IRAQI PM SEEKS GREATER AUTHORITY BUT QUESTIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004029 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI PM SEEKS GREATER AUTHORITY BUT QUESTIONS TROOP READINESS Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki told the Ambassador that he wanted the power to command the movements of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),arguing that he could not be asked to bear responsibility for security in Iraq without the having the appropriate authority. Saying he was ready to use the ISF to quell violence, Maliki previewed a statement he intended to issue later in the evening in which he would order ISF to confront anyone carrying weapons illegally. At the same time, however, Maliki confided to the Ambassador his doubts in the effectiveness of the ISF, saying that he did not have the necessary numbers of well-trained troops and that the army, and especially the police, was "infiltrated" with militia members and terrorists. The Ambassador and Maliki also briefly discussed the situation of the Regional Embassy Office (REO) in Basrah: Maliki said emphatically that closure of the REO would send the wrong message to terrorists, told the Ambassador that coalition forces should strike the sites where the indirect fire (IDF) originated, and promised to discuss the issue of REO Basrah security in more detail with his security team. END SUMMARY. -------------- PM Ready to Use ISF, Seeks Authority... -------------- ¶2. (S) In a meeting on October 23, Prime Minister Maliki told the Ambassador that he "had reached a new stage" and was ready to take more responsibility for internal security using the ISF. Maliki noted that, despite being commander in chief of the ISF, he did not have the ability to move forces. "Those who have the responsibility must have the authority," he argued, claiming that it was unfair to put partial blame on the Iraqi government for recent security problems while MNF-I had primary authority in the security realm. Taking Amarah as an example, Maliki argued that he needed to have the authority to order the Minister of Defense to move military units, such as elements from the 10th division in Basrah to Amarah quickly. The Ambassador told Maliki he would discuss the possibility of speeding up the timetable for transfer of authority with MNF-I. ¶3. (C) Saying that "excuses are over" and that he had reached a stage he had been building toward through the reconciliation process and diplomacy, Maliki informed the Ambassador that he planned to release a strong statement later the same evening. The text, he said, would clearly state that armed groups outside the authority of the state were endangering the government of national unity and that he had authorized the ISF to use force against anyone carrying weapons illegitimately. ¶4. (S) Maliki claimed that Shi'a leaders accepted that the government had to use force against armed groups. Even Badr leader Hadi al-Amri, he observed, "told me even today that the ISF should use force against any Badr member defying the state." Turning to the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),Maliki said that Muqtada al-Sadr knew that the JAM had been infiltrated by "criminal elements" and was trying to eliminate those elements. The problem, Maliki continued, lay with Sunni leaders, who thought that any decision to move forces for security reasons was taken for political reasons. Maliki gave the example of Mohammed al-Deini, a Sunni MP from Diyala, who "created a tumult" in the Council of Representatives after a recent movement of security forces in Diyala. Maliki expressed frustration at MNF-I's performance in Diyala and characterized the situation there as "almost out of control." The Ambassador noted that MNF-I had some concern that ISF movements in Diyala were causing Sunni citizens to leave; Maliki assured the Ambassador that a MoD review of the performance of the current ISF commander in Diyala had been positive. -------------- ...But Has Doubts about ISF Capabilities -------------- ¶5. (S) Maliki then turned to the capabilities of the ISF, saying that "I do not have enough forces and those I have are weak." He expressed frustration that a committee on MoI reform "had not presented anything" on how to cleanse the ISF of militias and terrorists. "I am afraid to clash with militias and tribes," he continued, "because I am afraid the army or police might commit treason." Maliki noted that the situation in Amarah was complicated by the fact that many policemen there were allied with Badr and indeed had stolen BAGHDAD 00004029 002 OF 002 rifles from the police stock for Badr use. He also lamented the quality of officers brought into the armed forces from militias under CPA Order 91, saying that some of them could not read or write. Finally, Maliki observed, ISF training was progressing too slowly and he was considering placing new recruits directly into army units for on-the-job training. Maliki confirmed to the Ambassador that he was satisfied with the numerical goals for building the Iraqi forces as discussed during his trip to Washington, but that he wanted the training to proceed more quickly. -------------- REO Basrah: PM Against a Pull-Out -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador raised the security situation at REO Basrah, describing the REO's scope and purpose and the danger posed by nightly indirect fire (IDF). Noting that closure of the REO was one option on the table, the Ambassador asked Maliki for his opinion. Characterizing the decision as "critical," Maliki said emphatically that closure would send the wrong message to terrorists. "They would be emboldened, and we will have the same issue elsewhere," he argued. (NOTE: Maliki drew a distinction between the British troops and the U.S. REO: withdrawal of British troops, he said, might not be as harmful because of the problems between them and Basrah residents. END NOTE.) Maliki asked where the IDF was coming from, saying that "as a beginning, we need to strike the places the rockets are coming from." Noting that he needed more time to study the REO's security problems, Maliki promised to convene his security team to discuss the issue and determine a solution. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (S) Making the argument that taking responsibility requires authority, top Shi'a leaders have recently consistently asked for greater authority for the Iraqi government in the security realm and/or for greater clarity on the respective authorities of MNF-I and the Iraqi government. They express frustration with MNF-I responses to major security problems as in Balad or Diyala and say they want to exert more control. Curiously, Maliki did not even acknowledge the inherent tension between his desire for more authority and his doubts about the capabilities of the ISF. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD