VP ADVISOR HANNAH, PRESIDENT TALABANI ASSESS THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004057

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY TU IZ
SUBJECT: VP ADVISOR HANNAH, PRESIDENT TALABANI ASSESS THE
STATE OF IRAQ

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging discussion on October
18, President Jalal Talabani and the Vice-President's
National Security Advisor John Hannah discussed the
internal political divisions both within the Sunni Arab
groups and between the Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish
factions within the new Government of Iraq. As expected,
security issues were the focus of the discussion, with
Talabani suggesting that troops should be stationed in
areas recently cleared of terrorist elements to maintain
order. Talabani noted that there were also positive
stories - for example, the Presidency Council's increasing
unity and the potential formation of a more reasonable
Sunni Arab religious group - but that Iraq still lacked the
support of neighboring Arab countries in bolstering their
fragile democracy. END SUMMARY.

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Turmoil Within the Iraqi Cabinet
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting on October 18, President
Talabani told the Vice President's National
Security Advisor John Hannah that there was
some discontent with the cabinet ministers.
For example, Minister of Interior Jawad al-
Bolani is "a good man surrounded by many
difficulties," Talabani claimed. Both the Shia
Coalition and other parties are pressuring him
to take action in their favor, and all are
complaining that he is not responding.
Talabani noted, however, that Bolani had
inherited a ministry full of internal problems.
Bolani was trying to clean up the Iraqi Police
(IP),but it is increasingly difficult to find
quality recruits for the service, Talabani
said.


3. (C) Talabani claimed that Sunni Arab
Speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR)
Mahmud al-Mashadani is also in trouble.
According to Talabani, the Sunni Tawafuq bloc,
including even his own party the National
Dialogue Council, has come to the decision to
remove Mashadani as Speaker and the National
Dialogue was prepared to make a public
declaration of their intent. (NOTE: There
have been several rumors of Mashadani's
impending removal from office during the past
few months, but the National Dialogue has
consistently told the Ambassador that they
fully support Mashadani. END NOTE.) Mashadani
is not a serious politician, Talabani
complained, and his behavior both within the
CoR and in foreign trips was unprofessional and
embarrassing.

-------------- --
Sunni Arabs Needs Internal Unity, Cooperate
with Others
-------------- --


4. (C) The debate over Mashadani reflected the
overall disunity within the Sunni Arab
political community, Talabani said. Warming up
to a common theme in recent months, Talabani
noted that the Sunni Arabs needed to learn how
to cope in a democratic government. For
example, their preferred method of
demonstrating their disagreement in debates in
the CoR was to walk out of the proceedings. In
addition, it was difficult to understand what
was the "Sunni Arab position" on any key issue,
given the ongoing chaos within the main Sunni
Arab Tawafuq bloc.


5. (C) Aside from the politicians, the Sunni
Arab religious community was also making
national reconciliation more difficult,
Talabani said, citing the leader of the "Sunni
naysayers," Harith al-Dari of the Association
of Muslim Scholars. However, there might be
hope for more cooperation with the Sunni
religious community: according to Talabani,
two groups are trying to revive the defunct
Dara al-Ifta (roughly translated as "House of
the Religious Ruling"). The Kurd who had lead

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this organization had recently died, and it was
decided to replace him with an advisory group.
The first group is led by Sheikh Jamal al-
Dabbagh, and the second by Muhsin Abd al-Hamid
(who was fired from the Iraqi Islamic Party).
The two groups are not united, Talabani
lamented, and Talabani himself pledged to find
a way to help bring them together. According
to Talabani, this group had the potential to be
the "Marja'iyah of the Sunni Arabs," and both
groups have told him they are committed to
fighting sectarianism and terrorism. Talabani
stated that he was financially assisting this
group, in particular by finding them housing in
Baghdad. The Dara al-Ifta is currently based
in Tikrit, and is seeking to move to the
relative safety of Baghdad.

--------------
Presidency Council Pulling Together
--------------


6. (C) On a more positive note, Talabani
stated that the Presidency Council was working
very well together. There was full agreement
between himself, Shia Vice President Adil Abd
al-Mahdi, and Sunni Arab Vice President Tarik
al-Hashimi on key issues during the most recent
Presidency Council meeting last week: the need
to secure Baghdad, end sectarianism and the
ensuring violence, etc. Talabani reported that
he had tasked Abd al-Mahdi and al-Hashimi to
draft two position papers each, one on how to
improve Shia-Sunni cooperation, and one on how
to secure Baghdad.


