IRAQI MP HUMAM HAMMOUDI CALLS FOR NATIONAL UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004097 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI MP HUMAM HAMMOUDI CALLS FOR NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT BY COMMITTEE Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) In an October 18 meeting with National Security Advisor to the Vice President John Hannah and the Charge, Humam Hammoudi, Council of Representatives (CoR) member and senior SCIRI politician, said that the current situation in Iraq required a national unity government, rather than one centered on Prime Minister Maliki. He expressed deep gratitude for America's efforts to bring hope and liberty to the people of Iraq, noting Iraq's accomplishments in implementing checks and balances, a free media, and democracy that cuts against the prevailing currents of the region. Pointing to the terrorist challenge presented by takfiris and remnants of the former regime, Hamoudi argued that "a national unity government where all sides reach agreement in a committee on priorities, plans, and solutions" was the best way to build consensus among Iraqi political groups. Hamoudi said that this type of unity government would be in the Prime Minister's interest: "If he hesitates on something, the others will encourage him." ¶2. (C) Hamoudi complained that the Sunni autocracies and monarchies of the Middle East sought to convince the United States of its failures in Iraq, and of the limits of democracy in the Arab world. He criticized Iraq's neighbors as the "lungs" of the insurgency, and denounced their opposition to democracy in Iraq. He also complained about rumors concerning the Baker Commission's upcoming report, and sought assurances that it does not represent U.S. policy. He described the Commission's reported views as inverting the policy in Iraq by placing stability before democracy. In reality, he said, you cannot have stability in Iraq without democracy. A non-democratic Iraqi government, in control of such abundant wealth and a powerful army, would inevitably turn its sights outward and become a threat to its neighbors and a source of instability. ¶3. (C) Reiterating USG commitment to democracy in Iraq as expressed by President Bush in his recent telephone conversation with Prime Minister Maliki and noting the necessity of targeting groups outside of the state that use violence, Hannah asked if Shi'a leaders were prepared to push Shi'a militia members to lay down their arms if there were similar commitments from Sunni groups. Hamoudi replied that Shi'a leaders would support de-arming Shi'a militias as long as the problem of Sunni extremists and terrorists was addressed at the same time by a national unity government. However, he noted, the Baathists were increasing their activity in Diyala, were increasingly using the media to call for the return of the previous regime, and enjoyed logistical and financial support from neighboring countries. With the government too weak to defend the people, Hamoudi continued, "asking people to lay down their arms while the other side is getting stronger is like giving people to the executioner." ¶4. (C) Hannah noted that there was an important political component to the violence and asked if Shi'a political leaders were prepared to make the difficult compromises necessary to achieve a political deal for national reconciliation. Hamoudi replied that they were prepared and that Iraqi politicians were trying to achieve such a deal in a "fair and just" way. He described the regions formation law as one step in that deal, noting that federalism would offer the Iraqi people an opportunity for increased dialogue over the coming years. Hamoudi said that the fact that the "entrenchment" of political blocs was shaken during the debate on the regions formation law (with some Shi'a parties supporting the law and others opposing it) was an indication that democracy was working. Asked by Hannah if Shi'a politicians were insecure in their newfound position of leadership in a democratic Iraq and acting sometimes more on the basis of their fears than their hopes, Hamoudi differentiated between those who had lived in exile under Saddam and those who remained in Iraq. The Sadrists and Fadhila, he claimed, did exhibit a degree of insecurity, whereas those who had lived outside Iraq came back "relatively confident and strong." He ascribed the difference to a cultural/psychological discomfort with their newfound freedom and political power. He drew an analogy between Iraq's exiles, which experienced life in free societies, and an anecdote in which God willed that Moses would be raised in the house of the Pharoah in order that he would be at ease with power and become a confident leader, rather than a slave. He stressed that Shi'a for the most part have not been raised as rulers; either they do not govern or they govern as "second-class citizens." He suggested that Shi'a political leaders would gain confidence and maturity over time, but that many remained driven by fear BAGHDAD 00004097 002 OF 002 at the moment. ¶5. (U) This cable was cleared by OVPNSA John Hannah. KHALILZAD