.S. and Iraq could and should be quickly
worked
out. Mahdi complained that even Saddam under sanctions had
more
authority over Iraq than the current government. The Prime
Minister
cannot move fifty of his own soldiers without MNF-I approval
and U.S.
forces have the authority to arrest and detain Iraqis and
control
borders, yet the USG tells the GoI that it must take control.
Iraqis
may stumble, he admitted, but they would get right back up.
(NOTE: The
inability to control troop movements was a reoccurring theme
in
Hannah's meetings, probably spurred by recent events in
Balad. Adbul
Aziz al-Hakim complained to Hannah on October 17, that the
Prime
Minister recently gave orders for troops to move to Balad in
response
to growing violence, but MNF-I reportedly denied the
movement. END
NOTE.)


4. (C) Hannah inquired about the Sadrist stance on extending
the MNF-I
mandate. Mahdi insisted that during a recent PCNS meeting he

BAGHDAD 00004125 002 OF 003


asked the
Sadrists directly if they would fight an extension of the
resolution;
they assured Mahdi that they would not, but they would prefer
amendments that would grant the GoI more independence.


--------------
Mahdi blames Violence on the Baathists, AQI
--------------


5. (C) Hannah noted the problems caused by Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) in
marah (Maysan Governorate),but Mahdi insisted that Iraqi
forces now
have the city under control. He claimed that it is the
Baathists, not
the JAM, who are causing the most violence and aiding
al-Qaida (AQI).
Without Baathist support, he insisted, AQI would not exist as
a
meaningful force. Mahdi noted that the USG is negotiating
with
Baathists and insisted the only U.S. interaction should be to
negotiate
the Baathists' surrender. When Hannah wondered if there may
be some
moderate Baathist elements that would be responsive to
negotiation,
Mahdi dismissed their interest in reconciliation, noting the
Baath's
violent and destructive history, beginning with the
assassination of
'Abd al-Karim al-Qasim and continuing on through Saddam's
messages of
hate and violence he is broadcasting through his live trials.


6. (C) Mahdi noted that the door to participating in the
Iraqi
government must be open to everyone. The one condition they
ask of
Sunni leaders is that they fight the terrorists coming from
their
territories. The GoI wants to work with the Sunnis, Madhi
insisted, but
the Sunnis must be willing to fight terrorism. There can be
no
acceptance of a "legitimate" armed resistance against Iraq's
democracy.
Once Sunni leaders show they can be effective in this regard,
they will
earn more local authority in Sunni areas and political
authority in
Baghdad. Sunnis say they are trying, Madhi noted, but how can
they be
trying when they allow themselves to be surrounded by
Baathists? He
described a recent message he received from a phone number
used by
Adnan Al Dulaymi that said, "we will kill you." Al-Dulaymi
denied all
knowledge of the message, but Mahdi insisted it must have
been someone
in his office. Madhi also referenced a copy of a recent
assassination
list circulated by the Baath Party. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim was
first on
the list; Mahdi was number thirty. The list threatened not
only to
execute the listed individuals, but also their relatives to
the third
degree.

--------------
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Upcoming Trip to US
--------------


7. (C) Mahdi asked Hannah about his earlier meeting with Hadi
al-Amiri,
leader of the Badr Organization. Hannah said he had been
impressed by
Amiri's comprehensive assessment of Iraq's political,
economic, and
security challenges, as well as by his his prescriptions -
including
the imperative of disarming militias and fighting all those
who
continue to carry arms outside the authority of the state.
Hannah noted

BAGHDAD 00004125 003 OF 003


that Amiri had said all the right things, but given his
background it
was hard to judge his actual degree of commitment. Madhi
probed for
Hannah's opinion on whether Amiri - given his prominent role
in Iraq
and his ability to help address Iraq's challenges - should
accompany
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim on his upcoming trip to the U.S. Hannah
raised the
concern that the presence of someone so identified with an
Iranian-
backed militia might distract from the important central
purpose of Al-
Hakim's trip of building new confidence and understanding
between the
United States and the leader of Iraq's most important Shi'a
coalition.


8. (U) This cable was cleared by OVPNSA John Hannah.
KHALILZAD