AN IRAQI PUBLIC-EDUCATION STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000041 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EPET PGOV PINS KCOR IZ SUBJECT: AN IRAQI PUBLIC-EDUCATION STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM REF: A. BAGHDAD 0020 ¶B. BAGHDAD 4559 ¶C. BAGHDAD 5079 Sensitive - Not for internet distribution. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy, the British Department for International Development (DFID) in Baghdad, and the GOI are developing an economic-reform public-education strategy. To date, we have established that an effective campaign would address three areas: 1) fuel-subsidy reform; 2) social safety net implementation; and 3) basic economic issues. We believe the campaign must have simple messages and mainly target the average Iraqi, who typically does not understand basic economic issues. We have already engaged the Iraqi media on the necessity for fuel-price increases, have gotten GOI agreement to take the same message to the public, and are working this with the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The creation of a public-education strategy must have Iraqi ownership, and it will be an on-going process, requiring flexibility to change tactics as the public responds. End summary. -------------- Educating on Reforms That Are Happening Now -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Fuel-price increases went into effect on December 18 in order to satisfy requirements for the IMF Standby Arrangement (SBA). In initial response to the price increases, certain segments of the general public demonstrated in protest. These protests were mostly non-violent and measured, and there has been no upswell of opposition among the general population of Iraq. The insurgent and criminal elements of Iraq have taken a different approach, using violence and threats of violence to intimidate refiners, truckers, and ordinary Iraqis into cutting production and distribution and into protesting against the price hikes. This terrorist activity has caused severe supply problems throughout Iraq, which in turn has caused further public unrest. Urgent public-education efforts are needed to explain the price increases to the general public, and the GOI has been taking measured actions (Reftel A),both on its own initiative and in response to our encouragement. However, no amount of aggressive public education will convince the terrorists and criminals that they should relinquish their violent actions and allow fuel supplies to flow freely. We should make fuel-subsidy education an integral part of the public-education effort, but we need to set the strategy with the Iraqis in the lead, having the key officials at the planning table. ¶3. (SBU) USAID and the Embassy have worked with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) to create new social safety net legislation that has been put into operation (Reftel B). While not specifically addressed by the SBA, many ordinary Iraqis believe it is linked. In any case, the basic messages about the economic distortions and corruption caused by continued subsidies are the same. This new Safety Net will provide money, career counseling, and job training to approximately one million Iraqi households, or that 20% of the population that lives in extreme poverty. USAID plans to use World Bank funding to launch a public-education campaign in the mid-March timeframe to teach the public about the benefits and necessity of the new Safety Net. This new Safety Net is critical (and revolutionary for Iraq) in that it creates a means-tested welfare system on which Iraq can base future subsidy reductions, especially critical as Iraq begins reforming its Public Distribution System (PDS) (Reftel C). -------------- Educating on Reforms to Come -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Possibly the most important part of an economic-reform public education campaign will be to prepare the Iraqi public for the necessary changes that will come, and State has $3 million that should be put toward this program. Post believes that this program should be based on three main objectives of economic reform in Iraq: 1) Subsidy reductions; 2) Privatization; and 3) Anti-corruption. Under each of these subjects, there should be three simple messages that the Iraqis push out to their people, and these messages should be crafted both to educate the recipient on basic economics and to influence his current beliefs about the Iraqi economy. (Our current discussions with the MOF are focused on this strategy, and we will be using the US/Iraq Joint Task Force on Economic and Financial Issues as a structure to continue developing and refining it.) ¶5. (SBU) While the campaign will need to address government, business, and social leaders, the main audience of the campaign should be the average Iraqi, who currently believes that the government owes him handouts because of Iraq's oil reserves and who quite possibly benefits from some form of corruption in his daily life. Only by influencing the attitudes and opinions of average Iraqis can we truly ensure that the GOI is taking actions that will be understood and supported. If we focus our efforts on the leadership and intelligentsia of Iraq, whatever positive actions they might take run the risk of falling on the deaf ears of unwilling citizens. ¶6. (SBU) Post believes that the GOI should hire Iraqi media companies to design and implement the public education campaign. This is necessary to avoid the impression that outsiders are forcing change on a sovereign Iraq. Post, through the Public Affairs Office, can assist with the design and publication of posters, but only with the agreement and buy-in of the GOI. However, according to Embassy media sources, the best way to reach the average Iraqi audience is through television, and Iraqi media companies are in the best position to utilize this medium. -------------- Media Engagement -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Discussion with the media and government on the subjects of reform and subsidies has already begun. EconMinCouns and Commercial Counselor participated in an on-the-record press conference for the domestic and international media January 4 in Baghdad. EconMinCouns emphasized the linkages between corruption, fuel blockages, and protest actions. He also provided an outline of the budgeting impact of subsidies on security and a large variety of social services valued by the public. Later, during a discussion between Acting DCM Litt and DPM Chalabi, the latter said he would: a) Provide a brief explanatory paper for the media on subsidies; b) Release to the press a paper on the reasons for unrest contributing to the fuel crisis at Bayji; and, c) Initiate a public discussion of Iraqi consumption of refined products, focused on the need to cut imports owing to negative budget impact. (Parenthetically, Chalabi observed that consumption has dropped in Baghdad from 10 million liters to 6 million liters per day. As we see Baghdad as better supplied than the rest of the nation, we tend to agree with Chalabi that this is a price-related drop in demand.) ¶8. (SBU) Public Affairs will be holding press conferences on a regular basis with Embassy Econ and Commerce to inform the Western and Iraqi/Pan-Arab media on economic issues. EconMinCouns and Commercial Counselor participated in the first of these on December 27. These press conferences will serve as one medium through which to educate the Iraqi public on the need for subsidy reductions and anti-corruption efforts. KHALILZAD