Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD410
2006-02-10 18:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM MOPS PINS EPET ENRG IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000410 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS PINS EPET ENRG IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
DISCUSSES ASSASSINATIONS, OIL INFRASTRUCTURE, OTHER TOPICS

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 328

B. B. BAGHDAD 212

C. C. BAGHDAD 344

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),(B),(D
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS PINS EPET ENRG IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
DISCUSSES ASSASSINATIONS, OIL INFRASTRUCTURE, OTHER TOPICS

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 328

B. B. BAGHDAD 212

C. C. BAGHDAD 344

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),(B),(D
)


1. (C//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: The Iraqi Ministerial Committee
for National Security (MCNS) met the evening of February 6,
2006 at the residence of Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari.

-- MNF-I Commanding General Casey urged the members to
address the issue of kidnappings and assassinations about
which members of the Sunni political leadership have been
complaining; he warned that failure to deal with this issue
could jeopardize the progress being made on political
inclusion. The members decided to form a committee to
investigate these allegations and directed the Ministry of
Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) to Continue to
investigate allegations of such events as they become aware
of them.

-- Deputy Prime Minister Chalabi gave another presentation on
the current oil infrastructure situation. Earlier in the day
the Prime Minister had signed an order giving Chalabi
authority to take necessary measures to assure the flow of
oil and fuel products. After discussion, the committee
determined that the threat to the oil infrastructure
constitutes a matter of national security and that the Iraqi
Government (IG) should approach MNF-I to request that Iraqi
Army assets be redirected to provide security to oil
infrastructure facilities.

-- Following up on an issue raised at the previous meeting
concerning which Ministry exercises control over the National
Joint Operations Center (NJOC),it was concluded that NJOC
falls under the Minister of State for National Security but
that its recently fired commander should be given the
opportunity to refute the corruption charges that led to his
dismissal.

-- The MCNS approved the MOI security plan for Ashura.

-- Discussion of a security plan for the Tigris River area

near Taji was postponed, as it is not yet fully formulated.

-- Ja'afari briefly addressed the issue of Anbar, stating
that it makes sense to consider working with tribal leaders
in addition to the governor and his security council. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C//REL GBR AUS) Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari
convened the MCNS at his residence the evening of February 6.
Members of the committee present included Minister of
Interior Bayan Jabr, Minister of Defense Saadoun Dulime,
National Security Advisor Mowwafak al-Rubaie, Minister of
State for National Security Affairs Karim al-Anzi,
Ambassador Khalilzad, MNF-I Commanding General Casey, and
British Ambassador Patey. Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi
and MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Houghton also were
present, as were the Prime Minister's chief of staff and
military advisor. Ambassadors Khalilzad and Patey, along with
GEN Casey, departed early due to previously scheduled
engagements.

--------------
SUNNI CONCERNS RE ASSASSINATIONS
--------------


3. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey requested that the MCNS
consider and address the allegations made by Sunni leadership
figures that members of their community are being
systematically kidnapped and executed by men wearing police
uniforms and driving what appear to be police vehicles. These
complaints were raised most recently at a luncheon hosted by
the Ambassador on February 4 (REF A.) GEN Casey noted that
since January 1 there have been nearly 90 murders in the
Baghdad area, and it appears that at least half of them were
executions. Ja'afari recounted the discussions from the
Ambassador's lunch, calling it a frank exchange and noting
that the Sunni leaders were very concerned by these killings.
Ja'afari said that he shares their concerns but rejected any
allegation that government officials were responsible,
despite the use of what appear to be police uniforms and
vehicles. Although he acknowledged that it is possible that

BAGHDAD 00000410 002 OF 004


low-ranking members of the security forces may be committing
crimes on their own, he argued that there is no evidence to
show that this is a policy condoned or promoted by
high-ranking members of the government. He mentioned the
case of a Shia who had been kidnapped and killed by persons
wearing police uniforms, intimating that this is not just a
Sunni problem.


4. (C//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Interior Jabr reported that
he had met with a Sunni leader to discuss the reports of
eleven people being killed in a vehicle and fourteen others
who had been found murdered. Jabr claimed that the eleven
were killed by Coalition Forces (CF),a statement with which
GEN Casey took issue, asking that Jabr clarify and provide
details. With regard to the fourteen, a committee has been
formed to investigate such crimes. Minister of State for
National Security al-Anzi said that, since January 1, over
1480 innocent civilians have been killed, and he wondered why
everyone was so concerned with this particular group of
fourteen people.


