IRAQI MP GIVES SHI'A NARRATIVE OF DIYALA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003971 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 TAGS: IZ PGOV PINS PREL SUBJECT: IRAQI MP GIVES SHI'A NARRATIVE OF DIYALA'S WORSENING SECURITY Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: According to Diyala native and Council of Representatives (CoR) member Taha Der'a al-Saadi (Shi'a coalition independent),nascent cross-sectarian security cooperation in Iraq's Diyala governorate has ended and Sunnis, with the help of local offcials, are actively seeking to expel Shia from the governate. The narrative is consistent with accounts of some Shia leaders, but at odds with Sunni and MNF-I accounts. End Summary. Nascent Cross-Sectarian Cooperation Ends -------------- ¶2. (C) Der'a told PolOff on October 18 that nascent cross-sectarian cooperation at the national level on security issues in Diyala had ended with Tawafuq's withdrawal after MNF-I's operation "Fast Response" in Diyala in late September. Before this operation, Der'a said, a group of leaders from the Shi'a coalition (Der'a himself; Hadi al-Tamimi; Jalal al-Din al-Saghir; Hadi al-Amri),Sunni Tawafuq bloc (Ayad Samari'e; Amer al-Azawi; Salim al-Jabbouri),and the Kurdish alliance (Fu'ad Ma'sum, Yousef Ahmed, and Arif Taifour) had met at SCIRI headquarters to discuss Diyala. (NOTE: This meeting was held September 21.) The group agreed to form a committee (including all CoR members from Diyala plus Ma'sum, al-Saghir, and Samari'e) to follow the situation and coordinate with central and provincial government institutions, Der'a said, but then Tawafuq withdrew from the process claiming that MNF-I was targeting Sunnis after the late-September operation. Shia Allege Sunnis Seek Strategic "Belt" -------------- ¶3. (C) Der'a then offered a comprehensive analysis of Diyala's security woes. Sunni extremists in the Ba'th party network and affiliated with al-Qaida, he claimed, are seeking to expel Shi'a from Diyala to gain demographic dominance in an area they considered strategic because it was on Baghdad's northeast border and, if Sunni-dominated, would create a Sunni-dominated belt between Syria and Baghdad. These Sunni extremists initially targeted leaders of the Shi'a community, Der'a continued, including political party leaders, members of the governing councils, and professors. ¶4. (C) More recently, he claimed, they have expanded their targets to include all Shi'a government officials, Shi'a �0A;professionals who are considering taking government jobs, and finally ordinary citizens. Der'a said that 7,000 Shi'a families had left Diyala because of the violence. He also claimed that 10 Shi'a members of previous governing councils had been killed (as well as two members of the current council) and that 23 Shi'a professors had left the University of Diyala after assassination attempts and the murders of five of their colleagues. Allegations that Officials Help Sunni Extremists -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Der'a said that a number of government officials in Diyala provided information, money, and other forms of support to the Sunni extremists. In particular, he singled out the deputy governor and "General Tahseen", who was until recently or still is the director of an office that coordinates between military and police units. Der'a argued that many of the police in Diyala were sympathetic to the Sunni extremists, pointing to the lack of response by the police to a number of terrorist incidents. The army, he said, was better "but too few." ¶6. (C) Finally, Der'a alleged that many Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) officials in Diyala are connected with the terrorists; he mentioned Adnan al-Mahdani, a governing council member affiliated with the University of Diyala, and "Abu Mujahid" as examples. Abu Mujahid, Der'a continued, headed a branch of the IIP that gives money and legal advice to families of detained terrorists and connives with local officials to get them released where possible. Asked if any Shi'a groups or militias were targeting Sunnis in Diyala, Der'a acknowledged that, with the escalation of terrorist acts by Sunni extremists over the past three to four months, the Shi'a were starting to lose faith in the coalition and Iraqi security forces (ISF) and were turning to militias to protect them. ¶7. (C) Der'a advocated sending another division of Iraqi army troops to Diyala. He also suggested forming a special court to hear terrorism cases but said it would be necessary BAGHDAD 00003971 002 OF 002 to locate the court on a military base and move the judges' families to another province. ¶8. (C) Bio note and comment: Der'a hails from the town of Khalis in Diyala province. Until the fall of Saddam, he was an economics teacher at a secondary school in Diyala. After Saddam fell Der'a became active in civil society, helping to build an organization called "mu'assasat nur" and then entering politics. His analysis of the security situation in Diyala was comprehensive, delivered with a sense of urgency, not hyperbolic but highly partisan. It echoes that of Shi'a ISF leaders Major General Hulail Shakir of the army and Chief Ghassan B,awa of the police, both of whom have been linked to death squads (septel),and is at odds with the accounts of leading Sunnis and with observations made by MNF-I on the ground. End bio note and comment. KHALILZAD