7. (C) On a related note, Talabani also
mentioned his desire to form a "National
Front," which would be composed of moderates
from the Shia Coalition (specifically, SCIRI),
Tawafuq (Iraqi Islamic Party),and the Kurds.
This National Front would form a strong front
in the CoR and the Cabinet to work toward
ending the sectarian conflict and providing
much-needed leadership in Iraq. (NOTE:
Talabani has been pushing for the creation of
this moderate National Front ever since his
preferred candidate for the Prime Ministry,
SCIRI's Abd al-Mahdi, lost to Nuri al-Maliki of
the Dawa Party. END NOTE.)

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But Security Still a Problem...
--------------


8. (C) Despite the improving dialogue in the
Presidency Council, and the recent agreement
within the Policy Committee on National
Security (PCNS) by both Shia and Sunni Arab
politicians to Prime Minister Maliki's 4-Point
security plan, Talabani noted that the overall
security situation in Iraq is still dire.
Talabani suggested that military forces needed
to remain to secure areas that have recently
been cleared of terrorist elements, otherwise
the terrorists and insurgents would just return
after the Coalition Forces have moved on. As
for Baghdad's security, Talabani suggested a
mixed force of Shia, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds to
maintain order in Baghdad. This group would
have one uniform, one type of weaponry, one
type of vehicle, and one commander - a unified
look and a unified purpose - to secure the
city. This unit would select from within
itself a contingent to clear out different
parts of the city - a majority Shia unit to
clear Sadr City, for example.


9. (C) According to Talabani, there are two
main problems: Terrorists and militias, and a
lack of a unified Iraqi identity. The first
issue is primarily the problem with the Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM). JAM needs to be punished,
Talabani stated, and the PCNS had been
pressuring Maliki to do something about the
Sadrist-affiliated militia. Maliki claimed
that he wanted to give the JAM until the end of
Ramadan to change their ways, and the PCNS had
grudgingly agreed. In addition to the JAM, the

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multitude of private militias - ministry
protection units, private bodyguard groups, etc
- is contributing to the chaos in Baghdad,
Talabani complained. There is no way of
maintaining control over so many different
organizations, Talabani said, and no
centralized method of ensuring quality,
training, or accountability for these extra-
governmental groups.


10. (C) The second issue is the lack of an
"Iraqi identity," Talabani said. Right now,
there was no sense of a national community -
people defined themselves in terms of their
sectarian, ethnic, or tribal identities.
Talabani hoped that as sectarian violence
declined and the political groups could work
more effectively together, the people of Iraq
would begin to define for themselves what it
meant to be an "Iraqi."

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As Are the Neighbors
--------------


11. (C) Talabani complained that the
neighboring Arab countries were doing little to
assist Iraq in quelling sectarian divisions.
The Saudis, for example, are encouraging the
negative attitudes of Sunni Arabs like Harith
al-Dari and others who openly speak of killing
Americans, he said. Syria continues to support
elements of the former Baathist regime, and
Iran continues to interfere in the internal
affairs of Iraq through training militia
elements and providing materials for insurgency
activities. Talabani noted that he had seen
Syria's foreign minister in New York, and told
him that rapprochement should begin by the
foreign minister visiting Baghdad and
committing Syria to end its support for
terrorists attacking Iraq and pledging its
support for the new government.

--------------
UNSCR Extension, PKK, and Minority Rights
--------------


12. (C) Talabani also discussed with Hannah
several current issues during the meeting:

-- UNSCR Extension: While Talabani understood
the need to extend the UNSCR as soon as
possible, he noted that Maliki needed to have
some control as well. Talabani argued that
Maliki should have the authority to move units
of his Iraqi Army, and the right to more
information-sharing from the Coalition Forces.

-- PKK: Talabani stated flatly that the
Government of Iraq had become involved in the
PKK issue as a favor to the head of the Turkish
National Intelligence Office (TNIO). However,
Talabani believed it was a reasonable demand
that the Government of Turkey try to work with
the legitimate Kurdish political party in
Ankara as well as its trilateral efforts.
Talabani reminded Hannah that many groups had
tried to eliminate the PKK over the past 25
years - including both the Kurdish parties -
without success.

-- Minority Rights: Hannah raised the issue of a separate
administrative region for Assyrian Christians and other
ethnic or religious minorities in Iraq. Talabani stated
that, while he did not know much about the subject, he was
personally in favor of supporting the special
administrative areas or safehavens for minority groups in
the Kurdistan region. The situation of the Assyrian
Christians in places such as Ninewa, for example, was a
separate issue since the Shia and Sunni Arabs were not yet
ready to discuss these issues.
KHALILZAD