IRAQI MINISTER DEFENDS EFFORTS ON SECURITY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004098 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI MINISTER DEFENDS EFFORTS ON SECURITY AND BUDGET EXECUTION Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) In an October 17 meeting with National Security Advisor to the Vice President John Hannah, and the Charge, Minister of Finance Bayan Jabr, defended his record at MoI, where he served as Minister from April 2005 to May 2006. Asked by Hannah whether his tenure at MoI had resulted in the ministry's takeover by militias and a dangerous acceleration of sectarian conflict, Jabr responded that the current situation is "worse now than when I was at MoI because after January we held back on security to let politics move ahead." There was a need to bring Sunnis into the political process, Jabr acknowledged, but not at the expense of security. Furthermore, he argued, the Sunnis currently in the government "do not represent the Sunnis who are fighting terrorists, for example in Anbar." ¶2. (C) Jabr, a SCIRI member, denied the suggestion that his tenure at the Interior Ministry had been riddled by sectarian abuses. He noted that the three previous ministers had included one independent and two Sunnis and argued that the ministry, its security forces, and its officered were largely built before he arrived. He said he had only added 20,000 employees to a ministry that already had 230,000 employees and that he had allowed three Sunni leaders (Tariq al-Hashimi, Adnan Dulaimi, and Khalaf al-Ayan) to appoint 1,000 new employees each. He acknowledged some sectarian imbalance, but stressed that recruitment of Sunnis had been hampered by a Sunni fatwa that barred Sunnis from entering the police force. He viewed the current police force, however, as increasingly loyal to Iraq, not a particular party, and stressed that the answer to Iraq's current security woes lay in building up a loyal national police and army rather than popular neighborhood committees (as suggested by SCIRI chairman, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim). Turning to the Baghdad Security Plan, Jabr said the plan was "not a good one" and noted that it was not working because terrorists were re-entering the cleared areas. He suggested convening a conference with MNF-I and Iraqi generals to adjust the plan. He also recommended an alternative strategy to improve security in Baghdad by expanding the Green Zone over time, and mentioned that he had raised this idea with General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad. ¶3. (C) Jabr commented on perceptions of both Iraqi and American officials in Baghdad, and compared them to inhabitants of a smoke-filled room. Because they are acclimated to the smoke, they see improvements in the air quality when one person stops smoking. But someone who walks into the room would still be overcome by the smoke. He made explicit his analogy by suggesting we should be cautious of being too impressed with modest reductions in violence, because a drop from 100 deaths per day to 90 deaths per day still means the situation is exceedingly dangerous. He stressed that we need fresh perspectives and ideas on the political and security situation. ¶4. (C) Responding to a question about budget execution, Jabr claimed that he was asking the ministers to spend money but they were not doing so at the desired rate. Jabr complained that no one in the government wanted to sign a check for fear of being accused of corruption. The result was paralysis in getting money spent to improve the government's performance and address the needs of the people. He characterized corruption and inflation as improving, saying that recent inflation figures suggested a 50 percent annual rate, down from 70 percent. Jabr expressed his satisfaction with progress on the International Compact for Iraq, pointing to promises of debt cancellation from a number of countries, including some from the Arab world. Jabr was optimistic that the Saudis would take positive steps on debt relief in the near future. Jabr complained about a lack of significant American pressure on Syria to curtail its support for the insurgency, and suggested that Iraqi officials invite former Syrian VP (and opposition figure) Khaddam to Baghdad to cause discomfort in Damascus. When pressed on the importance of ensuring Iraqi expenditures on security were adequate to leverage U.S. support, Jabr agreed to look closely at the suggestions being put forward by the U.S. side. ¶5. (U) This cable was cleared by OVP NSA John Hannah. KHALILZAD