5. (C//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Defense Dulime, himself a
Sunni, dismissed many of the Sunni leaders as complainers.
For example, he said that Ayad Samarie of the Iraqi Islamic
Party had called on him, upset because one of the party's
buildings was being raided by CF and Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). Dulime said he investigated and learned that: a U.S.
soldier on patrol in the area had been shot by a sniper; the
area had been cordoned; and all buildings had been searched
for the shooter. In the IIP building, ISF found hand
grenades, explosives, remote control and communications
devices, as well as a sniper rifle with empty shell casings.
"They complain about us, but look what we find in their
building." Dulime also asserted that the Sunni leaders
always make claims of groups of people being rounded up but
are unable to provide names or details when asked. "If an
accusation is made, evidence must be provided. If the
allegation is false, the one making it should be punished."


6. (C//REL GBR AUS) Ambassador Patey told the Iraqis that
they were missing the point, particularly al-Anzi and his
remark about the large number of innocent civilians killed:
"We know who killed them - terrorists - and we are fighting
them. Even though many of the Sunni's claims may be
fabricated, you still have a duty to listen and to
investigate." Ambassador Khalilzad concurred and emphasized
that the seriousness of the matter derives from the fact that
it is the government that is being accused of killing people.
These claims must be investigated and, if false, refuted.
Ja'afari replied that it is his job to defend his government,
and he will not accept as true allegations without evidence
that members of his government, including Ministers, are
involved in killings. He concluded by stating that the
committee to investigate these allegations will look into
them and that the Ministries of Interior and Defense have a
duty to investigate all such allegations that come to their
attention.

--------------
OIL INFRASTRUCTURE
--------------


7. (C//REL GBR AUS) Following up on a presentation he made
to the MCNS on January 22 (REF B),Deputy Prime Minister
Chalabi reported again on the status of Iraq's oil
infrastructure. He reviewed the fact that crude oil exports
are declining and spoke of the recent attack on the new
Kirkuk oil processing plant, calling it the most serious
attack on oil infrastructure since the liberation and
explaining that it will put a major hole in Iraq's oil export
plans and forecasts. No oil is flowing from the Kirkuk
fields to the Bayji refinery due to pipeline interdictions;
Bayji is shut down; and no fuel products are flowing from
Bayji to Baghdad. In the south, security is not an issue,
but a shortage of tug boats, among other things, is
preventing Iraq from exporting the maximum possible
quantities of oil. In short, Iraq is failing to meet the
International Monetary Fund's standard that it export at
least 1.57 million barrels per day, and, at best, Iraq's
northern oil imports will be half what had been anticipated,
according to Chalabi. With regard to the creation of rapid
repair teams, Chalabi told the MCNS that the government, due
to opposition from the Ministry of Oil, has failed to
establish such teams despite the fact that MNF-I has made
arrangements to house them and protect them. He also

BAGHDAD 00000410 003 OF 004


lamented the government's failure to heed his advice months
ago to install valves on the pipelines that would enable
repairs to be made more quickly.


8. (C//REL GBR AUS) Ambassador told the MCNS that the USG
is committed to helping solve this problem. MNF-I Deputy
Commanding General Houghton emphasized that the IG must
recognize the seriousness of this issue. It is a critical
issue that threatens both the credibility of the government
and the economic health of the country. If no oil flows, the
country will have no income and will not be able to pay for
its army or police, which are required for the security of
the nation. He also urged the Iraqis to recognize that the
problem is not simply one of security. Iraq must achieve a
secure and resilient system so that terrorism, corruption,
and equipment failure cannot make it fail. Houghton asserted
that the IG must acknowledge the criticality of
infrastructure integrity and take action by telling MNF-I
that this is a major priority that justifies the reassignment
of Iraqi Army units to protect oil infrastructure facilities.
He urged that Chalabi be empowered to direct the
non-military aspects of this effort, which involves several
non-security ministries. (NOTE: At the meeting, Chalabi was
provided with a revised order signed by the Prime Minister
giving the new committee that Chalabi heads authority to
"take all necessary measures" to assure that at least 1.6
million barrels per day are exported. It is not contemplated
by anyone that this gives Chalabi authority to direct troops.
END NOTE.) The MCNS agreed that the security priorities of
the government must be rebalanced to raise infrastructure
integrity to a higher level. There was a brief discussion of
what army units should be deployed where, but Chalabi and
Houghton successfully urged the group to leave these
decisions to the military authorities.

