GOI AND KRG TO STUDY UNHCR MAKHMOUR CLEAN-UP PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003936 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV IZ TU SUBJECT: GOI AND KRG TO STUDY UNHCR MAKHMOUR CLEAN-UP PLAN REF: BAGHDAD 3807 Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Government of Iraq and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) representatives agreed only to study the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) plan to expel the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) from the Makhmour refugee camp in order to restore its civilian character and allow UNHCR to register the refugees and survey their intentions. The GOI and KRG did not address the concrete steps proposed in the plan, and complained that the Turkish government has not committed to facilitate the return of the refugees. The GOI and the KRG said they will provide UNHCR comments on the plan the first week of November. In the meantime, they asked that UNHCR press Turkey on repatriation. The KRG representative stated that refugees not wishing to return to Turkey should be resettled in third countries. End Summary. The UNHCR's Analysis -------------- ¶2. (C) UNHCR's Representative for Iraq operations Janvier de Riedmatten and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Dr. Mohammad Hamoud co-hosted the meeting, which took place at the United Nations Mission-Iraq (UNAMI) office in Baghdad on October 17. Also present were representatives from the ministries of Displacement and Migration (MODM),Interior (MOI) and Defense (MOD). Minister Dilshad Miran, head of the Kurdistan Region Representation in Baghdad, represented the KRG. RefCoord and MNF-I Liaison officer attended as observers. ¶3. (C) De Riedmatten opened the meeting recalling the letter that High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres had written to President Talabani in June of 2006 informing him about UNHCR's concerns that PKK fighters were using the Makhmour camp to rest, obtain medical treatment, and recruit new members. The letter stressed the importance of restoring the camp's civilian character, referenced the draft Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR and the governments of Turkey and Iraq for the voluntary repatriation of the refugees to Turkey, and looked forward to convene a meeting to discuss the issue further. (Note: De Riedmatten later shared a copy of the letter with RefCoord, who has submitted it to PRM in Washington). De Riedmatten recalled that he visited the Makhmour camp in August, and warned the camp's refugee committee (assumed to include PKK members) about the risks of having PKK members among them. He explained to the camp committee that UNHCR assistance would need to stop, and that the camp could come under attack from Turkey. For the sake of the refugees, some of whom are the relatives of PKK fighters, the PKK should leave. (Note: UNHCR projects in Makhmour are small and are not/not funded by USG contributions. The village-like camp is well-organized and the refugees, who have attained a certain degree of self-sufficiency, do not depend on UNHCR's assistance to survive. End note). ¶4. (C) De Riedmatten explained that restoring the humanitarian character of the camp was also required for UNHCR to register the refugees and to survey their intentions. The survey should provide the refugees with options regarding their voluntary return or possible local integration. In this sense, it was important to make progress on the Tripartite Agreement, and to consider the possibility of local integration for those not wishing to return. Local integration, De Riedmatten noted, could be achieved by dispersing remaining refugees along the north in order to avoid a recurrence of the problems currently affecting Makhmour. The UNHCR representative also stressed the importance of maintaining the camp secured once the PKK has been expelled. How to Distinguish PKK from Refugees? -------------- ¶5. (C) MFA U/S Hamoud agreed on the need to move forward with the Tripartite Agreement, and urged UNHCR to convene the three parties to discuss it. Hamoud again lamented what he characterized as Turkish government reluctance to discuss the repatriation of the refugees (reftel),but agreed to distinguish (as far as meetings are concerned) between the issue of restoring the camp's civilian character and progress on the Tripartite. For Hamoud, the challenge in expelling the PKK is in distinguishing its members from the rest of the 11,000 Turkish Kurd refugees at the camp. For cultural and linguistic reasons, he said, the KRG would need to be involved in sorting out the refugees. (Note: Makhmour is in Ninewa province, which is not part of the Kurdish region. However, the KRG exerts some administrative oversight of areas outside the KRG. End note) ¶6. (C) KRG Minister Dilshad Miran echoed Hamoud's concern, particularly with respect to identifying PKK within the refugee population. He claimed that most of the refugees were involved in politics, which is why they fled from Turkey. For the Government of Turkey, Miran added, everybody in this category is PKK. He stated that the KRG has only limited influence with the PKK, which has its own military and political views. The KRG is concerned about the civilians in the camp, and