AMBASSADOR AND DCM MEET WITH IRAQI NATIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004054 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS JO SA AEMR IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DCM MEET WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador and DCM held a wide-ranging discussion with Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie immediately following the Ambassador's October 27 meeting with PM Maliki: - Rubaie portrayed the PM as under pressure, worried about failure, and without adequate staff to advise him and implement his decisions; - Rubaie said the PM hopes to bring Moqtada al-Sadr into the political process; the Ambassador urged that the PM also needs to explain his plan for confronting militias; - The Ambassador urged the GOI to promptly come to agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on hydrocarbons, and he and Rubaie discussed possible solutions to the Iraqi flag issue; - The Ambassador urged Rubaie to move to get internal GOI agreement on UNSCR rollover; - The Ambassador and DCM urged Rubaie to raise Site 4 issues with the PM; - Rubaie welcomed efforts to engage Iraq's neighbors to help quell Sunni violence; - Rubaie requested a U.S. political advisor on security and counter-terrorism and assistance with transportation to the International Compact conference in Kuwait. End Summary. Rubaie on PM Maliki -------------- ¶2. (S) Rubaie was upbeat about the Ambassador's just-completed meeting with PM Maliki. According to Rubaie, the PM is under "tremendous pressure" and feels frustrated; he has "responsibility without authority." In response to a question by the Ambassador, Rubaie said the PM has few people he feels he can turn to for sound policy options and advice. The PM thinks in terms of people, not institutions, and is slow to trust new people. He makes good decisions, Rubaie continued, but has no one to follow up and implement them. ¶3. (S) In a discussion with the PM Rubaie said he had just before the PM's meeting with the Ambassador, Rubaie had found the PM preoccupied with the prospect of failure for which he would be blamed. Rubaie urged him to think instead of what is needed for success, including focusing on strategic partnership with the US. ¶4. (S) Rubaie said the PM is not intimidated by Moqtada al-Sadr, nor does he feel politically dependent on him. The PM hopes Sadr can be "tamed" and brought into the political process. The DCM told Rubaie that the PM needs to explain his plan for handling militias; the Ambassador noted U.S. military frustration on this point. Kurds, Oil and the Iraqi Flag -------------- ¶5. (S) The Ambassador noted that during his recent talks with KRG President Barzani, Barzani had agreed not only that the KRG would share hydrocarbon revenues with the rest of Iraq, but also that it might share contracting authority for fields in the KRG. This represents significant progress, the Ambassador noted, and the GOI and KRG should seek to settle the issue promptly. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador noted he had also discussed the Iraqi flag issue with Barzani and asked Rubaie whether the GOI had agreed on the issue with Barzani. Rubaie said there had been agreement, but "under duress." The present flag is popular with non-Kurdish Iraqis and changing it will be difficult. The Ambassador and Rubaie agreed that perhaps some of the present's flag's content could be retained in a new flag, but with changed meaning. Engaging Iraq's Neighbors -------------- ¶7. (S) The Ambassador briefed Rubaie on efforts to engage Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE with Iraq's Sunnis to help quell Sunni violence, including AQI. Rubaie welcomed the initiative, agreeing to identify Iraqi Sunnis with whom such engagement would be productive and ways to measure whether the efforts were being effective. The Ambassador suggested that another visit by PM Maliki to Saudi Arabia would be helpful. ¶8. (S) Rubaie asked about U.S. efforts to reach out to Sunni insurgents. The Ambassador noted engagement, but only with those who accept the legitimacy of PM Maliki's government. Rubaie wondered whether GOI engagement would be productive. BAGHDAD 00004054 002 OF 002 UNSCR -------------- ¶9. (S) The Ambassador urged Rubaie to come to agreement with FM Zebari on the GOI approach to UNSCR rollover. The best option would be GOI and USG letters stating that both governments had reached agreement on renewal and formally request renewal. The main focus should be to not re-open the UNSCR. Rubaie asked about the possibility of one joint letter that incorporates a bilateral agreement. Rubaie said renewal must include the issue of authority to detain, because PM Maliki is concerned about detentions which he says he should know about, and give approval for, in advance. Site 4 -------------- ¶10. (S) The Ambassador asked for an update on the Site 4 case, noting that the Interior Minister had not announced the measures the USG had hoped for in his October 12 press conference. MG Mahdi had not been arrested; he had merely been transferred to another MOI position. The DCM noted that under Iraqi law, ministers must approve requests to detain officials in their ministries, but Interior Minister Bolani is taking too long. Rubaie promised to raise the issue with the PM. Two Requests for U.S. Assistance -------------- ¶11. (S) Rubaie requested the Ambassador's assistance in finding him an Arabic-speaking U.S. advisor on political matters, including security and counter-terrorism, similar to his current U.S. military advisor, who Rubaie said had helped him a great deal. The Ambassador agreed to look into the possibility. ¶12. (S) Rubaie also requested U.S. assistance in transporting him to the upcoming International Compact meeting in Kuwait. Reconciliation and National Security Ministers -------------- - ¶13. (S) The Ambassador asked Rubaie about the Ministers of State for Reconciliation and National Security, noting that National Security Minister Wa'ili had asked for USG assistance. Rubaie said National Reconciliation Minister Al-Hakim's "heart is not really in it." National Security Minister Wa'ili is influenced by Iranian intelligence services and beset by a recent corruption allegation that has upset the PM. KHALILZAD