--------------
CONTROL OF NATIONAL JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER
--------------


9. (C//REL GBR AUS) At the previous MCNS meeting (REF C)
GEN Casey had expressed concern that Major General Ghazi, the
Iraqi general commanding the NJOC, had been fired and that
the NJOC had come under the control of Minister of State for
National Security al-Anzi (MSNS). Rubaie explained that the
NJOC had, since the Allawi administration, fallen under the
MSNS. This might not have been readily apparent due to the
fact that the NJOC was staffed by employees from a variety of
ministries. Rubaie argued that, because the NJOC is an
interagency operation, it is logical that it should be under
the control of the MSNS. Al-Anzi justified the firing of
Ghazi by citing allegations of financial mismanagement and
corruption, and he claimed Ghazi had refused to cooperate
with investigators leaving no choice but to remove him. He
added that Ghazi's replacement is a fine officer who is doing
well and should be left in place, and he asserted that
running the NJOC is the most important function of his
ministry.


10. (C//REL GBR AUS) Ja'afari expressed concern that GEN
Casey had raised this issue and was no longer present to
discuss it. (NOTE: GEN Casey had departed the meeting prior
to this discussion, for a higher-priority prior engagement.
END NOTE.) Minister of Interior Jabr speculated that GEN
Casey was concerned because an officer he was comfortable
working with had been removed without prior notice. Ja'afari
also pointed out that questions might arise because Ghazi is
a Christian, and some might think he had been removed for
this reason. Al-Anzi assured Ja'afari that this was not the
case and pointed out that Ghazi had been offered a very good
high-ranking position following his dismissal from the NJOC.
Nevertheless, Ja'afari concluded that Ghazi must be given the
choice of vying for reinstatement. To do so he must contest
the corruption allegations made against him. If it is found
that evidence is lacking, Ghazi should be given his old job
back. Alternatively, he may choose not to fight the charges
and accept the new job he has been offered.

--------------
SECURITY PLANS
--------------


11. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jabr provided copies of the MOI's
security plan for Ashura, which was approved by the MCNS.
The MCNS agreed to postpone discussion of the security plan
(which Ja'afari had requested at the last meeting) to deal

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with problems in the Tigris River region near Taji, as the
plan is not yet completely formulated.

--------------
ANBAR PROVINCE
--------------


12. (C//REL GBR AUS) Ja'afari advised the MCNS that he
would meet the next day with the governor of Anbar Province.
He said he had received a letter from fifteen Anbar sheiks
who wrote that their views about the province should be
considered as well as the Governor's. Ja'afari said the
sheiks seemed to be respectable and made some good points; so
he will consider whether to deal with them in addition to
working with the governor.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


13. (C//REL GBR AUS) The apparent reluctance of the MCNS to
take seriously the allegations made by Sunni leaders about
kidnappings and assassinations, true or not, is troubling.
We will continue to work to convince Ja'afari and his
ministers that, if these allegations are unfounded, the best
way to put them to rest is to convincingly investigate and
refute them. If they are true, then immediate steps must be
taken to put a stop to them and to punish those responsible.
With regard to energy infrastructure, the delegation of
additional powers to Chalabi is encouraging, as is the
determination to reorder security priorities to move
infrastructure higher up the list. However, we can't help
but think that members of the MCNS still fail to grasp the
reality of the situation they face. During the meeting, the
lights flickered and went out, plunging the room into
darkness for a few minutes. The conversation continued as if
nothing were amiss. Several minutes later, Chalabi received a
note telling him an explosion, possibly a car bomb, had just
detonated near the Doura power station. He made a call and
announced that the electrical system had tripped and the
entire country was blacked out. (NOTE: MNF-I was unable to
confirm that an explosion had occurred. Later reports
indicated the system was tripped due to a line malfunction
caused by a combination of wind, dust, and corrosion. END
NOTE.) Rubaie joked that Chalabi was an "alarmist", and he
and Jabr argued that a nation-wide blackout is simply
impossible. Until the Iraqi leadership opens its eyes to the
situation it faces, attempts to get the IG to take real
action to address the infrastructure problem will remain
difficult.
KHALILZAD