thought of two possible solution to their situation: voluntary repatriation to Turkey (the preferred solution) or third country resettlement. Miran stated that local integration (if at all possible) was a sensitive issue that would require careful discussion. The KRG stood ready to cooperate with UNHCR and the GOI, and would use whatever influence it had on the civilians in the camp to do the same. Ultimately, however, Miran said that it would need to be Iraqi Armed Forces, with MNF-I assistance, the ones to restore the camp's civilian character. ¶7. (C) Addressing Miran's concerns, De Riedmatten stated that the local authorities in the city of Makhmour (separate from the camp itself) could assist identifying PKK members. The Mayor had told UNHCR that there were only 300 to 350 PKK fighters in the camp. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would be the ones expelling the PKK, but these forces should be comprised of Kurdish troops. De Riedmatten recalled that he had spoken with officers from one of the ISF battalions in the area, who stated that his troops could accomplish some of the tasks that would be needed in securing the camp, such as searching for weapons and establishing checkpoints. MNF-I could advise ISF on how to conduct these operations. Other actions that could/should be undertaken are closing down two buildings which the GOT believe are being used as PKK offices, and shutting down a PKK radio-transmitter. The mere presence of ISF forces, De Riedmatten thought, could convince the PKK fighters to leave. Taking these actions would proof the GOI's determination to restore the camp's civilian character. The use of force would only be necessary if the PKK fighters refuse to leave. Once UNHCR is convinced that the camp is free of PKK, it could produce a list of refugees that the police or ISF could use to prevent it from returning to the camp. The registration exercise could be completed in just one week. Next steps -------------- ¶8. (C) The meeting did not discuss, as UNHCR and we would have liked, the concrete steps that need to be taken on the ground to rid the camp of PKK. These steps have been laid out in a document produced by UNHCR entitled "Proposed Plan of Operation for Restoring the Humanitarian Nature of Makhmour Camp", which has been shared with the GOI and was again distributed during the meeting (Note: The document has been sent to PRM/ANE. End note). UNHCR's agenda for the meeting called on the government of Iraq and the KRG to agree on these steps and adopt a timetable for their implementation. Ministry of Defense representative Brigadier General Mohammed Ajmi Kanaan stated that if the Turkish Government was ready to accept the repatriation of the refugees, the Ministry of Defense was ready to coordinate with UNHCR, the KRG and MNF-I the required operations and to provide the appropriate forces. (Note: RefCoord underscored that ISF, not MNF-I, would need to be the one carrying out military operations. ISF could ask MNF-I for advice, if needed.) The Ministry of Interior Representative, Major General Yasseen Al-Yassiri, stated that the inter-ministerial permanent committee on refugees (which he chairs) had not studied this issue yet. He said that he would inform his ministry on the discussions. Ministry of Displacement and Migration representatives advocated for a comprehensive solution that would address the plight of all Turkish Kurds in Iraq, not just those in Makhmour. ¶9. (C) The GOI ministries and the KRG agreed to study UNHCR's proposed plan of operation for Makhmour, and to share their views on it by the first week of November. After that, MOFA suggested, the group could meet again to discuss the concrete, practical actions that need to be taken on the field. In the meantime, MOFA's Dr. Hamoud hoped that UNHCR would convene a separate meeting between the GOI, the GOT and UNHCR to discuss the Tripartite Agreement. (Note: Dr. Hamoud have said that, overall, the GOI "has no problem" with the draft Tripartite Agreement, but that his legal department might have some minor comments. The GOI has not provided these comments to UNHCR yet. End note). Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) UNHCR and Embassy Baghdad have succeeded in convincing the GOI and the KRG that addressing the restoration of Makhmour's civilian character can take place in parallel to discussions on the draft Tripartite Agreement. However, if the GOI continues to think that the GOT is not ready to make commitments on repatriation, it will again lose interest in spending effort and resources to expel the PKK from the camp. While the GOI has not formally responded to the High Commissioner (HC) for Refugees' June 1 letter to President Talabani, we agree with UNHCR's representative for Iraq operations that a formal response is not required to move forward (Note: in his letter, the HC does not asks President Talabani to respond, but rather "looks forward to our fruitful collaboration on this important issue". End note). The willingness of the GOI and KRG to meet with UNHCR to broadly discuss the restoration of Makhmour's civilian character is in itself a positive, if modest, development. We will continue to encourage the GOI to provide comments to the Tripartite and to UNHCR's proposed plan for Makhmour. SPECKHARD